

**THE
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REVIEW**

No. 585.

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Problem Child?

YOU'D never think Joan had been a problem child if you saw her today. She's happy in her job and doing very well at it too. Yet not so long ago her waywardness was making her mother so sick with anxiety that her father was compelled to get his discharge from the Army. They turned to us for help, and we took Joan into one of our homes. And now . . . well, we'd like you to meet her and judge for yourself.

We have helped in many such cases; there are so many more that need our help. £10 would keep a girl like Joan for a month in one of our Girls' Training Homes. More funds, and more homes, are badly needed. We already have the plans; will you help us—by donation or legacy—to find the money? Please send a gift to General Albert Orsborn, C.B.E.,

101, QUEEN VICTORIA ST., LONDON, E.C.4.

WHERE THERE'S NEED . . .

The Salvation Army

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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW

No. 585.—JULY 1950

Art. 1.—THE COURSE OF CONSERVATIVE POLITICS.

THE ABANDONMENT OF SOCIALISM

THE nation is held in suspense while the Labour Party makes up its mind whether to continue the pursuit of Socialism or to call off the war altogether. The race is on and the question is, who is to educate whom first? Can the political zealots convince the masses that Socialism has been insufficiently tried out, and that further efforts will bring nearer the millennium? Or will they themselves be converted into something more like Radical Liberalism by the studied insolence which the electors exhibited towards Socialism in February of this year? Those semi-Marxists who favour continuing the pursuit desire it with their whole moral being and fibre. They have risen from their schooldays in the profession of political arms. Their escutcheons bear the insignia of the martyrs. They wage war with the full armoury of ends and means: with the Bible of the classless society in the one hand and the sword of nationalisation in the other. They take the February vote as evidence of political immaturity and are prepared to launch forward in a new crusade of education at the earliest opportunity. The hated recollections of their childhood have established a neurosis incurable by proof that the conditions which produced it have been swept away. They dare not halt: for to go back upon a theory of society which has inspired their formative years would involve their spiritual destruction. These people are more than politicians. They are philosophers in action. The generality of politicians conceive it to be their duty to ride out the storm and bring the ship of State safely into the nearest harbour. Not so the doctrinaires. To them the ship of State is an instrument with which to quell the storm; and if, when the sea is again placid and calm, no trace of their vessel or even of their bodies can be found,

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their spirits would still avow that duty had been faithfully discharged.

The bulk of the Parliamentary Labour Party would, I should guess, tacitly acquiesce in the ending of the campaign for Socialism. If so they are wise in their decision, because the electorate has set its face against it and for three reasons. The first lies in the realm of foreign policy. The British people have rightly decided to have no ideological connection with their greatest potential enemy. So long as Russia remains that enemy, so long will *any* form of government she professes be impossible of emulation here. In answer to the Conservative charge that Communism and Socialism are interlocked Mr Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps have been trumpeting their belief in Social Democracy as the right and natural bulwark against Communism, and drawing their party's policy off much dangerous ground, such as direction of labour and the full-scale implementation of physical controls. Thus the fear of Russian Communism is forcing English Socialism into unexpected channels of freedom.

The second major factor in this process is the pressure of inescapable facts about Britain's trading position. For all that certain Colonies are being energetically developed, Britain's economy is by no means self-sufficient. We must hope it never will become so, because self-sufficiency is the planner's paradise. From the moment that the State can take legal control of all producers, consumers, and middlemen and the whole cycle of trade and exchange passes into the hands of scientific administration, the death knell to individual freedom will sound. But while so little as one quarter of our customers and suppliers are foreigners whose consent to our laws and social order cannot be enforced, we retain a life-line to the free society. The foreigners are persuadable only in terms of new fashion, high quality, and low price, and that means change, adaptability, and improvement in the industrial structure at home, the very opposite of the planner's dreams. The leaders of Socialism are being forced to realise that a planned pattern of production and consequently absolute security for the workers cannot be guaranteed if Britain is to remain an effective competitive unit in world trade. Devaluation last autumn showed that the defensive outworks of British Socialism were breached by world capitalism. This year

the struggle to bring Britain back into the comity of free trading nations will continue in Government Offices and factories up and down the land. The Labour Party is now visited on its very doorstep by the power and thrust of international commerce. The weak defences of planned Socialism have broken down.

The third main reason for the abandonment of Socialism is the growing awareness of the loss of personal liberty which Socialism entails. Taxation, the high cost of living, and dwindling personal savings are making severe inroads into financial freedom. The financial avenues to success in business are stopped by surtax and by penal—sometimes retrospective—legislation. Business enterprises are held back by restrictive licensing while Government departments and local authorities, whose officials grow ever more intolerant, continue their expenditure unabated. Free travel is thwarted by passport and exchange-control regulations and the use of property by fantastic development charges. Some or all of these things bear hardly on every individual, high or low, and cause him to question whether the close-ordered, collective society which is being prepared for him satisfies his most profound instincts as a Christian democrat. For a thousand years our forebears have fought to free themselves from primitive man-made restraint and autocratic rule, and have created for the individual ever-widening areas of space and liberty. By the second decade of this century—a more religious period than now—millions found ethical support from their natural patriotism in the knowledge that the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity were widely practised and applied no less by the people than by their leaders. But the siege economy of two wars and the massive power of a Socialist-headed bureaucracy have clamped an iron mask over the fair visage of our developing freedom, making personal faith a naïvety, personal hope an exercise of will-power, and personal charity an economic impossibility if not a vice. 'If the trumpet give an uncertain sound who shall prepare himself to the battle' and when, for example, Government repudiates its promises and turns war-time expedients into permanent policy, or when State trading and diplomacy practise the mean deceptions of small men of business, who will glory in the panoply of the nation's moral strength or praise the Christian endowment of its titular heads? I do

not doubt at all that reflections such as these were present in the minds of many who changed their political allegiance at the February polls. The vote, if docile and gentlemanly, was definite. The British people's most profound instinct for honourable dealing and spiritual and material freedom was massively reaffirmed. Socialism is beginning to be seen for what it is, a supremely reactionary movement forcing society back into past eras of political barbarism.

THE CONSERVATIVE OPPORTUNITY

In one of the first articles I wrote for this series I said that the progress of nations was an affair of seasons and that the high summer of flowering Socialism would inevitably be followed by an autumn of stillness and restraint. That day has now arrived. The era of collectivist planning, to which the war gave powerful impetus, is drawing rapidly to a close. The nation is determined on Peace and all that peace brings with it in the way of consulting the arts and graces of a freer life through the development of individual liberty. If the Conservative Party can persuade the people that its mood is identical with theirs, it will be entrusted with power for at least the next half-decade.

It should not be difficult to prove to the country that Socialism and war are closely related. Socialism has not hesitated to use as an instrument of its own policy the powerful Civil Service which was set up in the war to fight an external enemy. With the cessation of hostilities this instrument has been turned inwards on the nation and employed to bludgeon into equalitarian conformity the very persons and groups who best express the idea of individual liberty and the variegated life. The quality of life in small communities like schools, universities, religious foundations, and villages with their manor-houses is collapsing. The creators of knowledge and beauty are being forced to exercise their art within the narrowest compass. Architects, musicians and artists, professors, priests, and local leaders are so deprived of financial resources and service that they have no freedom to expand their tastes and influence. No large buildings except concrete rabbit warrens for civil servants are allowed to be constructed. There is no landscape gardening and, except for the

utilitarian work of the Forestry Commission, no attempt is made to restore and beautify the scarred wastes of the country. The great universities are becoming forcing-houses for administrators and losing their spaciousness and serenity. It is idle for the Socialists to claim that much more public money than formerly is spent on the arts, the sciences, and on education. The truth is that the proportion of the total national effort devoted to these things is far less than it was half a century ago. The quantity of public money spent in any one direction is by no means the same as the aggregate of private wealth that would have been so spent. Socialists might with as much justice claim credit for the fact that the sluices of the Tummel-Garry scheme represent the greatest concentration of water-power that Scotland has ever seen. But meanwhile the streams and rivers are dried up, the beauty of the glens destroyed, and the poetry of Burns and Scott loses half its meaning. By far the greatest proportion of five years of Socialist expenditure has been devoted to the production and distribution of strictly material and ephemeral things.

This, then, is the evidence of a continuing state of siege economy. The siege economy has the character if not the pace of war. It is the Government bent upon the downward path of exploiting to the full all the resources of production in egalitarian satisfaction of consumer needs. It has no attribute of selection, refinement, or moral uplift. It is wholly destructive of the quiet pride that lies behind patriotic endeavour. It exemplifies a decadent state of the nation. It is the second law of thermodynamics written into the English polity.

* * * * *

In one of his most famous passages Walter Bagehot draws the distinction between the two parts of our constitution—that which excites and preserves the reverence of the population, which he calls the ‘dignified’ part, and that which in fact works and rules, the ‘efficient’ part. The first *gains* authority by winning the loyalty, confidence, and homage of mankind: the second *uses* that authority in the work of government. The one raises the army; the other fights the battle.

It is characteristic of an approach to the perverse forms of government, like tyranny, oligarchy, and mass-

democracy, when the dignified part of the constitution is allowed to fall into desuetude, and when the army of the people is raised for the battle of life not by self inspiration and voluntary cooperation, but by legislation and compulsion. The really appalling act that the Socialist Government has committed is to render supremely powerful the efficient part of our constitution and to occlude and stultify the other. Conscription, overbearing taxation, and the imposition of physical controls are the principal weapons used. In every field of activity the sources of voluntary or charitable action have been dried up. The margin of spontaneous or dutiful service which lies deep in the nature of every single Englishman has been heavily scored across by the machinations of the State.

If we explore the full meaning of the 'dignified' parts of our constitution we see that they are instinct with Conservatism. I cannot resist an extended quotation from Bagehot here, not only for reasons of explanation but because the words immediately call forth to mind a single character whose example and ideas dominate our contemporary life—Mr Winston Churchill.

'Doubtless, if all subjects of the same government only thought of what was useful to them, and if they all thought the same thing useful, and all thought that same thing could be attained in the same way, the efficient members of a constitution would suffice, and no impressive adjuncts would be needed. But the world in which we live is organised far otherwise. The most strange fact, though the most certain in nature, is the unequal development of the human race. If we look back to the early ages of mankind,—if we call up the image of those dismal tribes in lake villages, or on wretched beaches—without culture, without leisure, without poetry, almost without thought and if we compare that imagined life with the actual life of Europe now, we can scarcely conceive ourselves to be of the same race as those in the far distance. There used to be a notion that in a little while, perhaps ten years or so, all human beings might, without extraordinary appliances, be brought to the same level. But now, when we see by the painful history of mankind at what point we began, by what slow toil, what favourable circumstances, what accumulated achievements, civilised man has become at all worthy in any degree so to call himself—when we realise the tedium of history and the painfulness of results—our perceptions are sharpened as to the relative steps of our long and gradual progress. . . .

'No orator ever made an impression by appealing to men as to their plainest physical wants, except when he could allege that those wants were caused by someone's tyranny. But thousands have made the greatest impression by appealing to some vague dreams of glory, or empire, or nationality. The ruder sort of men will sacrifice all they hope for, all they have, for what is called an idea—for some attraction which seems to transcend reality, which aspires to elevate men by an interest higher, deeper, wider than that of ordinary life. But this order of men are uninterested in the plain, palpable ends of government; they do not prize them; they do not in the least comprehend how they should be attained. It is very natural, therefore, that the most useful parts of the structure of government should by no means be those which excite the most reverence. The elements which excite the most easy reverence will be the *theatrical* elements—those which appeal to the senses, which claim to be embodiments of the greatest human ideas, which boast in some cases of far more than human origin. That which is mystic in its claims; that which is brilliant to the eye; that which is seen vividly for a moment, and then is seen no more; that which is specious, and yet interesting; this, howsoever its form may change, or however we may define it or describe it, is the sort of thing—the only sort—which yet comes home to the mass of men. So far from the dignified parts of a constitution being necessarily the most useful, they are likely to be the least so; for they are likely to be adjusted to the lowest orders—those likely to care least and judge worst about what is useful.

'Other things being equal, yesterday's institutions are by far the best for to-day; they are the most ready, the most influential, the most easy to get obeyed, the most likely to retain the reverence which they alone inherit, and which every other must win. The most imposing institutions of mankind are the oldest; and yet so changing is the world, so fluctuating are its needs, so apt to lose inward force, though retaining outward strength, are its best instruments, that we must not expect the oldest institutions to be now the most efficient. We must expect what is venerable to acquire influence because of its inherent dignity.'*

In these ideas of Bagehot it seems to me we find a *leitmotif* for the Conservative Party in these coming months, and we surely need one if we are to re-establish full confidence with the electorate. The great change that

* 'The English Constitution,' Chap. I, 1872

has come over British politics in the last five years is the transference to the Socialists of the Conservatives' old weapon of Authority and their release to us of its counterpart—Freedom. As our comparative feebleness in Parliamentary action shows, especially on finance, we have not recovered yet from the philosophical disaster which overtook us in 1945. We have been disarmed but have not yet taken up, much less acquired skill in fighting with, the new weapon. In spite of Mr Churchill's most gallant and courageous lead we do not yet stand determined to repair and restore the 'dignified' part of our constitution and to obstruct and reverse the steady growth of the 'efficient' part. Too many top-ranking men who count themselves Conservative voters are cautious and tactical, or disillusioned and disposed to compromise with what they regard as an inevitable drift towards the totally controlled State.

To my mind the most striking aspect of the February election was an instruction by the voters to the Conservative Party to indulge in some new and rapid thinking. We were in fact told that time was on our side provided only that we use that time well. The electorate have endorsed our courage and honesty in exposing the faults of the last five years. They know that the folly of nationalisation has not yet worked itself out in high prices, bad quality, and general frustration and inconvenience. They know that our overseas trading position is fundamentally weaker than appears from the springtime optimism of Economic Surveys. They realise that wastage in Government Departments, restrictive practices and short time in industry, the obvious sloppiness and 'don't care' attitude on the part of some sections of our countrymen must all have their inevitable result. The nation is morally uneasy under Socialism and knows it will have to pay for it one day and the large increase in the Conservative poll was an indication of its desire to set matters to right with the least possible delay.

The electorate, too, observes that the Labour Party has no sense of mission any more. The whirlwind of collectivism and nationalisation has blown itself out. People are not likely to vote with great enthusiasm for a party without a purpose, especially when it is a governing party. It is here that the importance of Conservatives giving expression to new thinking comes in. Outright opposition

alone will no longer suffice. When parties are evenly balanced and evenly contesting for power, the one without a constructive policy will fail. I know the pundits hold that the duty of an Opposition is to oppose. Generally that is true, but this situation is quite abnormal. It seems to me just as likely if we merely oppose and obstruct that the Labour Party will draw ahead again as it is that we shall overtake them. It is therefore essential that we should take our courage in both hands and vote in the House on constructive policies of our own devising. It will be useless henceforward our saying 'We cannot say what we will do—we are not in office. Only the Government have the knowledge.' The public will only answer: 'That is just too bad. You may do anything or nothing, and perhaps worse from our point of view than the other man.' We must say, 'We intend to do this and that; and if, when we get in, we discover a bureaucratic difficulty, we will overcome the difficulty and translate the bureaucrat.'

Let me give some short examples of the kind of authoritative party statement which should be made by our leaders and on which appropriate parliamentary action should be taken now.

Food.—Immediately on entering office the Conservative Party will introduce a double-decker rationing system designed to give the present ration at present prices to all and a surplus over and above at free market prices.

Petrol.—We will abolish all petrol rationing and keep the price from rising, if necessary by a subsidy, until a sense of competitive service has been induced in the railways.

Coal.—There will be complete freedom for consumers to purchase coal of whatever quality and from whatever merchant or area they please.

Housing.—Building licences except on location and standards will be abolished. The town and country planning development charge will be used to prevent builders from concentrating immediately on cinemas, offices, and large houses and reduced as soon as it is safe to do so. Local authorities and small property developers will stand side by side without discrimination.

Taxation.—Marriage, children, and dependants' allowances will be increased and graduated upwards through

the surtax. School and university fees will be classed as allowances. Post-war credit repayments will commence ; income tax and surtax will be reduced ; and the cost met by amalgamating or abolishing parts of certain Government Departments.

Wages and Salaries.—The wage freeze will be lifted for the administrative branch of the Civil Service, the higher grades of teachers and those workers in industry whom managements select as the best and ablest in their grades.

A great deal of legislation and political action is enshrined in the Conservative manifesto 'This is the Road.' At least half the electorate endorsed the principles and provisions contained in it. In a situation in which half the House of Commons, and on the occasions when we defeat the Government more than half, believes passionately in Conservative and Liberal policies, it is our duty to seize and maintain the initiative, to act as if we were the *de facto* Government, and to reproduce *now* in terms of Amendment and Motion the programme which so great a part of the electorate has endorsed. It must not be said that while in February Conservative Candidates under the generalship of Central Office successfully fought out the battle, in July Conservative Members under their Parliamentary leaders stayed their hand before the logic of Sir Stafford Cripps and the taunts of Mr Morrison. The object of politics is power ; and the object of power is to translate into practical reality our belief in the English way of life. It is our duty to carry forward at Westminster with zeal, impetus, and despatch what many millions of our countrymen are now demanding of us.

HINCHINGBROOKE.

Art. 2.—KASHMIR AND THE MINORITIES PROBLEM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

THE policy of the British Socialist Government of partitioning India and setting up two independent dominions met with wide approval in the civilised world. Even the Opposition in the British Parliament thought British withdrawal from the sub-continent could not have been much longer delayed. Responsible British statesmen felt that they had brought into being for the first time in Asia a great democracy, which under the inspiration of the mature statesmanship of men like Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel, Mr Rajgopalachari, and a dozen or more of nearly equal calibre, should give a new orientation and a new leadership to that vast continent.

India certainly started on her career under promising auspices. She inherited a splendid capital city with the machinery of central government intact, and a large and well-equipped army. Central finance was on a sound basis; the provinces were all under the control of Congress ministries looking to Delhi for inspiration and guidance. Was it surprising that, surveying the Indian scene, Whitehall looked forward to a brilliant future for its own creation?

Contrast conditions in India with what the leaders of Pakistan had to face. There was no capital city, no central government; the Muslim element in the pre-partition army was scattered far and wide over India: it lacked equipment, most of which was in Indian hands. The Panjab was in turmoil following on clashes between Muslims and Sikhs soon after the impending partition had been announced. The two wings of the Dominion were separated by over a thousand miles of India: at the time there was no direct telephonic service between them; through railway communication in the north was doubtful and was soon broken off. The popular government improvised in East Bengal had hardly got into its stride. The North-West Frontier Province had, as the result of a referendum, opted for Pakistan; a Congress Government was, however, in power supported by a group of Pathans known as the Red Shirts, whose objective was to set up a republic, a scheme to which the Afghan Government at Kabul was giving its support: it had, in fact, gone so far as to demand

the absorption of the province into Afghanistan on the ground that it was only right that it should recover its lost territories. It is hardly surprising that, in existing conditions in Pakistan at that time, many people thought that the new State could not make good. In political circles in Karachi one hears the cynical comment that the Indian politicians who negotiated the partition expected in a short time to re-absorb the lost provinces they had ceded to Islam.

The omens for Pakistan at the moment of transfer of power were certainly not favourable. But she had the inestimable advantage of the inspiring leadership of the Qaidi Azam and his lieutenants, Mr Liaquat Khan, Sir Muhammad Zaffarullah, Mr Ghulam Muhammad, Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, to mention a few, and in addition the welding force of Islam, the stronger because of its clashes with militant Hinduism. In an incredibly short time a capital and central government with the essential departments were organised at Karachi; the North-West Frontier was made secure, largely because the tribes readily accepted the new regime. They were not, unnaturally, attracted by the rise of a great Muslim State and the pledge of the Pakistan Government, in return for their support, to continue the allowances for tribal services and the system of administration adopted by the British, which gave congenial employment to thousands of tribesmen and meant so much in their economic life.

Now the two Dominions are economically complementary. Pakistan supplies the jute from East Bengal to the Calcutta mills, also much of the cotton required by the Indian textile industry; it has a surplus of food grains, the greater part of which goes to India. On the other hand, India supplies textiles and other manufactured goods, steel and coal, which Pakistan lacks. Strategically their cooperation is essential. For a century the chief concern of the Indian War Department has been to make the North-West Frontier secure against possible aggression from Russia. This is more necessary than ever to-day. Pakistan, with less than a third of the resources of undivided India, can hardly be expected to bear the responsibility unaided; India should pledge herself to support her neighbour in the event of a Russian attack. To do so is in her own interests. The Indian army could not resist

a Russian onslaught once it had penetrated into the Panjab plains.

The position, as here described, is so obvious that it is surprising that a responsible British statesman in a public address should have expressed the view that the stability of the Asiatic world, which was threatened, as he said, on every side, depended largely on the leadership of India. Could India exert any influence in international affairs in these days unless the North-West Frontier were firmly held? In any case, as regards the Middle East, would not Pakistan, as a Muslim power, especially if militarily strong, be more likely to command respect in the countries of that region than India, as a non-Muslim state, could expect to do? Moreover, Islam is dominant in Indonesia, which suggests that Pakistan would be able to compete there with India for Indonesian support.

Any hopes that there would be harmony between the two Dominions were speedily overshadowed by a violent outbreak of communal trouble. The reasons that inspired the decision of his Majesty's Government to allow only a couple of months for the preparations for partition have never been fully explained. Political observers in Karachi are inclined to think that the Hindu politicians negotiating on behalf of the Congress, in the knowledge that they were succeeding to a more or less ready-made Government, thought that a short interim from their point of view would be sufficient; if the result was to embarrass Pakistan, which had forced the unwelcome partition on them, so much the better. Whatever the truth may be, there is little doubt that because of the shortness of the time available nothing was done to solve the problem of the minorities, forty million or so Muslims in India and some twelve to thirteen million Hindus in Pakistan. For years there had been serious outbreaks of communal frenzy, especially in the Panjab in 1946; it was known that the Sikhs of the Panjab canal colonies were planning mass migration to the East Panjab and the massacre or expulsion of the Muslims from that region; it was known too that the great party of the Hindu Mahasabha, especially its left wing (the R.S.S.) was bitterly opposed to the partition. There was a danger that the more extreme among them might at any time rise in their wrath and wreak vengeance on the Muslims. In such conditions it is strange that neither

Indian nor British statesmen foresaw that the ideal of a great democracy developing in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent could never be realised so long as the problem of the minorities, with its unhealthy influence on everyday life, remained unsolved.

It is not a question of being wise after the event. As already noted, the portents were visible for everyone to observe. Surely it was not beyond the grasp of statesmanship to evolve a system that would have set at rest the fears of the weaker community in each Dominion. How different would have been the conditions under which the Panjab entered on its new life if the Sikhs had been induced to stay as peaceful citizens on the millions of acres they held in the canal colonies!

The world looked on with horror at the catastrophe that followed the handing over of control with its massacres and incredible brutalities. Both Governments did wonders in helping the refugees to start a new life among their co-religionists; even so, most of them have had to endure endless misery and hardship. The bitterness and hatred injected into each community as a result of these happenings has naturally reacted on their political and economic relations. The recent outbreak of communal disorders in the two Bengals, Bihar, Assam, and elsewhere in India, have convinced the Governments on both sides that a solution of the problem must be found. One may comment that much of the trouble in the Panjab in the autumn of 1947 could have been prevented had the Pakistan Government been given time to bring together and organise its army, which would have made possible the stationing of large bodies of troops in the danger areas.

The tension between the two Dominions arising from communal troubles has been greatly enhanced by the quarrel over Kashmir. That that country should not be controlled by a hostile power or a power that might become hostile is a matter of life and death to Pakistan. This is so because the West Panjab and the big State of Bahawalpur, which has acceded to Pakistan, depend on the Kashmir rivers for their irrigation, which is the life-blood of their economy. Pakistan has no coal or industries of any consequence; if she is to develop her military and economic potential she must build up industries on a large scale. In the absence of an adequate coal supply, the only course

is to develop power from hydro-electric installations ; for these she must depend largely on the rivers of Kashmir : the site of most of the necessary installations would have to be set up in the Kashmir hills.

There is a good deal to be said from the point of view of the Kashmiris themselves for their attachment to Pakistan. To begin with, 80 per cent. of them are Muslim ; most of them hate their Hindu rulers, under whom they have suffered heavily since, a century ago, after defeating the Sikhs, the British in a fit of abnegation and irresponsibility sold for a song Kashmir to the forbears of the present Maharaja, then rulers of Jammu. Economically, Kashmiris are linked with Pakistan : the main lines of communication of their territory with the outside world pass through the West Panjab. Their only link with India is along the sixty-mile road built through the hills by Indian sappers a couple of years ago for the purpose of military supply. Obviously the trade of the State could not be carried on along a route such as this. There is another difficulty. Jammu, the winter capital, lies on the verge of the Panjab plains. It communicates with Srinagar, in the Kashmir vale, by a road which passes over the Banihal ridge at about 10,000 feet, blocked by snow in the winter. There is, it is true, a scheme for taking the road through a tunnel at a lower level, at which the difficulty of snow would be avoided, but engineering opinion differs as to its feasibility. It would, in any case, take years to build. The road down the Jhelum Valley to Rawalpindi is infinitely better suited as an outlet for the trade of the country, in addition to being open all the year round. The construction of a railway up the Jhelum Valley would be a comparatively easy proposition. There are 10,000 square miles of forest in Kashmir, and timber, which is the most valuable export of the country, can only be brought into the plains down the rivers converging on the West Panjab plains. It could not be got out on the Indian side.

With the threat of a possible Communist invasion from Sinkiang on the northern border of Kashmir, Indian representatives have argued at Lake Success that it was essential that the regions now in the hands of Pakistani irregulars should be entrusted to their Government. Pakistanis retort that, with access to the valley closed in the winter,

India would lose touch with her frontier outposts; if invasion were threatened she could not keep a large force supplied in the northern mountains. Responsibility for holding the Sinkiang frontier must, in their view, rest on the shoulders of Pakistan.

As is generally known, the Kashmir problem has been under the consideration of U.N.O. for nearly two years. Practically all that has been achieved is that both sides have been induced to agree to a truce line which gives Pakistan the north of the country, Gilgit, Chilas, and Guraïs to the Karakorams, with a strip in the west in Poonch to a point opposite to the Pakistani town of Sialkot. The rest, omitting inaccessible hill country on the Tibet border, is with India.

The position at the time of writing is as follows. Pakistan agrees to accept the result of an impartial plebiscite even if it means giving up its claim to Kashmir. It is prepared to remove its troops and disband its Irregulars—about 25,000 men—mostly war veterans, if India does the same. If necessary a neutral brigade might take over defence, the administration to be carried on under neutral supervision.

Indian authorities demur to this procedure. What they require is that all Pakistan troops should be removed, levies disbanded, and the country now occupied by the Pakistan forces handed over to the government set up by India in the country occupied by her forces. The head of this government is Shaikh Abdullah, a Muslim protégé of many years standing of Pandit Nehru, regarded as a renegade by many of the Kashmir Muslims. The Indian Government would withdraw most of its troops, leaving a small force to help in maintaining order. To this scheme of things Pakistan objects on the ground that it would give the Shaikh Abdullah government too strong an influence over the proceedings of the plebiscite. The rivals have now agreed at Lake Success to the appointment of a mediator to examine the points in issue regarding the procedure to be adopted in the working of the plebiscite and to endeavour to effect a settlement or a compromise.

One wonders whether it would be really to the advantage of India to hold Kashmir, apart from the constant pressure she would be able to exert on Pakistan, by having control of the Kashmir rivers. There is the difficulty of

communications. It would be necessary to build, at great expense, a railway through the hills between Pathan Kot and Jammu and an all-seasons road and perhaps a railway between Jammu and Srinagar. Would not the capital involved be better utilised on one of the vast hydro-electric schemes in India, planned but held up for want of finance, e.g. the Damodar, Hirakad, and Godavari schemes?

But there is more to it than that. Hindu rule would be unpopular almost everywhere in the country, especially among the hardy tribesmen of Poonch and of the north-west and northern regions, and India would have to maintain a large military garrison. This would be all the more necessary because the western border would be exposed to attack from the tribes of the tribal belt of the North-West Frontier. It is of course permissible to argue, as India does, that Pakistan is responsible for her tribesmen, and must control them. That is not so simple as it looks. Half a million fanatical tribesmen, the finest fighting men in Asia, are determined that their co-religionists in Kashmir shall have a square deal; at the moment the restraining influence of Pakistan is holding them back: if a settlement is delayed beyond next cold weather, military force might be necessary to prevent a tribal invasion. The inevitable consequence would be the loss of tribal allegiance to Pakistan, a general uprising on the frontier, and an Afghan invasion encouraged and supported by Russia. A hundred thousand tribesmen would swarm into Kashmir. Is India ready to incur such risks?

The Kashmir quarrel has had serious reactions on the economic life of both countries. Finance is urgently required for development schemes designed to raise the dangerously low standard of living. They are held up because most of the central revenue is being spent on their armies against each other.

The recent outbreak of communal disorders in the two Bengals and elsewhere has been referred to in an earlier paragraph. There have been some frightful outrages followed by mass movements by refugees on either side; thousands of Muslims from East Bengal who took up land in forest areas in Assam years ago have been driven across the border. There has been much destruction of property. There is a lot of wild talk going on in Calcutta of an invasion of East Bengal. Take East Bengal, Hindu

leaders proclaim, and Pakistan will collapse like a house of cards.

How the trouble started is not clear. Each side blames its rival. The administration of Bihar and West Bengal seems to be on the point of collapse. The authorities are, however, taking strong measures and are moving troops into the danger areas. The difficulties of the Indian Government are intensified by the existence of left-wing elements, such as the Socialists, the Peasant and Workers' Party, the R.S.S., and the Communists, all of whom are ready to exploit popular unrest. In some quarters one hears the fear expressed that popular discontent might take a violent form if India lost Kashmir. This has doubtless influenced the attitude of the Indian cabinet.

It is in the two Bengals that communal frenzy has been most intense and it is there that the two Governments have to face their greatest difficulties in dealing with the minority problem. A glance at the Bengali background will help to a better understanding of prevalent conditions. The great province was over-run and dominated by Muslim adventurers from about A.D. 1200 onwards. Brahminism had, by this time, overcome its Buddhist rivals and re-imposed the fetters of the caste system on the masses. Their aversion to the Brahmin regime made them responsive to the appeal of Islam, a religion of which the equality of man was one of the main tenets, and mass conversions followed. The illiterate and uneducated Muslims of Bengal have never forgotten that their ancestors embraced Islam in order to escape from caste tyranny. And they have never forgotten that Muslims ruled the province for several centuries until, under the British regime, Hindus acquired a predominant influence.

The Muslim element was concentrated in the East of Bengal. The Permanent Settlement of 1795 introduced a semi-feudal system of land holding from which a group of big landlords, mostly Hindus, benefited. Calcutta grew up into a mighty city dominating the whole economic life of Bengal. Its inflated university trained thousands of students, mainly Hindus, who afterwards monopolised Government service, the Bar, professions and business. The Muslims who had not been attracted by Western education had to accept an inferior status. Calcutta became a centre of political agitation for the whole of

India. Some Hindu observers, commenting on the lawlessness prevailing to-day, regard it as a consequence of inoculating generations of students with the idea that if you disapprove of a law you need not obey it.

In 1905 Lord Curzon, then Viceroy, decided to break up Bengal because of the difficulty of administering so large and unwieldy a unit. He was influenced, at the same time, by the feeling that if East Bengal were constituted into a separate province, the Muslim majority could live its own life and overcome its backwardness. The change was hailed with delight by the Muslim community: Dacca became the provincial capital. On the other hand, the Hindus regarded the partition as a deadly blow aimed against their movement for independence: there was a violent outburst of political agitation with an obbligation of terrorism. This went on continuously till, seven years later, to the dismay of the Muslims, the partition was annulled. This was at the time of the Delhi Durbar. It was felt that the move was a surrender to Hindu pressure. High-caste Hindus recovered much of their former influence and it is not surprising that the Muslim community welcomed the idea of Pakistan, especially the labourers, peasants, boatmen, artisans, and the lower middle-classes. A million or more Hindus mostly of the higher castes migrated to Calcutta and West Bengal on partition, professional men, Government servants—Hindus had most of the higher appointments at the time—bankers, merchants, landlords. The Hindu community in Calcutta, not unnaturally, resented the loss to their city of the advantages resulting from economic association with East Bengal. One can imagine how these feelings were embittered by the influx of hundreds of thousands of their caste folks, many of them their friends and relations, seeking refuge among them. It is not surprising in the light of recent events that Dr Khare and the militant partisans of the Mahasabha and the R.S.S. have found in Calcutta and its neighbourhood strong support for the movement for the recovery of East Bengal to Hinduism. From their historical background and existing conditions, one may conclude that the Muslim majority would resist such a movement to the last. Even if the two Bengals could be merged under Hindu rule it would be an almost insoluble problem to induce the Muslim element—which would probably be in the majority,

with its historical background, to accept a position of political inferiority. It is surely in the interests of both that they should remain apart. There are probably some 10,000,000 Hindus left in East Bengal. The Muslims now have no particular grudge against them: the Permanent Settlement has been abolished and Hindus are no longer in a dominating position. The administration has functioned normally; communication with the federal capital is kept up by a tri-weekly air service; the link will be closer when, with the jet-propelled air-liner, it will be possible to fly between Karachi and Dacca in three hours.

A reassuring feature in the gloomy outlook presented by the problem of the minorities is that both Prime Ministers are determined not only to repress disorders with a firm hand but to evolve a system that will give confidence and security to the minorities in both Dominions. They have recently had protracted discussions and they have evolved a scheme which it is hoped will restore confidence. It has unfortunately not been well received in the Calcutta press. Two of the Bengal Ministers in the Central Government, Dr Mukerji and Mr Neogy, are reported to have resigned in protest. There are strong men on both sides: the Indian Government, despite its embarrassments, commands respect; Mr Liaquat Ali Khan has no reason to complain of lack of support. It is, however, doubtful if there can be a real settlement of the minority problem so long as the Kashmir quarrel obscures the political horizon.

Another danger threatens both Dominions: not so imminent perhaps as the danger of civil war, but one that, unless they can get together in close alliance and friendship, may overwhelm them both. It is generally recognised in the West that Russia intends to absorb South-east Asia, including India and Pakistan as well as the Middle East, as soon as opportunity offers. The red tide of Communism is surging up to the frontiers of the sub-continent from the north-west onwards, between Sinkiang and Kashmir, along Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Assam to Burma. Burma is in chaos, with Communism rampant; a huge French army in Indo-China is, with difficulty, keeping Communism at bay. The danger is all the greater for India since Communism has already penetrated into Indian life. Russia is intriguing on the Afghan frontier; she controls Sinkiang; Mao-Tse-tung plans to invade Tibet: with that vast area

under the control of Peking Communist emissaries would find penetration into India an easy matter. The policy of the Kremlin would go further than this : they have pledged support to Mao-Tse-tung if he decides to invade India. Should an invasion be planned there would, in all probability, be a move from two directions : through Sinkiang into Kashmir and from Tibet into India, possibly through Nepal. It may be noted in parenthesis that Pandit Nehru has recently given out that he would regard an attack on Nepal as an attack on India. Once in Tibet it would not be surprising if Mao-Tse-tung threatened Nepal with invasion unless it desisted from supplying the troops for the British and Indian armies, and insisted further on the recall of all Gurkhas already serving in those armies. The danger from Sinkiang and, one might add, from Burma and Tibet can only be obviated if the two Dominions stand closely together. Civil war would be an invitation to the Kremlin and its ally. Chaos or widespread disorders in India would be another opportunity. What would be more effective than anything else in checking the Communist menace is a close alliance, military and economic, between the Muslim and Hindu rivals.

Is there any real hope of such a development ? Success depends almost entirely on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. If that were effected there should be no difficulty in bringing about agreements on other contentious matters. When there is so much at stake, high-caste Hindu leaders who dream of annulling the partition must surely realise that to persist in such an attitude may bring both countries down in ruin.

Responsibility lies heavily on the British Commonwealth and the U.S.A. to insist on an early settlement of the Kashmir dispute. They should press for the immediate despatch of the U.N. mediator to Kashmir. If his efforts fail to bring about an agreement on the procedure to be followed in carrying out the plebiscite, the Commonwealth and the U.S.A. should intervene and endeavour to effect a compromise. They are in a strong position to influence both parties. The future of both Dominions depends on economic development. Without it there can be no improvement in the standard of living and unless there is such an improvement an era of political instability will inevitably follow and here would be the opportunity

the Kremlin looks for. Only the U.S.A. and the Commonwealth can provide the financial and technical assistance required in the economic field: neither party can reasonably expect investments of Western capital nor the assistance of Western technique in its country so long as the danger of civil war subsists. One might hope that both sides will make up their minds to compromise even if it means concessions to which, at the moment, they are reluctant to agree.

WILLIAM BARTON.

Art. 3.—THE ART OF CANNED BIOGRAPHY.

The Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940. Edited by L. G. Wickham Legg. Oxford University Press.

THIS famous production has now reached certain forms and rulings. It can no longer be referred to as a 'Dictionary of No-Bodies.' The D.N.B. now sounds like a decoration, a minor Order of Merit awarded posthumously to the dead. It is the recognised Canon of fame and success in British life and history. It is edited and guaranteed from a University and of all Reference Books must be reckoned Queen.

Apart from the invaluable history and occasionally fine writing it is the tale of our times and the steady record of our contemporaries in miniature biography. Some of the contributions are lifeless catalogues, but there are sprightly pieces of prose showing that restriction in words often embellishes a paragraph.

Analysis is difficult in such a variety Valhalla, but the choice is admirable and covers a great deal of the national fame which has missed Westminster Abbey and Madame Tussaud's Waxworks the great criterions of public estimation.

Mr Wickham Legg must have endured all that the Lord Chamberlain endures in settling the names on the Royal Enclosure list at Ascot. A half are secure in their merits, a quarter are fortunate to be remembered, and another quarter are dubious. Whereas at Ascot each visitor occupies the same amount of space, one of Mr Wickham Legg's difficulties must have been the right apportionment of so many or less inches of print to the memory of each accepted participant. He describes his Scylla and Charybdis as an attitude 'between too much stiffness in refusing and too much easiness in admitting names.'

We are a long way from the early days of the D.N.B. when several mythological characters found an entrance, chiefly through Irish Channels.

During the decade of 1931 to 1940 exactly 729 people have been found worthy of record. It would be interesting to know who were the thousand odd who must have been examined and rejected, some by a narrow margin. It would be invidious to suggest names, for criticism is drawn rather

to the amount of space awarded to those who have entered the biographical canon.

It has been a personal pleasure to read the accounts rendered about any whom we happened to know or cross tracks with during this rather hasty and unhappy period of human existence. Personal views can bring no disparagement to the editor or his magnificent team of collaborators, but many beside ourselves will seek out Lives of those, whom they have known or studied, and contrast them eagerly with what they remember or think should be recorded.

Another of Mr Legg's immense difficulties has been to decide *what* should be recorded and to what extent the *de mortuis nil nisi bonum* rule should apply. It is obvious from many, many instances that the best view is always taken and that what would be permissible to bring out in Court is often omitted. Historians are generally remorseless, for if the feelings of friends and relatives have to be considered, then history would have to be reduced to hagiology.

When there are actual cases of charges resulting in imprisonment these are bluntly stated. We have only found two. Lord Kysant, who remained loved and admired after prison, went there only to satisfy the sensitive judicature that there is not one law for the rich and another for the poor in England. The second case occurs in a lively article on Horatio Bottomley by the late E. S. P. Haynes. This is the opening of a Rogues' Gallery for the D.N.B. and for biographical interest that series could be much enlarged. The criminal or anti-social type is often historical and the D.N.B. should cover more than a multitude of useful or successful or decorous lives. It should afford a reconstruction of history and a great number of facts should be eventually recorded which have eluded Memoirs or the Press or 'Who's Who.'

Of that admirable publication we would only point out the keen difference lying between its columns and the D.N.B. 'Who's Who' records the living, often with their admiring sanction. The D.N.B. records the dead with discerning and generally impartial justice. 'Who's Who,' invaluable as a catalogue of reference, sometimes lent itself to the vanity or humour of those invited in early days to appraise themselves. One or two instances

remain legendary, such as the frank believer in the whole truth who added after his wife's name: 'married for money'! The section of 'Hobbies' always revealed character, while brevity invited epigram such as Osbert Sitwell's account of his Eton days: 'educated in the holidays.'

Mr Legg is parsimonious on humour, though when he admits a wit like Theobald Mathew, he allows his most famous *mot*, uttered amid the dusky denizens of the Temple while grasping a white hand and murmuring 'Dr Livingstone I presume!'

Bottomley is fearlessly etched. His illegitimate birth from Bradlaugh is allowed. It was to his credit that he rose and made such a thundering stir in the world. Ramsay MacDonald's birth is equally disclosed with no less credit attached to his achievements: a particularly able article.

Bottomley's financial adventures were typical of his age and of others beside himself. His name, we are told, was constantly in the Courts 'rarely with reverence.' But Hooley and Jabez Balfour deserve the D.N.B. as much as he, and Sievier's career on the Turf outclassed Bottomley's—if once Rogues are to figure amongst the divines, authors, scientists, and statesmen of the collection. Sievier's name creeps in only subordinately to the career of Lord Reading.

The three columns devoted to the entertaining Bottomley are followed by only two devoted to Cardinal Bourne. Here we suggest is a rare failure in form and matter. Bourne was not inspiring, but he ruled Catholic England for thirty years and the Education situation to-day is his legacy, at least the denominational school. He assisted at two Papal Conclaves. His generous attitude to the Modernists was admirable, less so towards Catholic Converts. Nor is there a word about his lasting personal and episcopal struggle with the Bishop of Southwark, most of whose diocese he proposed to absorb: nor about his conflict with Asquith as to carrying the Host in procession at the Congress of 1908. The question whether the Host should be carried is described in the article on Sir Edward Henry the Police Commissioner at the time. Bourne's stand-up fight with Bourassa, the Canadian Nationalist, when the Congress was held at Montreal is also omitted. These omissions are obviously

due to lack of space which might have been borrowed from the two oarsmen of the name, who follow with three columns, although their achievements have passed with the eddies of their races. So with some 'Popish effrontery,' we say that the Cardinal's Section is so inadequate that it might have been omitted.

Amid so many splendid contributions the few inadequates are conspicuous. Another occurs under the name of Bruce Ismay, unless it was another of the same name, who had the misfortune to be saved from the wreck of the 'Titanic' and to rouse the fiercest antagonism that has ever swayed the American Press. If so, it is incredible that his biography could fail to mention the sinking of the 'Titanic' which must have been the turning point of his life and of his shipping line, even more so than his deprivation of the Blue Ribbon of the Turf when Craiganour, after winning the Derby, was in the opinion of many good judges unjustly disqualified by the Stewards. These were two events sensational enough to send a tremor through the Empire though not to penetrate to the sanctum of Mr Legg. It can be well understood that Bruce Ismay developed 'an intense dislike of publicity,' in which case it was not worth while appending this rather feeble contribution to the D.N.B. Of course we may be mistaken and the 'Bruce Ismay,' whom we vividly remember in New York after the disaster, may have been another person in which case our apology is due. But neither the history of the Atlantic nor the history of sport can pass over these memorable scenes.

The lost list of soldiers and sailors is worthy of a period of two major wars. The concisely catalogued careers and continual mention of the same battles and armies and ships with the inevitable sequels of promotions and distinctions take much space. It is only when great leaders or controversies are summarised that the reading becomes interesting. The characters are always suitable to widows' reading.

The accounts of Jellicoe and Beatty are admirable, the more so that they leave the impression that they fought the battle of Jutland in perfect strategical accord and that, whatever journalists thought, Jutland was a more powerful and influential victory than Trafalgar in spite of losses on points.

Geddes as first Lord and the 'Landsman' Lloyd George are very roughly treated in the text, but not as roughly as Jellicoe was in life. His curt dismissal in the cowardly form of a written note was unworthy of England's traditions.

Jellicoe's all-surveying epithet 'unpalatable' is not quoted from his Jutland Despatch and Beatty's grim private opinions of the battle are not given. But his memorable words are quoted after he saw two of his battle-cruisers blow up. No Englishman will ever say so much again in so few words. However, the ghost of Geddes will recover *amour-propre* should he read the article devoted to his past under his own name. The use of the *obiter dicta* is rare but its occasional appearance is almost explosive in the dry, serrated text. It has to be of historical or supreme anecdotal importance to be acceptable to the editor. Readers may be assured that inverted commas invariably embalm what is valuable as well as unique. Ian Colvin is summarised in John Morley's words 'nothing like it since Junius.' Lord Dillon, the antiquary, translates *noblesse oblige* into the sentence: 'Duty is doing more than you are paid for' and stated his erudition in the words 'My opinions are facts.' Steve Fairbairn, the rowing coach, is amply described in his words: 'If you can't do it easily, you can't do it at all.' They come like an echo from the banks of the Cam.

The succinct summary of Fairbairn makes contrast with the somewhat boastful book which the redoubtable rower wrote for himself. We say so only because it illustrates the great value of the D.N.B. in enabling characters, pleasant or unpleasant, to be weighed in the true balances of biography.

The account of Sir Edward Clarke is short for a nonagenarian, but, even so, should mention the two *causes célèbres* in which he appeared: for Oscar Wilde and Gordon-Cumming, the plaintiff in the Tranby Croft Scandal. Clarke wrote his own obituary for 'The Times,' and it seems a pity he could not continue it for the D.N.B.

Another article which seems to miss points is Sir Thomas Lipton's, for long a household name and in the first rank of sporting magnates. As his Life is in process of writing, the material would appear small as yet. Credit is done to his splendid and vulgar gifts in the advertising and yachting

worlds. His sporting temper set a standard to the yachtsmen, who discouraged King Edward from pressing his election to the Royal Yacht Squadron. That Lord Salisbury had disdainfully blocked his way to the peerage was common gossip, but his just aspirations to the most select of clubs should be noticed, especially as they were finally crowned with success, though far too late to be any consolation. To say 'he entertained King Edward amongst many' is a very mild statement. He was a most intimate and useful friend and partly the cause of the King's quarrel with the Kaiser.

No doubt his coming Biography will bring out with what laughing *bonhomie* he took his social and sporting rebuffs.

The small area allowed to Cardinal Bourne is far from due to anti-clericalism, for that *malleus cardinalium* Lytton Strachey is reduced to the same meagre two columns. 'Eminent Victorians,' perhaps the most famous book and certainly the most influential in *belles-lettres* for this period, is allowed four lines and 'Queen Victoria,' which altered British biography, is simply mentioned. With such a brilliant critic as Lord David Cecil to hand, it seems deplorable that the writer was not given his head. In one pemmican paragraph he endeavours to pass his friend to posterity:

'His economical mastery of design, his faculty of vivid story-telling, and the mingled elegance and vitality of his style are alike eminent; and they are made exhilarating by the continuous sparkle of an impish and adroit irony.'

The reader requires pages of this sort and is loath to pass on to lists of school distinctions, out-of-date productions, degrees, merited or not, titles seldom merited, and the accumulations of dead letterings to the forgotten names of the exemplary dead upon which the editor apparently insists.

The keystone of the volume is the full-length of King George V by Sir Owen Morshead. Not every king is a hero to his librarian, but here is the tale of constitutional heroism in peace and war surely transcribed. Royalists, Socialists, and the historians of the future can dip advisedly into these well-planned paragraphs, in the course of which Canon Dalton and Queen Mary receive generous appraisal, the latter certainly in a few sentences of jewelled style which the world will accept as her perfect merit. Tacitus

would have enjoyed their Latinisation as well as the comment on Asquith as 'unexcelled in the use of language at once precise and enigmatic.' Likewise the King's phrase of 'Ordered Freedom' seems to call for an echo from the Classics.

Sir Owen's stimulating essay leaves the impression that the King was in all ways a monument of patience and a giant of constitutional wisdom amongst Ministers (with the exception of Balfour) who were never worthy of their master. The House of Windsor has excelled as though the majestic Flavian Dynasty had returned to make the world's possible peace and happiness. One matter we add is that when the poor old battered British public have an emotional crisis they run not to the Mansion House, not to Downing Street, but to Buckingham Palace.

Sir Owen just mentions to blow aside the only breath of scandal which ever befell the King. The D.N.B. is to be commended for ignoring all such silly scandals which have no historical value. In the case of a valued public servant we note that a Hyde Park indiscretion is omitted and a politician is allowed to terminate his career by sudden resignation before going to live and die abroad—and no more is said.

Very merciful is the account of Augustine Birrell 'not a great nor even a fortunate statesman,' whose indolence tempered by wit left English education and Irish government in the deadlock from which neither recovered in our time nor seem likely to recover during the century.

The Castor and Pollux of the Ulster revolt—Carson and Craigavon—are adequately featured. Each has been over-biographised, three volumes for Carson and recently 700 pages overlying Craig's stark and simple career. The D.N.B. did not call in the official biographers and the results are clear and judicial. Neither could be called genius, but the Ulster turmoil sharpened and even sublimated their very different gifts so that a brilliant hysterical Irish advocate and a four-square unexciting Ulsterman marked the history of their country and indeed in unexpected tangents world-history for all time as well. In one short paragraph Professor Savory estimates Carson's oratory and leaves the reader realising that the last great speech in the tradition of Sheridan was uttered in the Lords when the Government gave in to Sinn Féin. No less than the

Master of Trinity is called in to do justice to Sir Edward Grey : and right nobly as Whig unto Whig.

From Statesmen it is refreshing to turn to Cambridge Dons like Lowes Dickinson and 'Monty' James. Those who knew them might wish to add many features, which space has forbidden, such as psychical research in Dickinson and Provost James' private powers of mimicry. Dickinson's academic sympathy with John Chinaman is more than paralleled by the thrilling account of Sir Reginald Johnston, who became Confucian and defended the fallen Imperial Dynasty. Both he and Dickinson moralised severely on the Christian Missions in China. Beside Bottomley the only other Rogue described in this volume is Thomas Wise the Bibliophile and forger of rare literary items. Dr Esdaile judiciously summarises the overwhelming proofs. Forgery and piracy in the book world, where he was already honoured and successful, to say nothing of his denunciations of these crimes, make him the future subject for medical as well as literary theses. The shock he gave to the world of collectors still produces repercussions. Imagine a Washington convicted of secret lying or an Aristides of a paltry injustice ! For the collector of the Ashley Library to fill other collectors shelves with forgeries was a form of the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Great adventurers are few, but Lawrence of Arabia (written by Sir Ronald Storrs) and Robert Cunningham Graham (written by H. M. Tomlinson) should come under that heading which is given to the unspeakable Frank Harris (rather kindly unmasked by Frank Swinnerton).

Lawrence of Arabia having been so fully treated by himself becomes a difficult study, but Sir Ronald Storrs deals with him with perfect perspective as his friend and colleague in the Middle East. His summary is a tangle of brilliant paradoxes and the psychologist gets no further.

It is curious that this supreme desert-fighter could like Edward Fitzgerald have survived as a great letter-writer alone. In fact Storrs thinks his feats had slight chance of survival had he not recorded them in the 'Seven Pillars of Wisdom,' one of the most prized and most unread books in the English Classics.

If Frank Harris wins the D.N.B. as 'a systematic amorist,' Aleister Crawley will have to keep him company in a subsequent volume. If ever a literary ruffian deserves

damning without faint praise, it was Harris. Mr Tomlinson exposes the strength of that malevolent personality without hinting of the faults which lowered him into his un-honoured grave: but quotes for his epitaph Mr Shaw's reference to 'just his horrible unique self.'

'Systematic amorist' had been worthier of Havelock Ellis with his thousands of love-letters to Olive Schreiner and his 'Studies in the Psychology of Sex,' invaluable to medical men, alienists, magistrates, and confessors.

This very honorable life spent in the analysis of passions, honorable or dishonorable, has fallen to an admirable discernor. By a perfect touch we learn that Miss Schreiner attended the funeral of Mrs Ellis, also victim of his 'turbulent love.'

An Irish adventurer, who recorded himself less successfully, was Colonel Arthur Lynch. He was condemned to death for treason in the Boer War but wrote a book of philosophy which he decided would be 'a lamp to the feet of men when the British Empire is forgotten.' 'This has not received general endorsement' is his Irish biographer's dry comment. In these two quotations we have the man.

Lord Inchcape combined the adventurer with the merchant prince. The fact that he sold 35 $\frac{1}{2}$ million worth of ships for the Government after the first war at a cost of 850 $\frac{1}{2}$ should of course be framed like a Biblical text in every office of the Civil Service. There again we have the man in a single fact.

The most impressive biographies are devoted to the majestic minds of Sir J. J. Thomson and Lord Rutherford, whose work at Trinity, Cambridge, appeared to follow and to supersede Newton's. Their supreme achievements were in the field of the electron and the atom. They were mercifully spared living to see the appalling application of their discoveries to war.

All that can be recorded of these two great men is of interest, especially as they will certainly remain remembered and effective when everybody else in this D.N.B. volume has passed into oblivion save as footnotes or nouns in an odd sentence of history here or there. Indeed both may survive the English language, if indeed the whole human race can eventually survive the developments of their findings in the famous Cavendish Laboratory. In their unsurpassable greatness they scarcely seem to be

human beings themselves, a sort of Gog and Magog of Science. Rutherford could be liable to fits of temper like a frightening cloud. Thomson had curious lapses of memory (like Newton perhaps) and was discovered late in life to be addicted to private prayer. These at least are human touches.

It is obviously better that the D.N.B. article should not be written by the previous or official or family biographer. In the case of G. K. Chesterton Miss Maisie Ward has only to give a résumé of her previous, well-stocked Biography. There can be nothing fresh in such cases but what the D.N.B. calls for is the final view, almost the Day of Judgment sentence with some of the awful brevity which will be needed on that over-crowded occasion.

For instance, the difficult point in the great career of Lord Reading : his failure to disclose his holding of shares in the Marconi American Company. He eventually confessed 'it was a mistake to purchase those shares' which excuse the House accepted. The D.N.B. lays down that 'it was a lamentable error of judgment' and Lord Simon is undoubtedly the right man to make the statement. Reading was the greatest statesman in the book. It appears that he was so deeply ruffled when passed over for the Lord Chancellorship in 1912 that he had to be soothed by a place in the Cabinet. Perhaps it was part of his amazing good luck, for had he been Chancellor during the subsequent Marconi scandal, he would have hardly been able to retain the position. As Attorney-General he did manage to hold on to office.

Lord Simon mentions his career as 'kaleidoscopic' which applies to no other in this volume. It was a moment of the Arabian Nights when he sighted India as Viceroy, his previous glimpse having been as a boy behind the mast. Another pungent moment must have been when the Italian Government appointed as his opposite number in Washington—Marconi!

It is obvious that for general reading the scientists, mathematicians, bankers, economists, and minor statesmen and minor ecclesiasts must be dull and decorous. Often a life is reduced to a catalogue. The writers and artists have a much better chance of providing grist for gusto. When an important writer falls to another, the

result is stimulating. By far and away the best is G. M. Young's article on Kipling. It is biography and it is criticism—both intensely compressed. It is clear that like Shakespeare Kipling did what he 'damned well wished' with the English language and is likely to give equal trouble to distant critics. Mr Young deals with his changing style in almost lapidary language: 'more abrupt. From allusive he became obscure, from obscure at times unintelligible.' He was a sick Cassandra in politics but by his pen he retained Fairyland amongst the English counties and India as an Imperial myth.

Articles in which the deceased are brought to life sympathetically include G. G. Coulton's Henry Fowler the lexicographer, who is revealed as a stoic, Christian in all but faith, and lover of literature in a Catholic sense 'excluding only *cruel* satire.' But surely all satire is cruel. Another is Lord Justice MacKinnon's Lord Sumner, who was a voluminous writer for the D.N.B. in his days of poverty. He became 'one of the greatest judges of his time,' yet scintillated with phrases and wit. Two rather heavy examples are given but the style is manifest as of a Lord of Language. He was passed over for Lord Chancellor, but would have been consoled by the gentle irony with which his biographer contrasts him with Lord Cave. Unusually vivid, the brief article closes on unexpected notes: Sumner's burst of manly grief after listening to the Maybrick tragedy and Lord Justice MacKinnon's own reaction to Oswald Birley's fine portrait. They are so well told that the reader rushes to MacKinnon in the index and discovers that he is a judge himself, but a good judge of other judges. We turn to his picture of Justice Scrutton for another literary treat. There are the preliminary touches—'the only Englishman of his time who never shaved in his life' with the 'reckless courage,' which inspired him to represent his University on a High Wheel. But the account of Scrutton working in his chambers could not have been bettered by Dickens. The whole party come alive in their 'hideous' surroundings and imbibe a 'repulsive liquid.' Rude and grim, Heaven sent him to settle the murderer of the 'Brides in the Bath.' He became a supreme judge and posterity will be relieved to learn that his beard was finally given an Elizabethan clip.

Lord Justice MacKinnon describes the 'ideal judge' in George Talbot, about whose achievements it is a pleasure to read. His subjugated temper was as hot as his bath was cold. He could do without an overcoat but not without a daily dip into the Classics. All that is necessary to be said about him is concluded from a strait answer from Bishop Gore to a certain 'foolish person.'

Posterity will expect some unborn legalist to do by Lord Justice MacKinnon in the D.N.B. as he has done to his predecessors. If it is equally good biography, it will be worth reading.

The judge, whom Talbot succeeded, was far better known than Talbot or Scrutton, Charles Darling, whose famous cases and trials are part of the Newgate Calendar. However good in murder cases, his lapses are severely rapped.

'The Pemberton Billing case was a shocking example.' His levity and wit lowered the status of the bench. He laughed when witnesses insulted him. No instances are given, but may we recall that when he inquired in court 'Who is George Robey?' he was told by counsel 'The Darling of the Halls!' Mr Laski does not include among his portraits that which Lavery painted of him wearing the Death Cap!

Whether Irishmen, who live under their Republic, will be allowed extra-territorial privilege in future D.N.B. depends on the coming editors. Perhaps in Yeats, Tim Healy, Lady Gregory, and James MacNeill we have the last gleanings of the Green. Joseph Hone is most informing about Healy, for whose brilliant vituperations and lachrymose betrayals he makes generous apology. A good life of Healy should be inspired by reading this mild condensation of his vitriol. An 'Irish Talleyrand *à rebours*' is the clever superscription invented for what the Irish called 'Uncle Tim's Cabin,' when the old rebel took possession of the Viceroy's Lodge. Is it possible that he almost knew Shakespeare by heart and 'memorised the Bible' thanks to six months in prison?

Yeats' career makes good reading. Like every literary achievement in the book he awaits the verdict of history. This is especially the case with Galsworthy who, we are told, was widely read in Germany because his novels seemed to detail English decadence. The same wishful

reading once led Bismarck to read Zola in connection with French depravity. George Moore is recorded briefly by Charles Morgan, showing how great a loss literary biography has received in the withdrawal of Mr Morgan from the bigger life.

Valiant women find their way into the pages. Dame Nellie Melba is the only one mentioned on the cover blurb, but there accompany her in the pages Lady Frances Balfour, Lady Warwick, Lady Gregory, Elizabeth Haldane, Vernon Lee, Miss Horniman, Mrs Patrick Campbell, Ethel Dell and others of various grace and grit.

The analysis of Melba's voice almost makes the pages thrill, but great as was her first triumph in Brussels, it cannot have equalled Mrs Pat Campbell's great night in the 'Second Mrs Tanqueray' when she gave London 'incarnate reality, the haggard truth.'

Lady Warwick might well have been classified as one of the three 'professional beauties' of that time. That was her proper appellation. It was a Ball she gave, which Blatchford criticised in the 'Clarion,' that led to her social repentance and conversion to a very genuine Socialism. It has always been supposed that she opened King Edward's eyes to labour possibilities.

The great roll of chemists, botanists, metallurgists, journalists, archaeologists, scientists, generals, and admirals, etc., comes within the book's scope, and the reader must not complain of the constant cataloguing effect.

He can turn for refreshment to articles like Mr Robertson's Housman or Mr Shewring's Eric Gill. The latter gave lettering on stone 'impersonal grandeur and finality.' The other wrote English lines worthy of receiving such trenchant and enduring treatment. The D.N.B. has risen majestically to both tremendous artists, one of whom found in heavenly love the ultimate star to which creation moves, while the other solaced his soul by prose which became satire, and by verse which stands like a tombstone over human love, at least as realised in Shropshire. Both men are beautifully monumentalised though they scarcely live.

The great line of English 'eccentrics' is allowed only in the case of Lady Houston. On the whole her largesse was admirable. She enabled the Schneider trophy to be won by England and offered the same parsimonious

Government the means of London's Air Defence. It is impossible to say how much her action enabled the *Hurricanes* and *Spitfires* to be eventually designed in the nick of time for the Battle of Britain.

If 'eccentrics' are to be enrolled in the D.N.B. we will expect a brilliant account to be given one day to Horace Cole who in our day procured Empire fame by his practical jokes outdoing even Theodore Hook.

The literary craft has a better chance than any other in what is largely a literary production. No prominent example fails: Barrie by Mason, Bennett by Swinnerton, Yeats by Hone, Kipling by G. M. Young, Saintsbury by Nichol Smith. Here indeed is richness. It is interesting that 'Peter Pan,' by which Barrie acquired stature beside Lewis Carroll, convinced Beerbohm Tree that he was going mad. The story of the appearance of the statue in Kensington Gardens is Barrie-ish in the extreme and symbolised his mind as much as Eros symbolises Alfred Gilbert's—'the English Cellini' whose odd career is told by James Laver. Mr Mason has built up his account of Barrie (with some reservations) out of Denis Mackail's Life.

Whether Arnold Bennett 'will live as long as English novels are read' is a puzzle for posterity to solve since he combined 'the grimness of Zola with the airy romance of Ouida,' both of whom have sunk posthumously, but their parentage may prove immortally fruitful. Hall Caine is to be remembered 'chiefly for astonishing popularity.'

Saintsbury is also rather a puzzle, for critics and compilers are elusive. Dr Nichol Smith has caught his powers ably enough. Few readers have read as much as Saintsbury succeeded in writing and editing. Oculists would have liked a note on the history of his eye-power.

Some of the information is quaint though often worth noting. We learn that 'perhaps the most accurate book in the world' is P. S. Allen's 'Letters of Erasmus.' Allenby is revealed in the sentence that like Napoleon he constantly employed men he had forcibly abused. An anti-alcoholic, called Charrington, seized the Mace in the House of Commons. A scientist bred one million snails to prove a point. Sir Charles Firth wrote 225 Lives for the D.N.B. Is it worth while recording that Mr C. R. L. Fletcher arrived at Eton 'in an Aberdeen version of an Eton Jacket?' It is amusing to read that Dr E. J. Dillon in

sacerdotal disguise once was asked for a blessing by an Italian Admiral and murmured a few erotic words of Anacreon. Lord Rothermere was believed to have been offered the Crown of Hungary. Lord Harris' greatness lay in bringing cricket to the Indians from whose midst arose one of the greatest cricketers of all time. 'Ranji' is here described at his greatest—and indeed he was 'perhaps the greatest cricketer of his generation.' A very striking oriental contrast was Saklatvala, Parsee and Communist M.P.

Staticians will find that a great percentage of this *élite* died childless, apart from the many who lost their sons in the wars. There is one death from enemy action in the Blitz: and two suicides (Gastner the painter and McCardie the Judge). Suicide is not so rare but not always recorded. The benefit of the doubt is a D.N.B. rule. That it does occur at all in the volume should be a mild consolation to the vast majority who will never be successful enough for inclusion.

Incidentally the life of 'Chinese' Johnston reveals that he erected a shrine to Shelley, which Chinese women frequent in order to pray for children. No wonder Sir Reginald fell foul of the missionaries!

A good *mot* fell from Bishop Talbot describing his politics as 'Conservative with a bad conscience.'

What is a 'cape-and-sword part' as established in acting by Fred Terry? We thought it was a pontifical position at the Vatican (*di capo e spada*). Others may ask what is a 'shanty-collector'? Well, one of two fine musicians of the name of Terry commemorated here, was one.

Information, suggestive and sometimes exciting, leaks from every column. It is worth while abandoning newspaper-reading for a fortnight in order to read through this volume of the D.N.B.

He who perseveres to the last page, covering 730 short lives condensed in 933 pages will be factually a wiser man and philosophically a sadder one.

SHANE LESLIE.

Art. 4.—QUIET FLOWS THE SAAR.

'THE wooden curtain!' said my driver—an ex-Leutnant of the Luftwaffe. Into those three words he managed to put all the helpless fury felt by almost every German of whatever class or creed at seeing the Saar once more severed from the Fatherland.

We had rounded a bend in the Rhineland road from Trier—once busy but now grass grown and all but deserted—and there, dividing village from village, farm from farm, was a white barrier backed by soldiers.

No German may pass this barrier without a special permit to visit a parent or a child. No newspapers from Germany are allowed into the Saar. A 'frontier' has been drawn through the Rhineland to link the 'Saarlanders'—they are forbidden to call themselves Germans—with Luxembourg and seal them off from all contact with the east.

Gendarmes minutely examined our visas—the special visas needed for entering the Saar, which no French consulate may grant without authority from the Sûreté at Saarbrücken.

'You will report on arrival to Monsieur Zenner, the High Commissioner's Information Officer,' said the N.C.O. in charge at the barrier.

After an interval of over two years I was again inside the Saar. We drove through magnificent forests which fail to mask the blast furnaces and slag heaps—those towering slag heaps that are darkening the hopes of Western Union. The mighty *Bunkers* of the Siegfried Line have been literally blown out of the ground by French sappers and sprawl at strange angles among the corn.

But to-day the most striking contrast to the French Zone—once you are clear of the frontier patrols—is the absence of all signs of military occupation. You see no *képis* and no *tricolores*. Even the High Commissioner's castle and headquarters are guarded by the newly raised Saarland militia, blond young Germans in field grey.

French tactics have in fact been reversed. The Sûreté now keep in the background. Expulsions from the Saar are to-day rare and Saarlanders no longer glance furtively over their shoulders before discussing politics. Gone are the Gendarmerie, fear of whose forceful methods had made

it difficult on my last visit to persuade any Saarlander to speak his mind.

France is now out to impress the Saarlanders.

Famous French actresses play in the theatre that Hitler built as a memorial to the plebiscite of 1935, when more than nine out of ten Saarlanders voted to return to the Reich. France's best race-horses and football teams compete in the Saar. They draw larger crowds than the actresses. They are easier to understand.

Posters everywhere invite the Saarlander to spend his holidays in France.

Bookstalls are filled with French newspapers and the glossy picture magazines of Paris. The latter sell best. The wittiest French article is somewhat lost on people who cannot speak French.

All hotels and restaurants are open to the Saarlander—a striking contrast to the rest of the French Zone, where many of the best are still 'out of bounds to Germans.' In the evening Saarlanders fill the cafés along the river, eating gargantuan pork chops—at about three-quarters the price they cost in Germany—and listening to the records of Jean Sablon. They wear French clothes—and still look very German.

Distinguished French professors lecture at Homburg University, founded by France in 1947. This university is turning out far more doctors and lawyers than the Saar can possibly absorb, so they are now to be allowed to practise throughout the French Union.

But Monsieur Grandval, the young, immensely able and astute High Commissioner, no longer flirts with the idea of turning the Saarlanders into fully fledged Frenchmen. Marshal Ney's new statue still towers over his birthplace at Saar Louis, but his head has been withdrawn from the postage stamps. Too much has happened, says Grandval, since Saarland peasants marched to Moscow with the Grande Armée. Triumphs won under the first Napoleon have been eclipsed by victories won over the third. Grandval has reluctantly decided that the Prussians have nothing more to fear from Marshal Ney.

He is making no attempt to stave off the collapse of the M.R.S.—the *Mouvement pour la Rattachement de la Saar à la France*. He used the M.R.S. as a *ballon d'essai* in the hungry winter of 1946-47. France has never

admitted an official link with this movement, which is run by a few returned *émigré* Saarlanders. But they were allowed liberal supplies of petrol and newsprint and an imposing office as a headquarters. They plastered the Saar with posters showing a dove flying towards a ruined street, carrying in its beak an ear of corn and a *tricolore*. These were the only posters then to be seen in the entire Saar.

Yet even in that nightmare winter of 1946-47 the M.R.S. enrolled few members. Grandval decided that they were doing more harm than good and refused to license their candidates at the General Election of 1947. They can no longer afford their fine headquarters and have retired to a modest third floor in a back street of Saarbrücken.

Grandval now concentrates on fostering 'anti-Prussianism' and loyalty to the 'independent' Saar State.

Prussia swallowed up the Saar in 1815. Prussian officials installed themselves in Saarbrücken, and with the rapid development of coal and steel came Prussian technicians and a host of Prussian workers.

Schools are now taught that the Saar's wealth has been exploited for the benefit of Prussia; that for over a century the Saarlanders have been ordered about by arrogant officials from Berlin. 'Prussians' are now being weeded out of the civil service. Anyone who was not resident in the Saar before January 1933—about 8 per cent. of the present population—is denied a vote and treated as a foreigner.

How much ice this teaching cuts is doubtful. So many children are the products of mixed marriages. After over a hundred years of union with Prussia, pure Saarland blood is rare.

Grandval will tell you that the vast majority of Saarlanders support 'the autonomous State.' He will point out that the Christian and Socialist parties—both pledged to the Saar's new constitution and the economic *Anschluss* with France—won 48 out of 50 seats at the General Election of 1947.

But in fact the Saarland voter was allowed only two choices by the French—the hated Communists or the Christian-Socialist Coalition, led by *émigrés* to whom I heard a high French official refer in private as the '*marionnettes*.'

The Saarlander was afraid not to vote—for fear of drawing attention to himself. The Sûreté were then active and there were frequent expulsions from the Saar. So he voted for the coalition led by Johannes Hoffman, who had lately returned with French citizenship after ten years of exile.

Great pressure had been put on the lesser Christian and Socialist politicians to force them to follow their *émigré*, French appointed leaders into the pro-*Anschluss* camp.

They were summoned before Monsieur Grandval. It was the days of famine—that second icy winter of slow starvation, when the few warm clothes hidden beneath the empty shop counters were on sale only to the black-marketeer. Grandval made himself perfectly clear. The moment the economic *Anschluss* took place, food trains from France would enter the Saar. Shops would at once be filled with shoes, overcoats, dresses, shirts, and stockings from France. Cigarettes—then rationed to nine a week—would be rushed in bulk across the frontier. The Saarlanders would once again be able to buy saucepans and blankets and all the consumer goods they had so long been denied.

Provided there was economic union with France, the Saar's factories would escape dismantling. The fate of the steel works was in their hands.

The Communist 'Neue Zeit' immediately protested that France had no power to strip the steel works, dismantling being a matter for the Allied Control Council. This article was suppressed by the Sûreté and 'Neue Zeit' was banned for a week.

From Trier—just north of the 'frontier'—the aged Archbishop sent a pastoral letter to his clergy in the Saar, strongly opposing any breach with Germany. Father Hollenbach published this letter in his parish magazine and was promptly expelled from the Saar. Father Mollito appealed from the pulpit for a plebiscite. Next day he was put on a train to the Black Forest.

'I shall never permit a popular referendum on the constitution,' Monsieur Grandval told Ernst Roth, the Socialist Secretary-General. 'The great majority of the Saar population are Catholics and are under the influence of the Archbishop of Trier, who is opposed to any union of the Saar with France. It would be an easy matter for the

Archbishop, with the help of the Catholic clergy, to secure a vote against the constitution if the referendum was by secret ballot. I shall not give His Grace the opportunity.'

So the election was held. Johannes Hoffmann, the French-appointed leader of the Christian People's Party, fought his campaign largely on the demand for confessional schools. Attacks on the *Anschluss* and the 'independent' Saar State were forbidden. The whole question of the breach with Germany was played down. The press was not allowed to publish the new constitution proposed for the Saar, a few copies of which were only printed and distributed to Burgermeisters on the very eve of the poll.

The Saarlanders duly turned out and voted—against the Communists. The French then announced that an overwhelming majority had voted for economic union with France and an independent Saar State.

One newly appointed Socialist deputy, Herr Kossmann, said he would propose a plebiscite on the constitution when Parliament met. He was summoned before Monsieur Grandval, who said that should the constitution be rejected, the food trains from France would be turned back. Herr Kossmann capitulated.

The whole French plan depends on keeping the leadership of the Christian and Socialist parties in the hands of extreme francophiles. I asked at the Socialist headquarters in Saarbrücken for Ernst Roth, who as Secretary-General of the party had told me in 1947 that 'the tragic decision to support the *Anschluss*' had been taken 'only to save the steel works from dismantling.'

Ernst Roth, I was told, had 'left for Germany.' (I later found out that he had been expelled from the Saar at twenty-four hours' notice in 1948.) In his place I found one Peter Schattner, wearing a French decoration that he had won fighting the Wehrmacht.

But the membership of both the Christian and Socialist parties is very small indeed. 'Join nothing in the Fourth Reich that may be unpopular in the Fifth' is a modern German maxim.

No new political party or trades union may be formed without the unanimous consent of the Saar Cabinet. The Catholic Saarlanders will never vote for the only licensed opposition—the Communists. So that as long as the handful of *émigrés* can keep control of the two governing parties,

with their small and unrepresentative memberships, Grandval can count on a Cabinet of rabid francophiles.

Grandval has even to curb their zeal. In January the news that 'Jo Jo' Hoffmann, the Saar's eighteen-stone Prime Minister, was off to Paris to lease the Saar's rich mines to France, started an uproar in the rest of Germany. Nazi catchwords leaped into the German headlines and German mobs bellowed that stirring campaign song of the 1935 plebiscite: 'German is the Saar.'

Herr Hoffmann retaliated. He rapidly produced 'a Bill to safeguard democratic order in the Saar State.' It gave his Government some remarkable powers against anyone who 'in public or private meetings, in printed or written matter or in any other way' attacked the Saar's new constitution. Doctors and lawyers would be forbidden to practise. Tradesmen would be forbidden to trade. Anyone who gave 'either indirectly or directly to the foreign Press false or distorted accounts of happenings in the Saar' would be imprisoned for 'not less than three months and fined from 50,000 to 500,000 francs.'

Before the eyes of the world the democratic façade was torn down to reveal the police state. Grandval sent for Hoffmann and no more has been heard of 'the Bill to safeguard democratic order.'

France's most fearless opponents within the Saar are the Communists and the Catholic clergy, led by that staunch German nationalist the Archbishop of Trier and his Vicar-General, von Meurer, an ex-officer of the Prussian Army.

The Communists beat the nationalist drum with gusto, though the noise is largely muffled by the Saarland police. They forecast a glut in coal and steel and widespread unemployment. Police officers stand nightly over the printing presses of 'Neue Zeit' and almost every other issue is confiscated.

Grandval faces more formidable opponents in the aged Archbishop and his Vicar-General. France has asked the Vatican to remove the Saar from the Archbishop's jurisdiction. Father Bungarten, who tried to organise a counter-petition to the Holy See from the Saarland clergy, was promptly escorted across the 'frontier.'

The Pope has now sent an Apostolic Visitor to Saarbrücken—Monseigneur Schulien. Grandval hopes that the Saar, like North Tyrol in 1919, will be made into a special

Apostolic Administration, but Monseigneur Schullien does not expect the Pope to take any definite action before the peace treaty.

Besides priests and communists, France has lately had trouble with footballers. Saarbrücken Football Club, who are of course forbidden to play against German teams, have refused to join the French Second Division—much to the annoyance of Monsieur Grandval. As they recently beat Rheims—much advertised as the 'master town' of the French First Division—by two goals to nil, their reasons may not be entirely political.

What is in the mind of the ordinary Saarlander, whose views both sides are so eager to interpret? He thinks as a German. 'Why are you British dismantling *our* ship-yards?' asked a miner.

He respects Monsieur Grandval as a 'strong man,' but looks on the Saarland Ministers as quislings. The courage that several of them showed in fighting with the French Resistance against the Wehrmacht with a price on their heads is now held against them by the average Saarlander. They say they were fighting Fascism. He says they were traitors.

Emigrés who return to their conquered country in the baggage wagons of foreign armies are always suspect. 'Where was "Jo Jo" Hoffmann during the Allied terror-bombing? Eating his head off in South America,' said a woman in Saarlouis. 'Just look how fat he got while our men were dying in Russia.'

I talked with 200 Saarlanders—other than officials—during my last visit. Of these 102 were for 'an immediate return to the Reich'—mostly on grounds of *Blut*. 'We're as German as the Rhine,' said a washerwoman living in the cellar of a bombed house. But industrialists also pointed out some material drawbacks to the economic *Anschluss*. Under German rule Saarland industry enjoyed an 18 per cent. discount on Saar coal. France has abolished this. Saar coal at the pithead now costs 4,500–3,000 francs a ton (52.9–35.3 marks). Ruhr coal at the pithead costs an average of about 34 marks a ton. Southern Germany, which used to buy 30 per cent. of the Saar's heavy-finished goods, now buys from the Ruhr instead.

Of the other 98 Saarlanders with whom I spoke, most

supported the 'independent' Saar State 'for the time being'—because 'we get cheaper food and it saves our industry from dismantling.' But there is more and more food and less and less dismantling in Western Germany itself.

A small minority favour the Saar State in the hope that it can become the kernel of Western Union. But they emphasise that others too must sink their nationalism. 'France also must pool the coal and iron ore of Lorraine.'

But even these in their less sober moments are apt to yearn for the glitter of the Reich. One night I was asked to a birthday party by a forester of Lebach. He had lost an arm in the Ukraine and told me he had had a bellyful of nationalism. The West should scrap its frontiers and unite its resources, skill, and *Kultur*.

Glasses were filled and refilled. The forester brought out his scrap book. He gazed nostalgically at a photograph of Chartres Cathedral. 'Prima,' said the forester. 'That's Western craftsmanship for you.' He was referring not to the cathedral but to a Tiger Tank parked beneath the *Porte Royale*.

As the evening went on there was a good deal of hearty Teutonic singing. I asked for a Saarland folk song. In a moment my host—this high-minded internationalist—was on his feet. He raised his glass and led a rousing chorus of 'German is the Saar.'

The memory of that tune haunts the French. 'We shall hear it again openly in the streets before much longer,' said a French mining engineer, who is now running the same pit as he did before 1935. The *Sûreté* expect trouble and are gloomy of the outcome of any plebiscite.

There are ominous signs. In March—in defiance of their French-appointed leaders—the miners' trades union rejected the Franco-Saar Mines Convention signed this year in Paris by Herr Hoffmann and the French Foreign Minister.

The Saarland Cabinet did its utmost to suppress this news. Its significance is hard to exaggerate, for the French have always treated the miners as a privileged class.

The truth is that the Saar State and its puppet Cabinet can be maintained ultimately only by force and faked elections.

What are the French motives in the Saar? First and foremost comes security. The French, thinking of war in

terms of the last one, are haunted by the nightmare of a great Panzer Korps once more rolling off the production lines. Coal is the basic ingredient for the making of a Panzer Korps. Alone the French coalfields can produce less than half as much as Western Germany. But detach the Saar mines from Germany, add them to the French, and their combined output equals more than two-thirds of that of the Ruhr.

Almost on his death-bed Leon Blum this year begged the French Government not to divide the West over the Saar. France, he urged, could secure the coal without political annexation masked by a puppet State.

Dr Adenauer and his Cabinet are not unreasonable. They suggest that the Saarlanders be allowed a plebiscite to choose between the independent Saar State and becoming the 12th *Land* in the West German Federal Republic. But they also propose an International Saar Authority, which will see to it that the French need for coal is satisfied.

It was fortunate for France—and for the whole West—that Konrad Adenauer won last year's election. We shall be lucky if we again see so broad-minded a Chancellor at the German helm. A life-long francophile, he ever flirted in his younger days with Rhineland separatism. His view point is West European, not nationalist, and he is determined that the Council of Europe shall not founder on the slag-heaps of the Saar. But his narrow majority at Bonn rests precariously on a loose coalition, and German feeling on the Saar is strong.

Soviet leaders were quick to see that the 'Saar Question' was by far the most formidable obstacle to Western Union. Max Reimann received his orders and the German Communists proceeded to shout their heads off. The Communists set the pace for other parties—just as the Kremlin had intended.

Kurt Schumacher, the dynamic and dictatorial leader of the German Socialists, was not going to allow the Communists a monopoly of patriotic thunder. He denounced the French action in the most violent terms and has firmly pledged the Socialists to the battle cry: 'If the Saar sits at Strasbourg, Germany will not.'

It took some courage for Konrad Adenauer to propose, in the midst of this furore, an International Saar Authority. Schumacher has taunted him as 'the Chancellor of the

Allies.' The life of Adenauer's coalition Government depends on the support of the small German Party, the more moderate of the nationalist groups. They are uneasy at the Chancellor's refusal to be stampeded by the Saar uproar, as indeed are several of his own party, the Christian Democrats.

It is not impossible that Dr Adenauer's broadminded approach to the 'Saar Question' and the Council of Europe will bring him down. His majority at Bonn hangs in the balance.

Schumacher at the Chancellery is not an encouraging thought. Adenauer puts Strasbourg before the Saar. Schumacher does not. 'Schumacher spricht': if you close your eyes while the Socialist leader is pounding the rostrum and shrieking the grievances of 'Das Deutsches Volk' you seem to be listening to another German leader no so long dead. Schumacher is a fanatic, who would rather break up the Council of Europe than yield an iota of German sovereignty over the Saar.

It is ironic to remember that the British Labour Government did much to plant this thorn in their own flesh. Mr J. B. Hynd had what seemed to the French a rather naïve trust in the German Socialists and deep suspicion of Adenauer and the Christian Democrats as 'reactionary Tories.' Schumacher was given a ration of newsprint out of all proportion to his party's numbers and Military Government officers in town and village received a letter telling them that the Socialists were the party to encourage.

But it is the Christian Democrats who have proved themselves the better Europeans, the Socialists who demand a centralised German State and reject the surrender of any scrap of national sovereignty. Schumacher's aims are not so very different from those of Marshal Tito. Both are Marxists who want to be masters in their own house and to interpret 'Das Kapital' to their peoples without the aid of Russian high priests.

Britain and America would do well to urge the French to accept the German Chancellor's offer of an International Saar Authority—an offer intended to guarantee France the coal she needs.

Instead, the British and American Governments are doing exactly the reverse. They are virtually allowing

France a free hand in the Saar. Dr Adenauer's offer has been ignored.

This is a dangerous course. Britain and America are backing a police state with a puppet government—the negation of all they have preached to the Germans for the last five years. Nationalists and Communists have been quick to point out the sort of justice that an unarmed, democratic German Government can expect from the West. It seems extraordinary folly to make Dr Adenauer's hard task so much harder.

We should allow the Saarlanders to federate with Western Germany, the distribution of their coal being supervised as the German Government suggests. But we should avoid a plebiscite that is certain to stir up old hatreds and so weaken the West.

French Ministers have spoken of the Saar State as a bridge linking Germany and France. In fact, of course, it has opened a gulf that the Russians will do their best to widen. Most of those Saarlanders who still tacitly support Herr Hoffmann's clique are 'bacon Frenchmen' cynically awaiting better times in Germany. And unless France is prepared to accept West European control of the iron ore and coal of Alsace-Lorraine, the few genuine idealists in the Saar will be disillusioned.

German demands for a plebiscite will grow, fanning the flames of German nationalism. We shall once again have to go through all the tedious rigmarole of 'Deutsche Fronts' and torchlight processions. The United States and Britain will not for ever be able or willing to deny a million Saarlanders the right to vote on the French-made 'frontier.' The longer France resists this demand, the louder will be the triumphant shouts when a plebiscite at last is granted.

German nationalism will have tasted blood. Nazis hailed the 1935 referendum as if it had been a great military victory. The neo-Nazis will do the same. Looking back at the Fuhrer's triumphal entry into the Saar, it seems strange that Whitehall and Washington should encourage France to give such hostages to fortune.

JONATHAN BLOW.

Art. 5.—PARTNERSHIP IN INDUSTRY.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VALDER PLAN

THE even balance between the two major parties which resulted from last February's General Election is not likely to be altered very much at the next election even if the Conservatives should win it and should form the next Government. As a consequence the present Labour Government, and the next Government by whichever party it may be formed, will have to devise a bipartisan economic policy capable of commanding the support of the Opposition. The Labour Government will be unable to proceed with its plans for the extension of nationalisation and will have to concentrate on the problem of increasing productivity and balancing our external payments, a task which depends to a large extent upon its improving industrial relations.

The Labour Party fully recognises the need for increased cooperation between management and labour in securing such an increase in productivity. We no longer hear Socialists telling the workers that cooperation with management is a betrayal of the class struggle; on the contrary they have been doing everything possible to secure such cooperation and advocating joint consultation and urging the need for a spirit of partnership in much the same way as the Conservatives. They are probably rather surprised to find that nationalisation has done little to increase such cooperation and that strikes occur as often in nationalised industries as in others. So we are told that 'nationalisation is not socialism,' while socialism is redefined in 'Labour Believes in Britain' in terms of full employment, industrial democracy, and the redistribution of wealth.

In the nationalised industries many workers seem to regard the additional officials that they have to support in much the same light as they used to regard the stockholders of private industry; and they have to support the old stockholders as well as the new officials. It is not surprising that many workers are rather disillusioned with nationalisation and that the more responsible leaders of the Labour Party are inclined to minimise the place of nationalisation in the Labour Programme and stress the idea of a fair distribution of the national income. It may

be that the abandonment by Labour of the nationalisation of insurance in favour of 'mutualisation' foreshadows a change from a collectivist to a cooperative interpretation of socialism.

After all Robert Owen, the Christian Socialists, and other Socialist pioneers meant by socialism not nationalisation but the cooperative organisation of production. To Keir Hardie and other founders of the Labour Party it meant a fairer distribution of wealth more than nationalisation, while groups such as the Guild Socialists were as strongly opposed to nationalisation as any Conservative. As the leaders of the Labour Party discover what nationalisation involves in practice, it may be that they will abandon the idea of general nationalisation and return to the cooperative ideas of the early socialists. For they must realise that nationalisation can do little or nothing to increase productivity and that greater production is of vital importance. If they are returned to office they will be forced to concern themselves less with grandiose schemes for nationalising more industries and more with the problems of incentives and of increasing cooperation between management and workers.

If the Labour Party is likely to be forced by economic necessity to change its ideas, so also is the Conservative Party. There was a time when most Conservatives were very well satisfied with our economic system and would have resented any proposals to change it as an intolerable interference with the rights of employers. Now, however, they have (so they say) all become Liberals and all in favour of reforms. Conservatives to-day realise that an economic system which leads to periodic depression and mass unemployment is far from satisfactory, and recognise that the growth of monopoly in the inter-war years under Conservative Governments was not an unmixed blessing. They also recognise, in principle, that the concentration of more than half the property of the country in the hands of less than 1 per cent. of the population is not really desirable and say that they favour a property owning democracy, that is a more equitable distribution of property. Moreover, they are attaching increasing importance to the creation of a spirit of partnership in industry, perhaps partly as a result of their recognition of the urgent need for increased productivity.

At the Conservative Party Conference at Blackpool in October 1946 Mr Churchill declared that Conservatives 'seek so far as possible to make the status of the wage earner that of a partner rather than of an irresponsible employee.' Mr Eden developed the same theme. 'We must not be content,' he said, 'that the workpeople in our industries should be mere units of labour. We must regard them as individuals who have the right to share in the knowledge of the common purpose of the industry in which they are working. If capital and labour are to be partners they must be full partners. Nothing less than this matches up to the needs of human personality.' During the three years since the Blackpool Conference many Conservative speakers have re-emphasised the need for a spirit of partnership in industry, a need which has become more urgent as it has become clearer that our economic difficulties are not merely the after effect of war but the necessary consequence of the industrialisation of other countries. Without the full and enthusiastic co-operation of the workers we may not be able to produce and sell the goods necessary to pay for essential imports of food and raw materials. It is rather surprising, therefore, that after so much talk about partnership the last Conservative Conference before the election did not give any very clear indication as to what a Conservative Government would do to create such a spirit of partnership.

At the Conference at Earl's Court there were resolutions on the Agenda which proposed that co-partnership should be restored in the gas industry and introduced in the mines. They were not chosen by the party leaders for debate and amendments to the main resolution on the nationalised industries were not debated either. There was also an amendment to the resolution on the 'Right Road for Britain' which proposed that co-partnership should be encouraged in industry generally by means of tax concessions as proposed in Mr Marples' 'Road to Prosperity'; but this also was crowded out. The result was that the Conservatives were left to fight the election without any positive proposals for the extension of a spirit of partnership in industry. Perhaps this failure to translate principle into policy was to some extent due to the view of some Conservatives that the workers are already partners in industry if only they would recognise it.

It is sometimes suggested, for instance, that the chief problem in establishing a spirit of partnership in industry is an educational one. It must be made clear to the worker that Labour is already a partner of Capital in the process of production, that the interests of Capital and Labour are identical and that the workers should therefore work as hard as possible. Surely, say these people, it is obvious that the interests of Capital and Labour are the same and that the more they produce together the more there will be to divide between them. The poor ignorant workers do not seem to be able to appreciate this fact and it is therefore our duty to explain it to them by such means as we have at our disposal. That Capital and Labour have a common interest in producing as much as possible is as clear as day. Marxist agitators have been misleading the unfortunate workers and it is up to us to explain to them the true situation. Then they will work with a will and we shall all be very much better off.

Things do not, however, look quite like this from the worker's point of view. Whether he calls himself a Socialist or not, the Trade Unionist is apt to assume that the interests of Capital and Labour are diametrically opposed. He takes it for granted ; and he is determined by collective bargaining through his Union to secure for himself and his mates as large a share of the product of industry as possible. As he sees it, he is hired for as little as he can be induced to accept and the whole of the product of his labour goes to his employer, the capitalist. The more the employer gets, the less there will be for the workers. Why should we workers, he asks, work harder for the profit of capitalist stockholders ? The way to increase our incomes is not to work harder but to refuse to work, to stand together for our rights and come out on strike. He may add that strikes can be used to help to create a revolutionary situation, overthrow the capitalist system and set up the superior system called socialism. But in any case he will say that any talk about there being a common interest between Capital and Labour is Tory humbug. It should be self evident to any intelligent worker that the interests of Capital and Labour are diametrically opposed, that the more they get the less there will be for us.

Some employers go to a great deal of trouble to explain

to their workers that the interests of Capital and Labour are identical, that the more is produced the more there will be for all. Yet the workers continue to listen to the Marxist agitators. Why should this be? The answer is, surely, that the worker has no kind of legal guarantee that the product of industry will, in fact, be divided fairly. Whatever the Government may say about 'Work or Want,' however carefully employers may explain what a large proportion of revenues from sales goes in wages, what a large part to the Treasury in taxation, and what a small part in dividends to the poor shareholders, the workers are convinced that the primary purpose of production is to increase the profits of shareholders.

The employer is himself less inclined to produce efficiently if he knows that most of the extra income which he produces by good management is going to be collected by the state in taxation, and the worker feels much the same about payments to stockholders. He is not really interested in increasing the dividends of the widows and orphans who hold the shares any more than he is really interested in benefiting the community as a whole by paying more in P.A.Y.E. He wants to be assured that extra effort now is going to mean better living sooner for himself and his family.

It is probable that most managements to-day try to divide the product of industry as fairly as possible. The days are over when the employer was concerned only to pile up profits for himself or his shareholders. That may have been the case fifty years ago but it is not the case to-day. Modern managements recognise their responsibilities to their stockholders and seek to obtain for them a 'reasonable' return on their capital. But most of them also recognise their responsibilities to their customers, to their workers, and to the community as a whole. The primary duty of the producer is to provide the consumer with articles of good quality at a reasonable price, to give them good value for their money. At the same time he must try to pay fair wages and provide good working conditions and pay proper regard to the interests of the local community and the needs of the nation.

If most managements recognise these wider responsibilities, the law does not. In legal theory, if not in industrial practice, the object of industry is to produce

profits for the people who put up the capital. The public is served and the workers are paid because and in so far as it is profitable to do so. The whole of the product of industry belongs by law to the people who put up the capital and the necessary consequence is that divergence of interest between management and workers which is such a characteristic feature of the capitalist system. Nationalisation really does nothing to change the situation because the product of industry still goes to the people putting up the capital and the divergence of interest remains. Strikes are common enough in the nationalised industries for this reason, as also in consumers' cooperative societies.

One of the most important tasks of the new Government will be to encourage cooperation between management and labour and create a spirit of partnership in industry. Joint consultation is, of course, advocated by both parties, but joint consultation is unlikely to be fully effective unless a real common purpose can be established, unless the workers can be persuaded they are going to share fairly in the product of their work. What can be done to encourage this belief? Tax reduction can, of course, help. When the worker knows that a large part of any additional earnings are going to be collected in P.A.Y.E. it is not surprising that he should feel that extra effort is hardly worth while. He should also realise that the very large sums paid by industry in income tax and profits tax might very well be used to pay higher wages; every pound that industry pays in taxation is so much less money available for the wage packet. Yet the worker has no guarantee that if industrial taxation is reduced he will benefit in any way at all. He assumes that any funds made available by a reduction of taxation will be devoted entirely to increasing the dividends of stockholders. Therefore he is apt not merely to acquiesce in taxation at the present level but to demand increased taxation; and in spite of the effects of taxation upon prices and export markets.

Then there are bonus systems and profit-sharing schemes. These, unfortunately, are regarded by the workers with some suspicion as being designed primarily to increase the profits of the stockholders. They argue that they would not be introduced unless the management considered that it would thereby be able to get more out of the workers for less money. If these incentive systems

did not do this they would not increase the profits of stockholders and would not be introduced. The T.U.C. have recently been stressing the need for incentives ; but they suspect profit sharing and bonus systems as being designed to benefit the stockholders rather than themselves.

Bonus systems and individual piece rates have, moreover, a number of disadvantages. They tend to be complicated and to involve an excessive amount of clerical labour. They tend to lead to friction among workers and to have an adverse effect upon quality. They tend to lead to rate cutting and to what is known as a 'vicious speed up.' They are useful in some industries but do not help to create a spirit of partnership and are unlikely to be fully effective unless such a spirit is created.

What other ways are there of convincing the workers that they are going to reap a fair reward for extra effort ? One way which has received insufficient attention in this country is the system of employee partnership which has been developed by the New Zealand Employee Partnership Institute under the Chairmanship of Mr Harry Valder. The Valder Plan, as the system is called, is remarkably simple. Under it the workers and managers in an enterprise are issued with Labour Shares of no capital value in proportion to the value of their services. These Labour Shares carry voting power in the company in the same way as Capital Shares. Capital is paid a reasonable return ; first interest upon capital and then a cumulative 'risk rate' varying with risks involved. Any additional profits are distributed to managers and workers as a dividend on Labour Shares.

The Valder Plan is described in detail in Mr Wickham Steed's book 'A Way to Social Peace,' and also in numerous pamphlets issued by the New Zealand Employee Partnership Institute and in its journal 'Working Together.' Basically Mr Valder's employee-partnership system combines the cooperative principle of a limited return on capital with the unequal voting power characteristic of a company. The return on capital is limited so that the enterprise is run in the interests of all those engaged in it, but unequal voting power ensures that managerial authority is maintained. The system does not involve the election of managements by the equal vote of workers which contributed so largely to the collapse of the self-governing workshops of the Christian Socialists a hundred

years ago. On the other hand it does mean that the workers are represented on Boards of Management, and the fact that the return on capital is limited and management is working in the interests of the workers helps to encourage all kinds of joint consultation and cooperation between representatives of management and workers on joint committees of various kinds.

Mr Valder declares that his employee-partnership system derives to some extent from his observation of Maori cooperatives when he was a saw miller in North Island at the end of the last century. It was not until 1924 that he succeeded in getting New Zealand Company Law amended so as to authorise the issue of Labour Shares of no capital value. The empowering Act of 1924 was superseded by the New Zealand Companies Act of 1933, Section 59 of which empowers companies to adopt the system if they wish to do so. Quite a number of companies have adopted the system and it has proved itself in practice so that it is now possible for Governments to consider adopting it not merely on a permissive but on a compulsory basis, that is requiring limited liability companies to limit the return which they pay on capital and issue Labour Shares to their workers.

The basic difference between the Valder system of employee partnership and profit sharing is that under the Valder Plan the return on capital is limited and all surplus revenues go to the workers as a dividend on Labour Shares. There is no possibility of extra effort on the part of the workers resulting in higher and higher profits for the stockholders, and the plan cannot therefore be criticised by Trade Unionists on the grounds that it is designed to increase the profits of stockholders. The system is, indeed, very similar to that of the Cooperative Productive Societies in this country in which the return on capital is also limited and in which surpluses are distributed directly as a dividend on wages. Many of these societies have been established with the help of Trade Union funds, sometimes as a result of strikes in C.W.S. factories by workers who maintained that cooperative production as well as cooperative distribution was one of the basic aims of the Cooperative Movement.

There are about fifty Cooperative Co-partnership Societies in this country, in all of which the return on

capital is limited and surpluses are either distributed wholly as a dividend on wages or divided between labour and the consumer. None of these Societies has ever been involved in a strike, and it is not surprising that the Co-operative Party, in its pamphlet 'Building the New Britain,' should suggest that the principles of cooperative co-partnership might well be tried in industries not suitable for nationalisation. In all the Societies the workers are represented on the Committee of Management; but, as under the Valder Plan, the Management is not wholly elected by the workers. Most of the Societies include consumers' societies and Trade Unions in their membership, and this helps to maintain managerial authority at the same time as giving the workers an effective voice in control.

Now there are quite a number of people, both in industry and in the Unions, who consider that it is essential to establish the reality of partnership in industry if we are to get a spirit of partnership. In some firms, such as Glacier Metals Limited of Wembley and the John Lewis Partnership, the return on capital is definitely limited and every effort is made to make it clear to the workers that any additional earnings will either be distributed as a dividend on wages, or on wages and salaries, or used for their benefit in some other way. The Lincoln Electric Company of Cleveland, Ohio, said to be the most efficient firm in America and to pay the highest wages in the world, is organised along similar lines.

While firms such as these formally limit the return which they pay on capital, many others do so in an informal way and seek to pay a reasonable rather than the highest possible return on capital. As the 'Economist' remarked on July 30 last: 'the responsibility for dividend limitation cannot be put wholly on the Government, for some Directors practised dividend limitation long before the Government thought of it. In doing so they mentally segregated the company from its shareholders. Once capital is raised it is easy for management to slip into the idea of regarding members of the company as "lenders" who ought to be satisfied with a more or less fixed rate of dividend.'

Some industrialists, such as Sir Charles Bartlett, Managing Director of Vauxhall Motors, are convinced that

industry will never get the full and active cooperation of the workers unless the return on capital is limited and the surplus revenues of industry are distributable as a dividend on wages and salaries. The limitation of the return on capital is also favoured by the late Mr Samuel Courtauld in his recent book 'Ideals and Industry.' It was recommended by the Nuffield College Conference in 1943. It is interesting to note that it is also favoured by many Christian sociologists. In his book 'Christianity and the Social Order,' published in 1941, the late Archbishop Temple recalled that when limited liability was first introduced in 1855 there were many who claimed that if the liability of the investor was to be limited his return ought to be limited too. Archbishop Temple argued that company law ought to be amended so as to incorporate the cooperative principle of a limited return on capital. Mgr Ryan comes to the same conclusion in his pamphlet 'A Suggested Limitation of Capitalist Property,' and Fr Andrew Gordon in the 1949 Catholic Social Year Book 'Property in the Christian Tradition' also favours the limitation of the return on capital. The same principle is implicit in the ideas of Christian thinkers such as Jacques Maritain when they write of associative or cooperative production.

'Aims of Industry' and other people have made it clear that the return received by the average investor is more modest than many Trade Unionists seem to think. But if most investors do, in fact, receive a reasonable return that is no reason why they should receive an unlimited return. So long as the return on capital is unlimited the worker has no kind of guarantee that he will, in fact, receive a fair share of the product of industry. The average worker is prepared to recognise that the investor who has risked his money is entitled to a reasonable return proportionate to risks involved. He invests money himself in the Post Office Savings Bank or in a Building or Cooperative Society and receives a reasonable return. What he does not understand is why the investor whose liability is limited should receive an unlimited return.

The investor, for his part, would probably benefit from the limitation of the return on capital for two reasons. Firstly because the increased productivity that would be

likely to result would make him more likely to get that reasonable return. And secondly because he would be less likely to have to pay an excessive price for his shares and then suffer capital loss when anticipated dividends were not maintained. With the return on capital limited by law the ordinary shareholder would receive a somewhat greater return than the preference shareholder because his risks are greater, but there would be less chance of prices being pushed up artificially by speculators.

The distribution of the whole of the surplus revenues of industry to some of the people who put up the capital has exactly the same effect upon productivity as excessive taxation. When he knows that a large part of any additional earnings resulting therefrom will be collected in taxation the employer does not feel very much inclined to do everything possible to increase efficiency. It simply is not worth while. In the same way when the worker knows that the fruits of extra effort are going, largely or wholly, to the stockholder in higher dividends or to the state in taxation he is not inclined to put his back into his work. It is simply not worth while. But with the return on capital limited by law and surpluses distributed as a dividend on wages and salaries, or as a dividend on Labour Shares, both managers and workers would have every reason to work with a will. All those actively associated in production would receive an unlimited return as a return on work; hard work and enterprise would be encouraged. The common purpose established would encourage cooperation between management and workers and participation in control is, of course, an essential feature of real partnership.

Workers can participate in control in a variety of ways of which representation on the Board of Directors and voting at Ordinary Meetings in proportion to Labour Shares held is but one. At least as important is the election of representative committees to meet in joint council with management and discuss production and other problems, while the formation of cooperative labour groups within the factory is also most valuable. But it would probably be unwise to initiate legislation extending workers' participation in control beyond what is involved in the Valder Plan until a common purpose is established by the limitation of the return on capital and a spirit of partner-

ship established. With such a spirit joint consultation is likely to develop rapidly without any legislation at all.

The Liberal co-ownership proposals are, of course, a move in the direction of partnership, but they do not really amount to co-ownership but only compulsory profit sharing. If, however, the return on capital were limited by law and the surplus revenues of industry became distributable as a dividend on wages and salaries, the workers would become the residual beneficiaries of industry, holders of the equity, owners. The whole basis of company law would be changed. Two of the industrialists interviewed by the Liberal 'Ownership for All' Committee argued strongly in favour of limiting the return on capital and the employee-partnership system is in no way incompatible with the Liberal co-ownership proposals. It is a practicable way of making what the Conservatives call partnership in industry an effective reality. And it is very close to what the Socialist pioneers meant by socialism; after all the limitation of the return on capital was the basis of Owen's experiment at New Lanark and of the work of the Christian Socialists. The introduction of Mr Valder's system of employee partnership would be fully in accord with the principles of all three parties.

To establish employee partnership it would be necessary to frame legislation based on the New Zealand Companies Act, 1933, requiring all limited liability companies to introduce the system within, say, three years or, in the case of new companies, within three years of incorporation. Many companies claim that they already pay a reasonable return on capital and it might be possible to leave the determination of a 'reasonable' return on existing capital to negotiation between the management and workers of each company. The rate of return payable on additional capital raised by established companies might well be left, as in New Zealand, to supply and demand, a higher return being payable where risks were greater. In the case of a new company risks are, of course, very great. Profits made in the first three years might well be ploughed back and counted as initial capital on which a limited return, determined by negotiation between management and workers, would be paid when employee partnership was introduced.

On the other hand it might be found necessary for the

law to require the return on existing capital to be limited to, say, 1947 levels or, say, 6 per cent. of market values on a particular date or 6 per cent. of nominal values whichever might be the highest, and to allow a higher return to be paid in particular cases where a higher return seemed justified. It might be found necessary for the law to establish different maximum limits for the return payable on capital in different industries and to try to control dividends as prices are controlled. The nature of the legislation limiting the return on capital might well depend upon the character of the Government introducing it. But whatever Government is returned is likely to be forced to introduce some kind of legislation on the matter.

The Unions have been demanding effective control of profits since the autumn of 1947 as a condition of full Union participation in the production drive and in the Government's stabilisation policy. Resolutions calling for the more effective control of profits have been passed by individual Unions and by Congress by large majorities. At present the workers are being asked to work harder and lay off wage demands; but they know that extra effort and restraint in wage demands must necessarily tend to increase profits. Voluntary dividend limitation makes no difference; it merely means a delay in the distribution of dividends and the stockholder may benefit at once by an increase in the capital value of his holding. Since devaluation, profits and the cost of living have been increasing; yet the workers are being asked to refrain from pressing wage demands. It is not, perhaps, surprising that many are still being pressed in spite of the T.U.C.'s endorsement of the Government's stabilisation policy, and the pressure is likely to increase as a consequence of the size of the minority vote at the Trade Union Conference on January 12.

The Government will probably be forced to introduce legislation on profits in order to stabilise wages and prices, in spite of devaluation and the increased cost of living, and in order to provide the incentive for which the F.B.I., the T.U.C., and leaders of all the parties have been calling. Sir Stafford Cripps has said in April and July 1948 and again in January and September 1949 that he might have to introduce such legislation; and the 'Sunday Times,' the 'Investors' Chronicle,' the 'Economist,' and

the 'Financial Times' have all urged that this legislation should be introduced without delay rather than continue the system of 'voluntary' dividend limitation or Government by pressure.

Temporary legislation, like the dividend stop operative in Holland, would be of little value because undistributed profits, accumulated as a result of extra effort and restraint in wage demands, would still go, sooner or later, to the stockholders. But legislation making dividend limitation statutory and permanent, though not arbitrarily at 1947 levels, would alter the whole basis of company law. Many investors have been expecting such legislation ever since the White Paper of February 1948. As the 'Spectator' remarked on September 30 last, 'ordinary shares are becoming more and more fixed interest securities with an effective ceiling but no floor.' Shareholders will benefit if legislation helps to reduce speculation and increase productivity.

They would be the more likely to get their reasonable return because the profit incentive would be operative for the people who do the producing. The workers would know not only that productivity paid but that it paid them. They would have every reason to cooperate wholeheartedly with management in increasing production and little reason to press for wage increases. It is probable that some kind of legislation limiting the return on capital will have to be introduced before the centenary of limited liability in 1955. Otherwise we may not be able to stabilise wages and prices and maintain our export markets or to increase productivity sufficiently to pay for essential imports of food and raw materials.

PAUL DERRICK.

Art. 6.—INDONESIA'S INHERITANCE.

IF the nations of Southeast Asia viewed as a 'zone' are as similar as the nations of Europe in like aspect, considered individually their differences are probably correspondingly wide. I say 'probably' because it is virtually impossible for a Westerner to probe deep enough into *Burma and Siam and Indochina and Malaya and Indonesia* to make a valid comparison between the racial and national psychology of each. True, individual studies of one or other of these countries abound, are often penetrating and come as a rule from the pen of the pick of European officials after having spent a lifetime among the people they describe. But such books do not answer the sort of questions which to-day beset everyone occupationally connected with Southeast Asia in whatever capacity. 'Will Indonesia go the same way as Burma?' 'Can Malays and Chinese ever become assimilated into a homogeneous Malayan nation?' 'Which of these five countries offers the best prospect for capital investment?' 'In which is the native character least reconcilable with Communism?' 'Which displays most readiness to cooperate with the West?' For a true answer to such questions is not to be obtained solely from recent history or the contemporary political set-up. In each country the dominant factor is ultimately the national psychology. But a comparative psychological study of even the dominant races of Southeast Asia is a work of the future, if, indeed, it is ever accomplished. For such a task would presuppose long residence in each country and a thorough knowledge of its language, religion, social life, and custom. Possibly such opportunities for comparison will become more easily available with the disappearance or loosening of colonial monopolies and the increasing circulation of U.N.O. and similar international officials, though it is doubtful whether their functions would allow the time indispensable to a knowledge of even the dominant races of each country in depth. Perhaps one day Southeast Asia will produce a Keyserling, and an objective comparison of its neighbouring peoples from an Asian pen would be revealing beyond the capacity of any Western writer.

Like most Europeans, when visiting these countries I have been struck with their resemblances, and it is with

great diffidence that I now venture to suggest a contrast which seems to be borne out alike by recent and by more remote history. That the Dutch had an easier problem in Indonesia than we in Burma or the French in Indochina was due, among other things, to the character of the Indonesians, whose readiness to compromise and desire for good relations with the West seem marked by comparison with the intransigence of the Burmese and the Vietnamese. The men in charge of the new Federation of Indonesia are, on the whole, more modest, more cautious, more willing to learn, and less ruthless than their opposite numbers in Indochina and in Burma. Will these qualities make for greater stability in their new State? Indonesian aversion to reprisals has been remarkable, for neither the kidnapping of Sjahrir in May 1946 nor the Communist *putsch* at Medun in October 1948 was followed by the purge which such treasonable action might justly provoke. Is this moderation, more recently demonstrated in West Java and at Macassar, an indication of weakness which vacillates before opposition, or is it a touch of that inspired toleration which alone will build a free nation? On the other hand, was the massacre of Aung San and his colleagues in 1947 and 1948 due to carelessness on their part or to exceptional luck on that of the Communists, or can it be related to the basic fibre of the Burmese character? A glance into Burmese history discloses that one of the first acts of a new sovereign upon his accession was to order the extermination of the entire royal family of the preceding reign, the last occasion being when King Thibaw came to the throne in 1878. Is it certain that this custom has died with the monarchy, or will bloodshed accompany every transfer of power, even in a republican regime? The earliest European picture of Southeast Asia was penned by Mendez Pinto, the sixteenth-century Portugese adventurer now receiving a long-overdue rehabilitation at the hands of Maurice Collis and others, and in his pages there is a striking contrast between the bloodthirsty atrocities perpetrated by the Burmese conqueror of the Mon kingdom of Martaban and the chivalrous mode of warfare conducted in Java. Such incidents must not be pressed too far, but it is difficult to resist the impression that violence and bloodshed are apt to loom larger in the politics of Burma than of Java.

On Indonesian Independence Day, Dec. 27, 1949, the newborn Republic of the United States of Indonesia succeeded to a very different kind of inheritance from that into which the Republic of India had entered two and a half years before. At the time of the transfer of power India and Pakistan took over a going concern backed by a surplus balance of 1,160,000,000*l.* sterling, whereas in Indonesia every department of state—the army, the administration, and the economy—was in a state of chaos and the new Federation saddled with a national debt of 2,400,000,000*l.* (240,000,000*l.*). A similar contrast marked the psychological background. Indonesians who have spent a good deal of time under Nehru's wing in India continue to express amazement at the wholehearted co-operation given by British civil servants to launching the new regime which was to supersede them; and although the actual transfer of sovereignty was carried out in Jakarta with an outward flourish of goodwill from the Dutch on the top level, the old hostility continues to manifest itself, openly and secretly, in various forms, great and small.

The constitutional structure of the Federal Republic (not to be confused with the original Republic set up in 1945) at the time of the transfer of sovereignty was essentially a Dutch edifice. It then consisted of seven self-governing States each having its own president, cabinet, and representative assembly (East Indonesia, West Java, East Java, Madura, East Sumatra, South Sumatra, and the Republic of Indonesia) and eight 'autonomous units' (Middle Java, Bangka, Billiton, Riau, West Borneo, South Borneo, South East Borneo, and East Borneo), all of which, apart from the Republic, were set up under Dutch auspices during their four-year controversy with the Republic and intended to act as a counterpoise to its claim to be alike the fountain and the law of the Indonesian nationalist movement. The Republic, when first established in August 1945, had comprised the whole of Java and Sumatra, but as a result of the two Dutch police actions, since December 1948 had been reduced to a small area of central Java round Jogjakarta, its *second* capital (the Republic had originally been proclaimed and seated at Jakarta). Once Indonesia had obtained its independence, it was only to be expected that the truncated Jogja

Republic would seek to recover its severed members ; but a curious situation now developed. The leaders of the old Jogja Republic had become the heads of the new Federal Republic and had transferred themselves from Jogja to Jakarta, where President Sukarno now reigns in the former Doric palace of the Dutch governors-general. In the interests of general stability the new Federal Government had no desire to pull its own constitution up by the roots and was not a little embarrassed when, immediately following the transfer, the dismembered puppets in Java set up a clamour to be reunited with the parent Jogja Republic. By a presidential decree based on article 43 of the Federal Constitution, whereby 'the democratically expressed desires of the population shall determine the political status of each territory,' on March 8 their demand was conceded. To signal this reunion of Java as an example of fissiparous tendencies in the infant Federal Republic was entirely to misconceive the whole sequence of Indonesia's constitutional evolution. In surrendering their mandate to the Federal Government the Javanese puppets were repudiating the most blatant Dutch exercise on the divide-and-rule theme, not, as mendaciously suggested in certain quarters, the authority of the central Government. So far from being the beginning of internal dissolution, this inevitable reorganisation was an impressive reaffirmation of Indonesian solidarity.

Outside Java the same process is at work. At the time of writing West and South Borneo have already seceded from the Federal Republic in order to accede to the Jogja Republic. East Indonesia is also breaking up. Several of its component units—South Celebes, North Celebes, and Minahassa—have proclaimed themselves part of the Jogja Republic ; and on April 25, by 49 votes to 1, the East Indonesian Parliament adopted a motion calling upon the Government to resign. But an opposite course appears to have been adopted at Ambon, the centre of clove production in the seventeenth century and the first seat of Dutch power in the archipelago, where was proclaimed on April 27 an 'Independent Republic of the South Moluccas.' For centuries the Ambonese have served the Dutch as mercenaries, frequently being employed for the suppression of insurrection elsewhere, particularly in Java, down to the recent conflict with the nationalists, and in the eyes

of the Republic are therefore indelibly tainted with 'collaboration.' The position at Ambon is still uncertain, but, like 'Turk' Westerling's abortive bid to seize West Java in January, the coup d'état seems to have been organised by a mixed band of hang-overs from the Dutch regime who, because of their record as 'collaborationists,' see no future for themselves in Sovereign Indonesia, federal or republican, and are therefore out to sabotage it before it is truly established. It was mainly to forestall the Ambon conspiracy, of which the Federal leaders got wind some weeks before it matured, that Federal troops were despatched to Macassar, where the half-hearted resistance led by Captain Abdul Aziz was part of a plan to seize the whole of East Indonesia. In Sumatra the situation is more obscure than elsewhere. The ports of Padang and Sabang, hitherto under the direct administration of the central Government, have been merged into the Jogja Republic. East Sumatra, based on Medan, on the other hand, is resisting amalgamation with the Javanese Republic, an attitude the Indonesians believe is fathered by the influential European corporations centred there. Republican influence is strongest in central and southern Sumatra, from where many of the leaders come. The central Government contemplates an eventual tripartite division into northern, central, and southern Sumatra, an arrangement which would ignore racial constituents, of which about eleven are important; but so far it would seem that Sumatra is proving as indigestible to the federal Republic as it was to the Dutch.

The decision to send federal troops to Macassar was taken upon the insistence of the Minister of Defence, who is the Sultan of Jogjakarta, and, it would seem, against the inclination of Dr Hatta, the Prime Minister, who foresaw political complications if such action were challenged as an attempt by the Jogja Republic to annex East Indonesia by force. Incidentally this division of opinion should help to disabuse any lingering idea that the Sultan of Jogjakarta is a reluctant prisoner of the Republic. On the contrary, the Republic has probably no more wholehearted or disinterested adherent. Partly owing to his royalty, partly to his great personal prestige, in some parts of Java the Sultan's influence exceeds even that of President Sukarno. To his staunch refusal to cooperate with

the Dutch, Indonesians attribute their final emancipation. For when, after the second police action in December 1948, the Dutch forces occupied Jogjakarta and arrested its leaders, the Sultan refused to receive the Dutch commanders, and by his uncompromising attitude saved the Republic from extinction. He continues to administer his own territory and, as Minister of Defence, in reality wields the supreme power. For this reason he was the chief target of Sultan Hamid II of Pontianak, who in January plotted to assassinate half the Federal Cabinet of which he was a member. In case of need, the Sultan of Jogjakarta might well succeed President Sukarno as head of state.

This problem of administrative reorganisation has many aspects and raises fundamental issues. In Indonesia as elsewhere the authority of the central Government must be absolute if the State is to survive. Under Dutch rule this was ensured by the supremacy of their armed forces, but these the Indonesians have yet to build up. The only force whose loyalty can be relied upon is the T.N.I. (the old Republican Army), for the K.N.I.L. (the old Netherlands East Indian Army), which is in process of being transferred to the Republic, is more a liability than an asset. The amalgamation of the two armies so recently engaged in mortal combat will be neither quick nor easy. Dutch officers are now being withdrawn from the K.N.I.L., but the readiness with which part, at any rate, of these troops lent themselves to attempts to disrupt the Federal Government demonstrates their want of Indonesian patriotism. Apart from Sultan Hamid's plot against the Federal Cabinet, there is no indication that the civil governments of the states have supported these military saboteurs; but after so many challenges to their authority, it is not surprising that even the mildest federal leaders should feel that in administrative personnel loyalty is more to be desired than experience or ability. The 'political unreliability' of the Dutch appointees who staffed the federal states at the time of the transfer has been a cause of grave anxiety to the Cabinet, though with characteristic moderation it has wisely sought to conciliate rather than to purge. Any necessity for a purge has, however, been eliminated by the dissolution of the states which, while undoubtedly gratifying to the 'unitarian'

doctrinaires at Jogjakarta, seems to be mainly the result of spontaneous action within.

The so-called constitutional controversy between 'unitarians' and 'federalists' is unreal and occupies far more prominence in the foreign press than in the affairs of Indonesia. When the Jogja Republic was founded its authority was confined to Java, Sumatra, and Madura, and in plumping for a 'unitary' constitution it used the term rather as a formula to express its aspiration to unite the whole of Indonesia into a single sovereign state than to define the precise type of administration. Later the Dutch adopted 'federalism' as their formula for reducing the Republic to subjection. The long negotiations between The Hague and Jogjakarta were throughout exclusively occupied with the question of sovereignty, and the division of powers between the centre and the provinces never came under discussion. It was first raised at the Inter-Indonesian Conference at Jogjakarta in July 1949, when representatives of the Dutch-established Federal States agreed to join with the Jogja Republic in drafting a provisional constitution for an independent Indonesia, and presumably undertakings were then given by the Republicans guaranteeing the integrity of the Federal States. At the subsequent Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference at The Hague, a Provisional Constitution was adopted, but mainly for the purpose of effecting the transfer of power, and it makes no attempt to determine the relationship between the Central Government and the States.

At any moment we may learn that the Federal Republic has followed the example of its components and dissolved itself, thus leaving the Jogja Republic at last master of the field as the central government of Indonesia. Did President Sukarno foresee this evolution when, on becoming President of the Federal Republic, he retained his position as President of the Jogja Republic? Apart from involving no change in the head of state, such a development would be a change less of substance than of form. It would not signify a split between the new Republic which accepted independence and the old Republic which created the revolution. Nor should it be interpreted as a triumph for the 'unitary' as opposed to the 'federalist' principle save in so far as these words remain the respective banners of the Republic and the

Dutch. The charge that the Jogja Republic has worked to capture supreme authority in order to suppress local liberties is entirely misconceived. If the Federation began life with merely an *ad hoc* skeleton constitution, few of its component States established by the Dutch, except East Indonesia, had even an embryonic constitution. In any case the political system envisaged and partly fashioned by the Dutch was based on the assumption that the struggle would end in a compromise and under such conditions it might have worked satisfactorily. Once Indonesia became independent, however, an entirely new situation was created, making the political legacy of the Dutch obsolete alike as to structure and to personnel.

In the eyes of the Federal leaders, the constitutional metamorphosis in process marks the culmination of the revolution and the real fusion of all Indonesian nationalists. The Dutch, and they are many, who console themselves for their eviction by the belief that sooner or later they will be recalled to clear up the mess, view the 'victory of the unitarians' with dismay as raising a fresh obstacle to such a return. Against the perpetuation of this now artificial distinction between 'unitarians' and 'federalists' it is to be borne in mind that Sovereign Indonesia is fully entitled to adopt whatever form of constitution it pleases and that its insular geography makes some degree of provincial self-government inevitable, whatever name it be called by. In Indonesia as elsewhere there will always be a certain conflict between the centre and the provinces, and this will only be modified by experiment and patience. Java first became head and centre of the archipelago under the fourteenth-century dynasty of Majapahit, and continued so under three centuries of Dutch rule. Divided in all else, the Dutch and the Republicans were at one in their determination that Java should be the seat of power in modern Indonesia, and this was the crux of the deadlock between them.

Under the terms of the transfer, a general election to a constituent assembly was to be held within a year. Although officially this still figures on the agenda, no preparation is under way. In India and in Burma their first general election was held under British auspices and it remains to be seen when another will be attempted. With the Dar-ul-Islam rebels concentrated in the west and the

Communists in the east, even the attempt would seem to be a physical impossibility. For some time to come the Indonesian Government seems likely to remain a self-appointed oligarchy atop a nominated 'Parliament.' If, however, the present Dutch-Indonesian deadlock on the future of New Guinea continues, the Government might be tempted to seek some expression of the popular will. Since the transfer of sovereignty 'Irian Merdeka' has succeeded 'Indonesia Merdeka' as the popular slogan. ('Irian' is the name of the people of New Guinea.) The first Union Conference shelved the issue, which under the terms of transfer is also to be settled by the end of the year.

In the economic sphere the Indonesian Government also carries many burdens inherited from its predecessors. For its size Indonesia is one of the richest countries in the world in natural products, yet, unlike India, the whole of its capital investment is in foreign hands. Above all, most of the banks are Dutch, and it is there that the Dutch hold is strongest. Thus the new Indonesian Government cannot be regarded as truly master in its own house, having responsibility without power. In seeking to restore a bankrupt exchequer to solvency, however, it has chosen the hard way of orthodox finance, and in so doing has given impressive evidence of its willingness to follow Dutch advice.

To check the widespread smuggling which developed as a result of the Dutch economic blockade of the last five years, a new Foreign Exchange Scheme has been introduced under which the proceeds received for goods exported will be paid to the exporter in Indonesian currency. For half the sum so paid the exporter will also receive a Foreign Exchange Certificate entitling the owner to purchase foreign exchange of equivalent amount provided it is accompanied by an Import Permit or a Foreign Exchange Permit. Half the proceeds of this transaction will go to the exporters and half to reduce the Government deficit. Coupled with this system of Foreign Exchange Certificates is a Price Ceiling Order for foodstuffs produced internally and for many services. The price ceiling will also apply to imported goods.

Complementary to the new foreign exchange regulations is a bold measure of currency reform. To reduce

the post-war inflation the Government took the dramatic step of physically tearing in half all bank notes of five guilders and upwards. As from March 19 only the left-hand half was accepted as legal tender, the right-hand half becoming convertible into a 3 per cent. Government loan. At the same time bank balances (except the very small ones) were reduced by half. The population responded loyally to these measures of deflation, which so far have not been followed by a rise in prices. Perhaps it was in anticipation of some such step that, on the eve of the transfer, the Dutch doubled all official salaries.

In prescribing these measures the Dutch presented the Indonesian Government with a dose which they themselves stubbornly refused to swallow. Their utterly unrealistic policy of exchange control, now partially abrogated, was based on their unwillingness to free the N.E.I. guilder from the Dutch guilder, this in turn deriving from their century-and-a-quarter resolve to by-pass Singapore. Commercial opinion there, while welcoming the prospect of an immediate all-round increase in trade, does not consider that a 66 per cent. devaluation of the Indonesian guilder is sufficient to ensure lasting stability. On March 15 the 'Straits Times' commented: 'The scheme does not free imports and it does not give exporters the full world price for their products, or anywhere near it. Traders will now receive the guilder value of their exports at the official rate of exchange, together with a foreign exchange certificate for half the foreign exchange. The other half goes to the foreign exchange control fund. The Indonesian guilder's apparent value is about one-tenth the official rate, so the control fund is really paying the exporter one-half plus one-tenth of the true value of his goods. It keeps four-tenths for its ingenuity. Nor is that the end of it, for while the exchange certificates may be used by the exporter to finance his import contracts, he cannot import just what he likes. In fact there is no certainty that he can always use the certificate for imports. He has still to secure an exchange permit and an import permit. And if not an importer, then he must sell the certificate to the bank within thirty days. What the bank pays—in guilders—must depend on the amount of certificates offered, and the liberality of the Government's import policy. . . . The scheme appears likely to fail in the long

run . . . because the disparity between the official exchange rate and the black rate is far too great. The temptation of illegal trading is not really removed, nor is the producer and exporter really well rewarded.'

Although it is too soon to observe a reaction to this policy it is reassuring to note that the upward trend of foreign trade which began in 1948 has continued in the first months of independence. The adverse trade balance for the non-Republican areas reached a peak deficit of 456,000,000*fl.* in 1947, but the Dutch succeeded in converting this into a surplus of 21,000,000*fl.* in 1949. The monthly returns for January and February 1950 show an increase on the corresponding period of the previous year. The Dutch were unable to publish a budget since the war, but the new Government will have to make its account to Parliament. In such straitened circumstances the task of framing a budget will be no light one. Some external support has, however, already been received. The United States have contributed \$1,000,000,000 in the form of a special-purpose loan for approved capital projects and the Dutch 200,000,000*fl.* to offset the adverse balance of payments from Indonesia to the Netherlands. Trade agreements have recently been negotiated with the United States and with Great Britain.

If those at the head of the administration are making a gallant and determined attempt to steer away from the shoals, lower down the scale the picture is less auspicious. A clamour for jobs, nepotism, and sheer inefficiency clog the task of nation-building at every turn. Bribery and corruption are the rule. As in India, Western standards of integrity are honoured in the breach. The Indonesian leaders are keenly alive to these deficiencies and have every wish to follow the advice tendered them by the Burmese: 'Don't get rid of the Dutch!' They freely recognise their need of Dutch help, not only in technical affairs but also to maintain the standard of industry and efficiency, of public hygiene and general order, and above all, of professional integrity. In contrast to the Burmese, the Indonesians are essentially modest, eminently teachable, even to the point of naïvete. Even so, there are difficulties on the Indonesian side. For the unwillingness of the Dutch to cooperate, amounting in some instances to deliberate sabotage, substantially curtails their value.

For one who has been master to become the servant is not an easy change of role, but unless the Dutch are able to accomplish it, their days in Indonesia, even in individual capacities, are numbered. Of the 60,000 Dutch civil servants now in Indonesian employment, a few, notably the financial adviser Mr Oud, are wholeheartedly trying to set the Republic on its feet; but far more are openly contemptuous of and hostile to the new regime. It seems clear that some Dutch higher-ups were involved in the conspiracy of 'Turk' Westerling, now awaiting extradition in Singapore gaol.

Consequently it is small wonder that a commission has been appointed to purge those who are 'politically unreliable' from Government service, especially in view of the higher rates of pay secured to the Dutch by the treaty of transfer which are a burning grievance among the rank and file. Nor is jobbery confined to Indonesians, for when the Indonesian High Commissioner arrived to take up his post at The Hague, he found 1,200 Dutch on his payroll. Compromise and objectivity in so sensitive a zone demand genuine acceptance of accomplished fact by those Dutch who still seek their livelihood in Indonesia as well as continued restraint on the part of the Indonesians.

Apart from purely domestic affairs, the Republic's most serious anxiety is the spread of Communism. Since the recognition of Communist China by the Western Powers, the Chinese communities, totalling about two million in a total Indonesian population of approaching 80,000,000, who are concentrated in the island seaports, tend increasingly to become Communist in sympathy. Although the Republic successfully routed the Communist *putsch* at Medan in the autumn of 1948, the Indonesian Communist forces concentrated in East Java constitute a menace of unknown strength. The Indonesian Government is anxiously watching the struggle in Malaya, keenly aware that a Communist victory in the Peninsula would bring the wolf to their own door. For this as well as other reasons, Indonesia's attitude to Britain is perhaps more cordial than to any other Western Power. A practical expression of this sentiment is the allocation of no less a sum than 500,000*l.* foreign exchange for the purchase of English books from the United Kingdom. Silent resentment against the patronising attitude of India

and the United States tends to taint Indonesian relations with those two beneficiaries. In Britain, *per contra*, the Indonesian leaders feel they have a relatively disinterested and politically mature friend. Moreover, American beneficence has strings to it. Although Indonesian foreign policy is largely directed by Sjahrir behind the scenes, his return to office has been vetoed by the State Department, who dislike his avowed socialism and also prefer that so staunch an Anglophile should be kept in the background. But it is reported that Sjahrir's party is gaining strength and there is little doubt that he will soon become Foreign Minister, especially in view of the physical exhaustion of the Prime Minister, Dr Hatta, Indonesia's 'man of steel.'

In conclusion, it may fairly be said that of all Southeast Asian countries emancipated Indonesia presents the fairest prospect of steady evolution. Four years' resistance against the Dutch attempt to strangle the national movement at its source have taken their toll. Among the intellectuals the first flush of the revolutionary ardour of 1945 has undoubtedly grown a little grey. But the villages of Java were ignited by the first police action, just as Celebes and other 'federalist' areas were ignited by its successor. If the Government is precariously poised by the standards of old-established states, the prestige of its leaders, all veterans in the struggle, was never higher. The old saw that without the Dutch the archipelago had no unity has lost whatever point it may have had in the past. For the archipelago was no more a nation under Dutch rule than before the Dutch conquest. Whatever the future may hold, Indonesia to-day is cemented in infancy and for the first time by a common purpose and a common pride. That it should weather the political cyclones which attend its birth is of the first importance for the world at large as well as for its immediate neighbourhood. All that we in the West can do to help it on the road to maturity is prompted as much by self-interest as by altruism.

BARBARA WHITTINGHAM-JONES.

Art. 7.—RICHARD VON KÜHLMANN.

THE STORY OF A GERMAN DIPLOMATIST

HERR VON KÜHLMANN, well-known in London society during the years preceding the First World War, in its last phase stepped for a while into the very forefront of international politics, achieving considerable though ephemeral prominence. His Memoirs, recently published in German,* have even in this country gained a measure of recognition apt to endow them with undeserved credence. In the 'Spectator' of June 24, 1949, Mr Harold Nicolson attributes 'great historical importance' to 'this calm, serious, saddened, and in some ways honourable book'; while the reviewer in the 'Times Literary Supplement' of September 30, calls it a 'revealing book which historians of the period 1905-18 cannot well leave unread'—'it shows how near its author came to the attainment of aims that would have left Great Britain friendless and discredited in a Europe and a world made safe for Germany.' Revealing this autobiography certainly is as a self-exposure, and as such deserves being read; but otherwise, as I propose to show, it cannot be admitted in evidence. Trifling and self-important, suffused with the malignancy of a frustrated intriguer, these Memoirs if accepted would be more damaging to the men Kühlmann commends than to those whom he tries to disparage. But his inaccuracy in matters big and small—the result of a failing memory, of slovenly workmanship, and of an innate disregard of truth—eliminates him as a witness: on closer examination many of the transactions remembered by him in great and lively detail, change into mere comic potpourris, which must not be allowed to gain currency even in the lighter type of historical literature. It is stated by the publisher that Kühlmann died before he could revise his proofs, and that only obvious errors were corrected ('and not nearly all of these,' adds the reviewer in the 'Times Literary Supplement'); but had all been removed, the remnants of the book might no longer have been fit for publication.

* Richard von Kühlmann: 'Erinnerungen,' Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg.

There is a deceptive façade to these Memoirs, as there was to their author. Contemporaries knew him for an 'entirely unscrupulous intriguer,'* but credited him with a first-rate brain—'of his ability as a diplomatist there can be no doubt,' writes Lloyd George in his 'War Memoirs.'† Yet his dispatches, published in the 'Grosse Politik,' are nowise remarkable, while his books lack poise, depth, and judgment, and sometimes descend to puerility. As an author he falls into one class with the Kaiser and Bülow: a representative of the *Wilhelminische Ära*.

Richard von Kühlmann, the son of a German Director of the Anatolian Railways, was born in Constantinople, in 1873; entered the German diplomatic service in 1899‡; was Secretary at the Tangier Legation, 1903-05; Counsellor at the London Embassy, 1909-14; State Secretary from August 1917 till July 9, 1918, and chief German delegate to the peace conferences of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. At these historical junctures in his career, his chiefs happened to be absent or weak, or at least not equal to their forceful assistant. At the age of thirty-one, as Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, he played a busy part in the first Morocco crisis, and at forty-four virtually directed Germany's foreign policy, Kaiser and Army Command permitting. But dismissed in 1918, he lived another thirty years without re-entering politics: not for lack of trying. One such attempt attained publicity. In 1929, while the Young Plan for German reparations was being settled in Paris, Kühlmann approached the British Ambassador, Lord Tyrrell, with his pet idea of colonies for Germany. But he over-reached himself when he followed up the talks with a letter; this, duly transmitted to London, produced an angry communication from Austen Chamberlain to Stresemann, who replied by completely disavowing Kühlmann's unauthorised activities and un-

* See the note, 'An Ephemeral Career,' in 'The Times' of July 11, 1918. On the role he played at the London Embassy see Asquith, 'The Genesis of the War,' p. 105. Even Mr Nicolson, though lenient to him, describes him as 'not too scrupulous'—'a remarkable man' possessed of 'intelligence unaccompanied by strength of character.'

† Vol IV, p. 2082.

‡ Hardly any dates are given in Kühlmann's Memoirs, and his entry in 'Wer ist's?' (the German 'Who's Who') supplies a list of his decorations, but no proper service record. The above date, computed on the basis of his narrative, may be merely approximately correct.

warranted intrusion.* It was perhaps the hope of a comeback, joined to easy financial circumstances, which made him keep silent in the 1920's when others rushed into print with their memoirs: the Kaiser, Bülow, Bethmann Hollweg, Hertling,† and Lichnowsky, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Tirpitz, and Hoffmann, Erzberger and Scheidemann, Czernin, Burian, Conrad von Hötzendorf, and Auffenberg, or even secondary figures such as Schoen, Eckardstein, Musulin, J. Andrassy, jun., General Arz, etc. All that Kühlmann published in the inter-war period was several excursions into history and politics, superficial even when plausible,‡ flimsy,§ or primitive to a staggering degree.|| He prided himself on his historical erudition: 'I could never resist the temptation to get to understand the present in the light of the past.'

In 1943, at the age of seventy, he started writing his autobiography, finishing it in September 1944. By the time Hitler was tottering, Kühlmann obviously felt it opportune to relate how he had tried to stave off the First World War, and next to bring it to a timely close; how he had endeavoured to secure a glorious future for Germany in Central Africa; how he very nearly saved both her and the world from the disasters which have befallen them since; and how he was frustrated. It were a pity had he not gone on record: for at certain crucial moments he did get hold of the right end of the stick, and, without knowledge of the man, it might seem strange that after having risen so high he achieved so little, and that he went down never to emerge again.

So-called humour has its stereotypes. Some fifty years ago, Central European comic papers of the genteel, bourgeois variety went in for stories about the ageing spinster and the absent-minded professor, while inferior productions would sport, for instance, the vulgar figure of a semi-Balkan commercial traveller. Herr von Kühlmann, on his own level, somehow manages to recall that unattractive type and his enjoyments. Not that there

* See 'Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters and Papers,' vol. III (1940), pp. 424-29.

† The book, 'Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei,' is actually by Hertling's son.

‡ 'Thoughts on Germany,' German ed. 1931 and 1933; Eng. ed. 1932.

§ 'Die Diplomaten' (1939), with a chapter on decorations.

|| 'The Heritage of Yesterday,' German ed. 1936; English ed. 1938.

is anything improper in his book—it is his personality, polished yet crude and gross, that offends. He unconsciously depicts himself in writing of a friend: 'When he spoke of truffles in red wine, his eye of a poet would shine just as when he described the beauty of a divine woman.' Food, women, and the splendour of rich houses and luxury hotels is what Herr von Kühlmann seems to remember best, seeing himself as a refined *bon viveur*, a sportsman and traveller, a man of the great world, and an art *connoisseur* and collector. In short, here are 581 pages of 'high life,' decked with the appropriate adjectives and *clichés*. Every woman is beautiful and accomplished—*schön, reizend, charmant, elegant* (though of one he says that she was 'really very beautiful'); the meals which his memory treasures are rich, succulent, delectable; while the houses he visited are described in the language of a classy house-agent or auctioneer. Nor are we ever allowed to forget Kühlmann's interest in art, 'which invariably absorbed a substantial part of my working powers.'

The least part of Kühlmann's laudations goes to his chiefs. His first post was St Petersburg, where Prince Radolin, a friend of his father's, treated him with well-nigh 'parental kindness.' A *grand seigneur*, 'kind and soft, and without any sharpness of hard precision,' Radolin owed 'his, after all unusually brilliant, career,' to the sinister Holstein, whose confidential letters he would read out to Kühlmann 'under seal of secrecy.' Similarly, at a later date in Paris, Radolin is shown having regular confabulations with Kühlmann, kept secret especially from the Counsellor of the Embassy. With Kühlmann, there is usually someone to be short-circuited or circumvented.

His next chief, Count Rex at Teheran, is merely seen worrying lest that 'exile' might be his last diplomatic post. In 1903 followed a short assignment to London, and Count Metternich, under whom Kühlmann was to serve again 1909–12, comes in for a first dose of disparagement. His week-ends lasted four or five days; he would take long holidays to shoot in Scotland or recuperate on the South Coast; but packets of blank sheets, signed in various places, were left to be filled in with non-committal stuff by his officials. On his return he would dictate brilliant despatches. 'Were it sufficient in a diplomatist to write courageous and accurate reports, Count Paul

Metternich would have to be placed among the remarkable diplomatists of his time'; but 'the essential part of an Ambassador's task consists in inducing correct decisions at home,' while, by gaining influence with the leading men where accredited, he should 'carry on an active, constructive, go-ahead policy.' 'In that matter an appraisal of Metternich's activities in England would yield less favourable results.'

Kühlmann's next post was Tangier. The Minister, Freiherr von Mentzingen, was 'an experienced, painstaking diplomat, probably too painstaking'—he lacked 'wider horizons' or any desire 'to assume responsibilities.' Instead of intriguing against France he tried to see justice done to German subjects by the Shereefian Government.

'All my endeavours to convince him how inopportune his policy was just at that time, and all attempts, partly made through his charming wife and his clever mother-in-law, to deflect him from that course, proved unavailing.'

But Mentzingen soon went on leave, not to return. 'I never had . . . any conflicts with him'; but may not Kühlmann have had a hand in this timely disappearance?

1906: Washington. Freiherr Speck von Sternburg, a cavalry officer, had in 1898, as German Military Attaché, helped Theodore Roosevelt with his Rough Riders. To please him when President, Speck was appointed Ambassador. 'I was never able to detect a great politician in him.' 1907-09: at the Hague, where the Minister, Herr von Schlözer, was 'an amiable man, devoid of political passions'; and was rescued by Kühlmann from comic embarrassments caused by the Kaiser's visit to Holland.

And then back to London, to the lonely bachelor and morose hypochondriac Metternich, who, when things grew critical, would do nothing but 'sit passive with folded arms.' Hence a cleavage arose between them—but never 'any controversy or even argument'; Kühlmann would merely do things behind the Ambassador's back, or try to short-circuit him. Here is a typical tale. Kühlmann was attending a fashionable wedding in Berlin at a date ascertainable through the Gotha Almanac as March 12, 1912. During the 'excellent wedding dinner,' he was summoned to the State Secretary, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter, who made him report on the situation in London;

and agreeing with his conclusions, took him, in spite of the late hour, to the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. It was decided that Kühlmann should the next day return to London and seek an interview with Haldane (this was a month after Haldane's 'mission' to Berlin). 'The Chancellor added quite casually: "Please also inform the Ambassador of what was settled to-day".' But on hearing Kühlmann's report Metternich's face darkened visibly, and 'he said somewhat abruptly: "Obviously they told you that I myself should discuss the matter with Haldane." I replied that nothing of the kind had been said. . . . Still, if he desired to make the communication, I would comply with his wish.'

And next Kühlmann was reprimanded from Berlin for his claim to deal with Haldane himself—which did not impress me with Bethmann Hollweg's strength of character.' The new draft for a German-British agreement, brought by him from Berlin, is printed in the 'Grosse-Politik,'* which also shows that on March 14—possibly before his return—Metternich saw Grey in the presence of Haldane, and was given a draft approved by the British Cabinet:† it is difficult to see how he could have let Kühlmann handle the German counter-proposals.

Metternich was recalled from London in June 1912. His successor, Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, arrived at the end of the month, and in August went home for a holiday: he died in September. 'I am convinced even now,' writes Kühlmann, 'that he would have been able to prevent the outbreak of the World War.' But then came Prince Lichnowsky, who had made his career 'under the wing of Princess Marie von Bülow'—

'a *grand seigneur* whose forte was magnificent entertainment, and an amiable personality. . . . Brilliant dinners, and a number of footmen and butlers, surprising even for English conditions, dressed in splendid, absolutely correct, liveries, masses of silver and flowers, soon became the talk of the town among the upper classes.'

But what were his qualifications as Ambassador? Sir Edward Grey, writes Kühlmann, once asked permission

'to put to me a somewhat delicate question, fully relying on my discretion. . . . He was in the habit of dictating minutes of

* Vol. 31, pages 167-69.

† 'Grosse Politik,' vol 31, No. 11399, p. 173.

conversations while these were fresh in his memory. . . . So he did also after visits from Prince Lichnowsky. But he thought he had noticed that the Prince was "most inaccurate" about particulars, and therefore asked permission to submit to me his minutes of conversations with the Prince: I should tell him whether he had correctly understood the Ambassador. . . . I agreed to this being done. But in the few months which separated us from the outbreak of war, it never so happened that Grey asked me to examine his notes.'

The concluding statement would seem the most credible part of the story.

In August 1914, Kühlmann was sent to Stockholm, where the burden of work and responsibility seemed too great for the German Minister, Herr von Reichenau: while in Brazil he had suffered a severe sunstroke.

'I received a secret instruction to take as much as possible off his shoulders and to keep a watchful eye on him. Should I find that his nerves were no longer equal to the task . . . he would be sent on sick-leave and I would carry on as *Chargé d'Affaires*.'

Two months later Kühlmann was transferred to Constantinople, where his mission resembled his previous one.

'Baron Wangenheim was apparently thought to be highly strung, and a robust assistant was deemed necessary. Much importance was attached in Berlin to bringing Turkey into the war, and it was felt that the Ambassador was remiss in pressing the matter. Still, to my great relief, I was not expected, as in Sweden, to take over if I thought it necessary, but to try, with the utmost consideration for Wangenheim, to overcome his inhibitions.'

And so Turkey was brought into the war; 'the Ambassador was inwardly pleased when it was accomplished without his having had to take the crucial decision'; and Kühlmann's relations with him remained 'perfectly harmonious.' Wangenheim was Kühlmann's tenth and last diplomatic chief, and looking back at the series one can merely wonder at the dictum in his 'Thoughts on Germany' (p. 68): 'Our pre-war diplomacy was at least equal to the average of the diplomats of other countries. . . .'

Kühlmann's next post was that of Minister to The Hague, from April 1915 till September 1916, when he

returned as Ambassador to Constantinople: but this period seems blacked-out or confused in his memory—he mumbles something about The Hague, and then passes straight on to the final phase of his career. Bethmann Hollweg and his Secretary of State having resigned in July 1917, the new Chancellor, Michaelis, 'persuaded' Kühlmann to accept the Foreign Office. 'After we had reached basic agreement on the broad principles . . . Michaelis, I can truly say, left me completely independent in the conduct of foreign policy.' Even so he does not escape censure for 'political disloyalty,' which 'unfavourably affected' Kühlmann's judgment of his character. By October, Michaelis got into difficulties with the Reichstag, and asked Kühlmann, who was on the point of going with the Emperor to Constantinople, to intervene in a stormy debate. Kühlmann took the opportunity to deliver

'a serious and sharp speech about Alsace-Lorraine, which concluded with a most heartfelt "never." . . . The Reichstag was deeply impressed and seemingly reunited . . . by this appeal to its patriotic feelings. . . . As I descended the great staircase . . . I was surrounded by crowds of members . . . who excitedly . . . argued that the political position of the Chancellor . . . was too seriously affected by that most unfortunate debate, for him to remain in office . . . and begged me to report to the Emperor accordingly.'

At that time 'the idea seems to have arisen in certain Parliamentary circles, probably in connection with my speech on Alsace-Lorraine, that I should be his successor. No such ideas entered my head. . . .' And so, wholly disinterested, Kühlmann took the first opportunity to report against his chief, and to tell the Emperor

'that the leaders of the most important majority parties had asked me, before I left, to submit to him that in their opinion there was no chance of further fruitful cooperation with Chancellor Michaelis. . . .'

His successor, Count von Hertling,

'left me, I can truly say, from the first moment in completely sovereign direction of foreign affairs, and never during the whole period of our collaboration was there the least, even momentary, clouding of relations between us.'

These were 'absolutely harmonious'; 'the aged Chan-

cellor,' who complained that at such time he, 'a worn-out Professor of Philosophy,' should be burdened with that office, in private conversation frequently spoke of Kühlmann as his successor. But at the end of June the 'demigods' of the Army Command, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, demanded Kühlmann's dismissal. When told by the Emperor that their 'paths must part,' he pleaded the need of being allowed to bring to some conclusion secret peace talks which he claimed to have started with London. Finding that the decision was final, he felt that this would cost the Emperor his Crown.

Thus in a career of almost twenty years, Kühlmann had but two chiefs he fully approved of: one who died soon, and the other who was 'dead above ground.'

In Kühlmann's subjective story it is his attitude and emotions that matter rather than his 'facts.' But from the way he 'remembers' things which are of common knowledge and can easily be checked, conclusions must be drawn for 'events' of which he is sole witness.

Here are a few examples. In 1900, in St Petersburg, Kühlmann was presented to 'the beautiful, melancholic looking Empress' who 'was unhappy because her eldest son . . . was a so-called "bleeder".' Her only son was born in August 1904.

At the end of September 1914, Kühlmann learnt that he would be moved from Stockholm; 'some time later' he was transferred to Constantinople; he arrived in Berlin for instructions just when the Polish State was proclaimed by the Central Powers (which happened two years later, on Nov. 5, 1916); in Vienna he discussed that proclamation with the Austrian Premier, Dr von Koerber (appointed in October 1916); and having visited Sofia, spent a few days in Bucharest, where the German Minister told him that the anti-German elements would not prevail in the lifetime of King Carol (who died on Oct. 10, 1914). Kühlmann has mixed up his first journey to Constantinople with the (forgotten) second journey.

Similarly confused is his account of his, historically important, London negotiations. In September 1911 he went to stay with friends in the Isle of Mull, in order

'to recover somewhat after the exciting and exhausting days of the [Agadir] crisis. Sir William Tyrrell had been in attend-

ance at Balmoral * during the visit of the Russian Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, and now likewise arrived at the house. . . .'

As Kühlmann was leaving, Tyrrell offered to accompany him to the landing place ; and having reviewed the events of the preceding few weeks, asked—

“ Are you satisfied with the state of our relations ? ” I expressed my deep dissatisfaction, and he declared himself in complete agreement. He argued that radical measures were required to place the relations of the two great countries on a satisfactory basis. We reached agreement that proper positive negotiations were needed to achieve a *rapprochement*, and that the old Anglo-German treaty concerning the Portuguese colonies offered a suitable basis. Tyrrell asked me whether I was prepared and determined to throw in my weight in favour of a *rapprochement*, and I, in clear terms, promised my cooperation. He, for his part, assured me that he would not fail us.'

Pondering over the talk, Kühlmann concluded that Isvolsky must have spoken at Balmoral about the Balkan League which was being formed under Russian patronage, and that Isvolsky's 'personal policy,' actuated by a desire of revenge for his discomfiture in the Bosnian crisis, must have moved Tyrrell to abandon his reserve and offer Germany a closer understanding. 'The great historical value of the conversation was that Tyrrell, who was nearly all-powerful in British foreign policy, favoured Anglo-German cooperation' ; 'the true director of British foreign policy for the first time unreservedly showed me his hand.' Kühlmann's suppositions were soon confirmed by a talk with Grey, to which he was invited in Metternich's absence. Grey spoke of the need of Anglo-German cooperation to prevent the Great Powers from being drawn into the imminent Turco-Bulgar War.

Such is Kühlmann's story. But Isvolsky left the Russian Foreign Office for the Paris Embassy in 1910 ; he did not visit Balmoral in 1911 ; the Balkan League was started in the spring of 1912 ; and the Balkan War broke out in October 1912. Sazonov (not Isvolsky) was at Balmoral, Sept. 23-29, 1912 ; and Kühlmann's talk with Grey can be identified as that of Oct. 7, 1912,†

* Grey might have been 'in attendance' at Balmoral, but not his Private Secretary.

† See Kühlmann's cipher-wire of Oct. 7, 1912, 'Grosse Politik,' vol. 33, No. 12240, pp. 175-76.

with another of October 14 added to it.* But then where does Kühlmann's historical conversation with Tyrrell come in? If it occurred in September 1911† it loses its connection with Russia's Balkan policy and Kühlmann's talk with Grey, and anyhow produced no results: for negotiations on colonial problems opened only after Grey's speech in Parliament on Nov. 27, 1911, in which he disclaimed a 'dog in the manger' attitude toward Germany; and then the initiative came from Berlin. On the other hand, there is no room for such a walk and talk in September 1912: on September 24, when the news of Marshall's death reached Kühlmann, he was shooting clay-pigeons in London,‡ and not deer in Scotland; and his wires and despatches in the 'Grosse Politik' place him in London throughout the period (unless signed blanks were used in his absence). Moreover, dating it 1912 would make nonsense of a number of other statements in Kühlmann's account.§

'The foundation of my political creed' and 'the lodestar of all my diplomatic work,' writes Kühlmann, was to gain for Germany a Colonial Empire in Africa 'commensurate with the power and the greatness of the mother country.' || Even Angola and Mozambique would have made that Empire 'sufficiently great and rich to give scope to German energy for generations to come, and to lay solid foundations for Germany's economic well-being.' ¶ This gives the measure of Kühlmann's judgment: Germany's pre-1914 Colonial Empire accounted for half a per cent. of her foreign trade, and between 1887 and 1914 cost the German tax-payer about 100,000,000*l.*; doubling its size would probably have increased these figures proportionately.

* See No. 12276, pp. 221-22, and No. 12284, pp. 228-32.

† Grey was at Balmoral, Sept. 11-14, 1911, and Tyrrell may have accompanied him.

‡ See 'Erinnerungen,' p. 373.

§ For instance, that Tyrrell and he were by no means pleased with the Haldane Mission (of February 1912), because it was liable to break the 'fine silk threads' of their conversations; or that Tyrrell advised Kühlmann to have a talk with the Colonial Secretary, Lewis Harcourt, when, in fact, many talks between him and Metternich, Marshall, and Kühlmann himself about the Portuguese colonies and the Congo are recorded in March-July 1912.

|| 'Erinnerungen,' pp. 245-46.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

Kühlmann magnifies the colonial negotiations which he carried on in London into 'a great, constructive policy,' fraught with far-reaching possibilities, and misinterprets (ill-advised) British attempts at meeting the Germans in a friendly manner. Could anyone have seriously expected a contingent agreement about Central Africa to extinguish Germany's naval ambitions or Britain's interest in the balance of power on the Continent? Elsewhere Kühlmann admits that war may have been rendered 'scarcely avoidable' by the problem of Austria-Hungary's future,* and that Britain was bound to join in immediately, lest she be 'confronted in a few weeks by a victorious Germany in occupation of the entire Channel coast.'† No wonder then if in July–August 1914 Kühlmann's spurious achievements proved piffle before the wind.

Kühlmann, in his account of the London negotiations, tries to make us believe that, while Arthur Nicolson and Crowe adhered to the Entente, Grey and Tyrrell were veering toward Germany and working with him behind the backs of the other two. But there is evidence of the distrust which Grey felt of Kühlmann,‡ and Kühlmann's story of his close understanding and collaboration with Tyrrell seems about as accurate as of its inception in the Isle of Mull. Of Tyrrell I can speak from personal knowledge, having served under him in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office from April 1918 till May 1920; and I agree with the reviewer in the 'Times Literary Supplement' that Kühlmann 'seems never to have understood either the limitations of Tyrrell's influence or the mental reservations that may well have lain behind Tyrrell's politeness': Tyrrell was neither 'the true director of British foreign policy,' nor the man 'unreservedly to show his hand' to Kühlmann. Complex, versatile, talkative, but exceedingly secretive, he was amiable, and even yielding on the surface, but a stubborn fighter underneath. He avoided, if he could, personal collisions, and professed

* 'Thoughts on Germany,' p. 78.

† *Ibid.* p. 257.

‡ Mr Alwyn Parker, who in 1912 on behalf of the Foreign Office negotiated with Kühlmann about the Baghdad Railway, wrote in the 'Times Literary Supplement' of Oct. 7, 1949: 'Nobody in the Foreign Office had any illusions about Kühlmann. Sir Edward Grey warned me to be careful, adding that he had rather a full measure of self-esteem and was very *débrouillard*, and not over-careful to bring his actions to the touchstone of the moral sense.'

a preference for 'long-range artillery'; yet he disliked writing—active and restless, he shunned the drudgery of office drafts, and, cultivating the laziness which Talleyrand enjoined on diplomats, was selective even in his reading of office files.* He was a contrast to that austere, somewhat rigid, tireless worker, Eyre Crowe, one of the greatest Civil Servants this country ever had; but they were on the closest terms and never would Crowe have shown so much friendship to a pro-German within the Foreign Office. Tyrrell's curious, occasionally even impish, ways gave rise to doubts among some people; in reality he was a loyal friend, who fought the battles of his chiefs, colleagues, and subordinates, often with complete disregard of his own person. Because even after the Foreign Office files have been opened, it may be found difficult to ascertain Tyrrell's views or actions, it is now incumbent on those who worked with him to defend him from Kühlmann's encomiums.

As for the negotiations about the Portuguese colonies, these were not conducted by Tyrrell, then Principal Private Secretary to Grey (and as such not in charge of negotiations with foreign Governments independently of the relevant departments of the Foreign Office), but first by Harcourt and the Colonial Office, and next by Crowe for the Foreign Office. Further, after the agreement had been initialled on Oct. 20, 1913, it remained unsigned because the British Government insisted on publishing it together with the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1899, while Berlin objected, discerning a contradiction between the two. 'If that apparent perfidy of England against her old ally Portugal could trouble anyone,' writes Kühlmann, 'it was the English, but it was hardly a concern of Germany.' Does Kühlmann fail, or does he refuse, to understand that publicity was to deprive the Anglo-German agreement of the very character which he meant to give it?

While Kühlmann boasts of having managed in the East (on the basis of 'self-determination') 'to carve out of the body politic of Russia' whatever territories were coveted

* An administrative question concerning our department was once submitted to Tyrrell in a long minute on the jacket of its file. Tyrrell, uninterested in the subject, initialled the minute unread. It was returned to him with the remark: 'This matter requires your decision.' Reply: 'I agree, W. T.' The decision was then obtained orally, and the jacket of the file was changed.

by Germany, in the West he claims to have aimed at a peace 'without annexations,' negotiated and not dictated; this, he says, he meant to attain through secret negotiations with London. The story of his official approaches is told, at some length, in Lloyd George's 'War Memoirs.'* His good faith was always in doubt, but the approach being made (in Balfour's words) 'through the orthodox channel of a neutral Foreign Office' (Spain), H.M. Government were prepared to deal with the matter in a proper understanding with their major Allies. But Kühlmann's 'No, never!' with regard to Alsace-Lorraine in his Reichstag speech of Oct. 9, 1917, put an end to it.

Now Kühlmann produces a story about peace approaches in which he makes Tyrrell appear as his opposite number.

'Certain signs seemed to me to warrant the assumption that Sir William Tyrrell thought a moderate peace settlement in the British interest, presumably because he foresaw that a fight to the finish would produce an unsound French preponderance on the Continent.'

And next:

'Through a neutral personality I had entered into communication with my old political friend Sir William Tyrrell, and informed him that I could discuss peace only on the basis of territorial integrity for Germany and Austria-Hungary. . . . Tyrrell replied he was ready to start from that basis.'

Indeed, it requires a Kühlmann to imagine, and to try to make others believe, that anyone in the Foreign Office could have, off his own bat, engaged in peace talks—and Tyrrell, the friend of Grey and Asquith, had no personal connection with Lloyd George.

'My immediate aim [says Kühlmann] was to meet an English statesman for an informal talk at some Dutch castle in order to ascertain what possibilities there were of peace. German and British delegates were about to meet at The Hague to discuss an exchange of prisoners of war. This seemed to me a good opportunity to establish at least a first contact.'

With this in view, Kühlmann included in the German delegation Count Hatzfeldt, the son of a late German

* Vol. IV, pp. 2081-2107.

Ambassador to London, educated and subsequently resident in England. To this hint, claims Kühlmann,

'The British duly responded . . . and Lord Newton led their delegation—Tyrrell must have taken special care in selecting it. At the end of the very first session, Hermann Hatzfeldt and Lord Newton remained behind. . . . Newton immediately started talking about a general peace, and Hatzfeldt, following his instructions, promptly entered into the subject.'

And once more Kühlmann's story can be proved to be rubbish from beginning to end. Since February 1916, Newton had been in charge of the Prisoners-of-War Department of the Foreign Office, and as such had been chief British delegate to the Anglo-German conference on prisoners of war at The Hague in June 1917, and the Anglo-Turkish conference at Berne in December 1917: there would have been no need to 'select' him for it, and anyhow this would not have been within Tyrrell's competence. But in view of a bitter Press campaign which had preceded the Conference of June 1918, Newton, for once, did not lead the British delegation. He writes in his diary under date of May 31: *

'Sent for by Bonar Law, who told me that it had been decided to send Cave,† myself and Belfield‡ as delegates to The Hague. The agitation had been so great that the Government had determined to send a Cabinet Minister and, according to Bonar Law, Cave had proposed himself.'

But that Hatzfeldt would be there, the British only learnt at The Hague. Newton writes on June 7:

'Vredenburg§ says that the Germans are much exercised over Cave's appointment, and in order to be represented by a man of equal official rank have sent Prince Hermann Hatzfeldt, son of the former German Ambassador in London.'

And here is Newton's story of the 'peace talks':

'... although the work of our delegation had been to some extent disappointing, I had during our stay made a discovery that was at once important and unexpected, for we had not

* See Lord Newton, 'Retrospection' (1941), p. 256.

† Lord Cave, at that time Home Secretary.

‡ Major-General Belfield, Director of Prisoners-of-War Department, War Office.

§ Jonkheer van Vredenburg, a Dutch diplomatist, was chairman of the conference.

been there long when it came to my knowledge that the Germans were acutely, almost passionately, anxious to enter upon peace negotiations. We had been directed to confine ourselves to our own immediate business, but if two parties are in constant close communication for about six weeks it is a practical certainty that each side will learn something about the plans and intentions of the other. The information came to me as a complete surprise, for there was no indication of a German collapse. . . . The important fact was that the Germans obviously realised that they were going to lose the war, otherwise they would never have made any such approach. I determined to keep my information secret until I could convey it personally to the Prime Minister.'

He did so on July 25, more than a fortnight after Kühlmann's dismissal. Tyrrell is never mentioned.

Nor is there any ground to suppose that Tyrrell favoured lenient peace terms for the Central Powers. At the Paris Peace Conference, Crowe and he were in agreement with the French about Poland's Western Frontier. It was Lloyd George, supported by Philip Kerr and Headlam-Morley, who reduced Poland's acquisitions in Posnania, set up the Free City of Danzig, and conceded a plebiscite in Upper Silesia ; while Tyrrell, who was opposed to such modifications, ceased to serve as British representative on the Polish Committee. Of these matters I can again speak from personal knowledge ; and so I can of an earlier significant transaction, on the very eve of The Hague Conference. In May 1918, the Czechs asked the Western Powers to acknowledge the National Committee under Masaryk as a quasi-governmental representation. This was during the Ludendorff offensive, and even some, not averse to Czechoslovak independence, doubted whether it was the time to assume new and far-reaching commitments. I myself was of those who thought that if a new Austerlitz was imminent, we had better unroll our future map of Europe, a sign of hope to nations engulfed by the German flood. Tyrrell knew this, and on May 17, late in the afternoon, came to my room, carrying a pack of files ; said that Beneš was to see Balfour next morning ; that there was disagreement concerning the line to be taken about the Czech request ; and asked me to prepare from those files a short minute of our previous dealings with the Czechs, and a memorandum on further action. I do

not know what use was made of my paper which urged recognition of the Czechoslovak National Committee ; but this was officially extended to them on June 11, and the mere fact that Tyrrell got the matter put into my hands—it was not usual for our Department to deal with current executive work—illustrates his own attitude towards the ' territorial integrity ' of the Central Powers.

L. B. NAMIER.

Art. 8.—MILTON AND THE MODERN MAN.

EACH of the two great crises of the past century and a half has brought a significant return of interest in John Milton. This interest, during the Napoleonic period, has as its monument Wordsworth's 'Milton! thou shouldst be living at this hour; England hath need of thee,' with its timeless tribute:

'Thy soul was like a Star, and dwelt apart;
Thou hadst a voice whose sound was like the sea:
Pure as the naked heavens, majestic, free.'

That the English-speaking world still feels this 'need' for Milton was shown on both sides of the Atlantic during the Second World War, when several popular books about the poet appeared. In England there was F. E. Hutchinson's 'Milton and the English Mind' and G. W. Knight's 'Chariot of Wrath,' not to mention T. S. Eliot's renewed blessing, while in the United States there was C. G. Osgood's 'Poetry as a Means of Grace.' Each of these men has emphasised, in one way or another, the kinship between twentieth-century Western man and the great seventeenth-century puritan poet.

This popular interest, coming as it does after a period of general scoffing, indicates a literary trend. But it has a much wider significance, a significance growing out of the present state of our civilisation. It has its roots in the trials and dangers of our time. It is with us, as with Wordsworth, a return for guidance and strength. To men who have never been involved in conflict, Milton's ringing voice and unyielding stand may seem repellent. He did not write for the sheltered—indeed he could not write for them. Like others in his day and in ours, Milton lived with challenges which demanded active participation and response. His ideas and actions, suited to that bitter period of the English Civil War, cannot be fully understood by those whose times or whose inclinations have permitted seclusion from a world of upheaval.

That many of us, living in this century, can accept Milton's position in all its details is doubtful, but we can surely understand him. And, understanding him, we may gain from him some of the strength which carried him through a period which was not only one of the most

trying in English history but which ended in the disappointment of his most sacred convictions and of his once well-founded hopes.

A seventeenth-century Englishman with character, determination, and a sense of patriotic duty, could not escape the current, bitter controversies which involved every political and religious idea, every political and religious institution. There was no room for evasion. He must choose his side and play his part. This Milton did. He threw himself wholeheartedly into the struggle, speaking with power and courage on almost every disputed issue which faced his people at the time. Because of his moral earnestness, many now regard him as a dogmatist and a fanatic. But we must not forget that this moral earnestness was devoted to the cause of freedom, and that to condemn any man as overly dogmatic because he is a vigorous and convinced defender of freedom is to talk in mutually exclusive terms. A man whose interest was so bound up in freedom—political, intellectual, religious—as was Milton's, cannot be condemned on the grounds of dogmatism no matter how firmly he holds to his convictions. The extent of Milton's authoritarian ideas may be seen in the famous passage from 'The Ready and Easy Way' where he states that it is most just 'that a less number compel a greater to retain . . . their liberty, than that a greater number, for the pleasure of their baseness, compel a less more injuriously to be their fellow slaves.'

We do not find in Milton those opinions of political and religious Puritanism which have shadowed the movement with modern disapproval. He moved away from the Church of England, which he had once thought of entering as a priest, to support the Presbyterians when he thought that the Scotch Church offered more freedom. Being convinced that it did not, he freely declared that 'Bishops and Presbyters are the same to us, both name and thing,' and became an Independent. In Milton's opinion, man could no more be legislated into salvation by other men than he would be predestined to damnation by God. One of his prime convictions was in a Freedom of the Will which was never infringed upon by God and which should never be tampered with by man.

However well or poorly, then, the conception of the intellectual, political, and religious dictatorship of Puri-

tanism may apply to others, we must exonerate Milton. Placing Milton under this blanket condemnation has done much, I think, to prejudice our minds against him. By such a prejudice many modern readers have excluded themselves from membership in the 'fit audience, though few.'

The attitude which accounts for a large part of this self-inflicted exclusion arises out of a false conception of Milton's personality—a conception which should be corrected. Milton's education was, as we know, superlatively good. He had acquainted himself with the best that had been said and done up until his own time. Further, he knew the more stimulating personalities of his age, and at least from the contemporary evidence there is no reason to believe that any of them regarded him as repressed, dour, or unlikeable. Yet this impression of his personality is certainly with us to-day.

The large body of contemporary information which we have on Milton should clear up this misapprehension. When he set out for the continent at the age of twenty-nine, he was sponsored socially by the distinguished diplomat Sir Henry Wotton. Does it not seem unlikely that Sir Henry would have taken so personal an interest in him and that he would have written such cordial letters of recommendation to the British ambassadors abroad, if Milton had been either stuffy or unlikeable? Hutchinson says, 'It is creditable to the old aristocratic order that this young man of inconspicuous birth and barely known yet as a poet was helped by his countrymen of high rank to be received in France and Italy with greatest courtesy.' It was also credible to the young man himself. Lord Scudamore, the ambassador in Paris, received him warmly and introduced him to the great Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius, then ambassador from the Queen of Sweden. In Italy he was shown marked honour and attention by the scholars, artists, and nobility of that country. Certainly an unknown Englishman, who made absolutely no effacement of his Protestant religious views, would not have received such open-hearted hospitality and achieved such popularity in Italy had he not been a man of unusually pleasing personality.

Such evidence is not confined to the days of his youth. Even in old age and after the restoration of an order hostile

to his ideals, Milton received frequent calls from the Earl of Anglesey, as well as other members of the nobility and 'many persons of eminent quality,' both from at home and abroad, who delighted in 'his society and converse.' And opposite the popular tradition of his daughters' antagonism must be placed the fact that Deborah Milton Clarke spoke with warm affection and admiration of her father and said that 'he was delightful company, the life of the conversation,' and had 'an unaffected cheerfulness and civility.'

It is well to separate Milton from these two prejudiced pictures which have grown up about him, one identifying with him the dogmatism now popularly attributed to his age, and the other imposing upon him a thoroughly unattractive personality. In view of these prejudices, it is doubly significant that thinking Englishmen have, in the two great crises of the past hundred and fifty years, turned to Milton for support.

Here, I think, we may come to close grips with Milton. His strength was, essentially, the strength of religious faith and of personal principles drawn directly from it. Milton acted within the bounds of standards which he thought absolute, under the leadership of a God whom he regarded as infinite and omnipotent, and in anticipation of another life which he believed to be everlasting. Such a system required much of him, but at the same time gave him both the incentive and the power to live up to the requirements.

Milton was convinced that man's chief aim should be the establishment of a close communion with God and the understanding of His ways toward men. When this communion and understanding were established, they were to be taken into every aspect of human affairs. It was a 'faith to live by.' The phrase is hackneyed and over-used, but unfortunately for modern man, its realisation is only too rare. Milton would have us realise it, test it, and apply it in every living situation. As he said in the 'Areopagitica':

'He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true war-faring Christian. I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that

immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. . . . That which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary.'

What Milton meant by this was obviously the voluntary subordination of each individual will to the Will of the Almighty—actually, Government by God. He felt that men of whatever estate should 'walk according to the Gospel of Christ and understand that this was their Law, supreme over 'all laws.' At one time he even hoped to see this realised and the petition 'Thy kingdom come' fulfilled.

Here, there are remarkable similarities between John Milton and John Knox; so many, in fact, as to make it fair for me to apply to Milton, as I have done in the quotation of the preceding paragraph, a part of Carlyle's study of Knox. If we think Knox's system of truth too narrow, Carlyle wrote, we can rejoice that he never saw it put into practice, and that it still remains a 'devout imagination.' But we cannot blame him, or anyone else, for struggling to realise it. 'Theocracy, Government of God, is precisely the thing to be struggled for. . . . That right and truth, or God's Law, reign supreme among men, this is the Heavenly Ideal (well named in Knox's time, and nameable in all times, a revealed "Will of God") towards which the Reformer will insist that all be more and more approximated.'

What, we may well ask, has all of this 'God-business' to do with the twentieth century? This sort of thing is outworn. Our civilisation takes its revelations from science, pays its respects to liberalism, places its faith in progress. That is all we need. If this Godliness in Milton has any value, it is valuable only to the historian or to the sociologist who may be studying dead ideas. As for Milton's writings, we may go to them for their periphery and their style, but for no more, because there is no more that he can give us.

If this argument—which is basically religious—were sound, then there would be no point in carrying my case for Milton further. Yet many of us feel more and more compelled to doubt the validity of a modern religion based on progress and liberalism. We feel that our modern gods are merely golden calves made by our own hands, and that they have little or no objective connection with reality. And

we find this opinion crowding in upon us not only from all sides but from eminent twentieth-century thinkers. The brilliant Harvard sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin points out that our materialistic culture has become over ripe, and is now decaying. To save ourselves, we clutch after messianic panaceas—programmes such as socialism, communism, and so forth. But, Sorokin warns us, no decaying society, such as our own, has ever in the past been saved by political or economic manipulation. When the decay has been arrested, it has been through the spiritual and ethical medium of religion. Mechanical procedures of the kind now being suggested or practised 'can only give the same disastrous results for society as they have invariably given before,' Sorokin writes in his 'Crisis of Our Age.' 'There must be a change of the whole mentality and attitudes in the direction of the norms prescribed in the Sermon on the Mount.' But, Sorokin insists, no 'social gospel' is capable of saving our society, as it is only a 'pseudo-religion' reflecting some sort of political creed.

This imperative need for religious re-orientation is also pointed out by Arnold J. Toynbee. In his 'Civilisation on Trial,' Toynbee discusses the eruption of democracy, science, and modern scientific technique, which most men regard as the great new events in history which demand their attention and command their admiration. He then says that

'If we can bring ourselves to think of it as one of the vain repetitions of the Gentiles—an almost meaningless repetition of something that the Greeks and Romans did before us and did supremely well—then the greatest new event in the history of mankind will be seen to be a very different one. The greatest new event will then not be the monstrous rise of yet another secular civilisation out of the bosom of the Christian Church in the course of these later centuries; it will still be the Crucifixion and its spiritual consequences.'

Finally, Toynbee points out, we have been clinging to Christian practice without Christian belief, and practice unsupported by belief is a wasting asset 'as we have suddenly discovered, to our dismay, in this generation.'

This last passage links naturally with T. S. Eliot's position in his 'Idea of a Christian Society.' He contends that our present culture is mainly negative and that a negative culture has ceased to be efficient in a world where

economic, political, and spiritual forces are constantly proving the efficiency of cultures which, even though pagan, are certainly positive. We find ourselves, Eliot tells us, in so unstable a position that we cannot retain our equilibrium but must move in one direction or another. Neither liberalism nor conservatism, which are not philosophies and may be merely habits, is enough to guide us. Unless we can find a system into which all the problems of life can fit, we will probably go on 'complicating chaos' and moving 'from one uneasy compromise to another.' Eliot concludes :

'It is only by returning to the external source of truth that we can hope for any social organisation which will not, to its ultimate destruction, ignore some essential aspect of reality. . . . If you will not have God (and he is a jealous God) you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin.'

The convergence of opinion here as to the solution of the problems facing twentieth-century man is, at the very least, striking. Even more so as it comes from eminent figures in three separate fields—sociology, history, and poetry. It would be possible to expand this list almost indefinitely. From authorities on international affairs, for example, we have continual warnings that if western culture is to survive the Cold War it must fill its own spiritual and moral vacuum, and even in science there are signs of a definite trend towards agreement with those who hold that the new synthesis must be basically religious. Finally, we have the recent insistence of Sir Walter Moberly and of Lord Elton that the universities must put education on a more soundly Christian basis.

If, then, our civilisation must be reoriented in all of its aspects along Christian lines, we must seek guidance from every possible source. I am not suggesting that we take Milton as a substitute for Holy Writ. Neither do I mean that we should accept all of his dogma and each of his details. I do suggest that we must turn for strength and guidance to those who have lived and worked before us. There are few figures in human history whose stature is great enough to give us either guidance or strength. In that small company of the great, John Milton holds a high and honourable place.

ROLAND MUSHAT FRYE.

Art. 9.—THE NATURE CONSERVANCY AND NATURE RESERVES.

'No one who visited Fallodon,' wrote Seton Gordon, in his brief 'Edward Grey of Fallodon and His Birds' ('Country Life,' 1937), 'failed to be impressed by the atmosphere of the place. It was a sanctuary in the inner meaning of the word . . . and the calm and kindly presence of him who had his home here radiated goodwill, and especial goodwill towards the living creatures which had trusted themselves to his care.'

I was reminded of this Northumbrian sanctuary, near to the site where Saint Cuthbert fed his birds, when recently visiting the Hudson Memorial in Hyde Park. The starlings were bathing in the bird bath beneath the trio of giant limes that tower over this little London bird sanctuary. Probably these starlings were residents of the park. Or perhaps they were among the thousands who fly in from the outer suburbs each day as dusk draws near. Or again, they may have been remnants of the great flocks that often sweep in from the Continent as winter approaches.

Thanks to our increasingly enlightened attitude towards nature, it is now possible—if unlikely!—for a flock of birds to leave a Danish sanctuary in the morning, spend an hour or two in some Dutch sanctuary, and move on to a Norfolk nature reserve before eventually arriving at the Hudson Memorial in Hyde Park.

A flight of this kind may seem wildly improbable, but it is increasingly likely to occur now that the Government have established the new Nature Conservancy with powers to open more sanctuaries for wild life. This organisation has been formed not a month too soon. Far too many valuable reservoirs of rare and interesting plants and animals have been lost in the last few years as our cities have sprawled across the countryside, regimental hordes of conifers encroached over northern moors and southern heaths, and the service departments turned hundreds of attractive acres into training areas.

Reading the list of potential nature reserves in Britain which the Society for Promoting Nature Reserves issued as long ago as 1915, one can only mourn that we were not more prompt in founding the Nature Conservancy. Yellowstone Park in the U.S.A. was opened in 1872. The

Dominions and many continental countries have been much more punctual in their attempts to call a halt to the swift destruction of wild life, that is the inevitable sequel to man's rapid advance in the sphere of technology. Life to-day is so much easier to destroy than to preserve.

One shudders at the thought of the steady shrinking of wild life in modern Britain that would have happened without the enthusiastic few of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the Bird-Watchers and Wardens Association, and similar societies. It is only thanks to these faithful few that the kites have not dwindled to extinction in the remote valleys of Wales. Indeed, they are now advancing into Devon. The bittern booms again in a score of counties where it has not been heard for half a century. The avocets have returned, and the marsh and Montague harriers fare far better than seemed possible only a few years ago.

Not that we can afford to be complacent. The great bustard may be extinct in Britain, but not the human egg-collector. The polecat and pinemarten have retreated to remote haunts in the north and west, but the 'man with a gun' still flourishes. There are too many tourists who over-pick—roots and all—the attractive marsh gentians (*Gentiana pneumonanthe*) on the commons beside my home.

Not that all the destruction is deliberate. Can we blame ratepayers who clamour for more and more and yet more water and sadly reduce water-tables just as they flood fertile valleys? Can we altogether blame the War Office when their training ground for tank crews happens to be the nesting site of rare birds? Even the Ministry of Town and Country Planning are not always blind to the facts when claiming the rich farmland or the habitats of interesting species for their 'new towns to starve in.'

Clearly the Nature Conservancy should be consulted before further attempts are made to grab land for these purposes good and bad. It is all too easy for Government departments and Local Authorities to grow self-centred. Too many recent decisions on land use have been made without full weight being given to the complex biological factors involved.

Not the least important function of the Nature Conservancy and the state Biological Service which it is form-

ing, is to provide authoritative advice on the thousand and one problems which spring from the vexed questions of land use.

Biologists in the years since the First World War have learned much about the interdependence of plants and animals. On the other hand, too much must not be expected of the experts employed by the Nature Conservancy. The biologist can warn about the disastrous consequences likely to arise from the wrong use of the land. He cannot always answer questions with a plain 'Yes' or 'No.' There are many problems which lack any quick and easy solution.

Take, for example, the vexed question of the rook. What of the ruthless war on these birds waged by some authorities? Some facts are clear, thanks to the well-planned survey carried out by the British Trust for Ornithology. We know that our 3,000,000 rooks spend roughly half their time feeding on open grassland. They are said to destroy some 7,000 tons of wire worm and similar pests each year. Their consumption of corn is put at 26,000 tons a year. If there were no rooks, would the wire worm destroy more corn than the rooks?

He is a brave man and a very unwise one—and probably a most ignorant bird-watcher—who dares to answer this question with a plain 'Yes' or 'No.' Does economic ornithology exist, asked P. H. T. Hartley in a valuable paper published last year? We cannot commend, he insists. We are not yet in a position to condemn. Naturalists should be grateful for these home-truths from Mr Hartley. Over vast spheres of the important science of ecology, the student can never forget that every good scientist is seldom afraid of the virtues of the open-mind. It is only the little man—and the dangerous one—who is terrified of saying 'I don't know.'

Some of the same problems that occur in any consideration of the national use of our all too limited land surface arise also in the management of each nature reserve. It has often been supposed that a neat notice board warning the public to keep away was all that was needed for the formation of a rich reservoir of rare plants or animals.

Yet the neglected reserve may prove a fine breeding ground for pests, as the special Committee on Wild Life Conservation pointed out in their excellent Report (1947).

Nor are the problems of maintaining the natural order in an area set aside for the protection of a particular species any easier. If a southern heath on which the rare Dartford warbler breeds is made into a nature reserve, the qualified wardens in command of the area may have to intervene and protect the birds from competing species.

This means that a nature reserve for the Dartford warbler may have to be made into a death-trap on a vast scale for rats, grey squirrels, and even marauding sparrow hawks. Nor does the problem end there. If the public are denied regular access to the southern heath where the Dartford warbler breeds, there will be few of the dreaded fires which have done so much to damage the status of this bird of the commons. At first sight this may seem a pure advantage. Yet in the absence of the fires over a number of years, there will be an advance of the gorse (*Ulex europaeus*). This in turn will offer protection to seedlings of silver birch (*Betula pendula*). These young trees will shelter the scots pine (*Pinus sylvestris*). Before long oak trees (*Quercus robur*) will establish themselves where there was once only gorse, heather, coarse marsh grass, and bracken.

It is then only a matter of time before the common becomes a wood. And with this enormous change in its habitat, the Dartford warbler will disappear.

Similar changes are likely to occur in the neglected fen where the reeds and osiers soon close about the neglected expanse of water. In time the willows (*Salix*) and alders (*Alnus*) establish themselves there. Again, it is the oak which may eventually take command and dominate what was once open fen.

Already much the same sequence of events is occurring on parts of the South Downs. These Downs, wrote Arthur Young, 'carry 280,000 sheep in summer and 220,000 in winter.' Driving along this same route a few weeks ago I found no more than fifty sheep grazing on the green, springy turf. Shepherds are scarce and expensive. Dairy herds are more profitable than sheep. The sequel is seen in the hawthorn and juniper scrub advancing over turf once close-cropped by the thousands of Southdown sheep. And with this change in the ecology of the area, it becomes increasingly difficult for certain plants to thrive on land where they have flourished for centuries.

In every Nature Reserve it will be necessary for much of the area to be mown fairly frequently at the discretion of competent wardens. This has long been the practice at Wicken Fen where so much valuable ecological research has been carried out. A certain portion of this Reserve, on the other hand, has been allowed to develop unhindered, thereby providing excellent opportunities for expert study of the natural succession.

This should be the policy in many reserves if our understanding of ecology is to advance. There is need for more careful and detailed research if we are to solve the thousand and one problems facing the farmer and forester, landowner and naturalist. The distinguished group of experts led by Professor A. G. Tansley, F.R.S.—to whom every student of ecology owes so much—who form the new Nature Conservancy, are not finding their task easy. They are explorers in a sphere where few men have travelled.

Some lessons have been learned in the past. We now know enough of the grey squirrel and its wicked ways to realise that never again must a foreign species be introduced into Britain without a special licence issued only after the experts have carefully considered the consequences likely to arise from the animal's appearance here. We do not yet know the answers to a whole host of other questions.

Is the magpie the enemy of small birds that some observers make him out to be? What is the influence of our birds on the caterpillar problem? What will be the effect on nature of the new machine farming and the uprooting of trees and hedges? How can the grey squirrel be exterminated? What of the rat and its future? Should reindeer be brought to the Highlands? Are the new coniferous forests certain to destroy the fertility of the soil? And what of their influence on wild life? How long should be the list of protected species in Britain?

These are only a few of the questions which must be answered in the coming years by the state Biological Service.

It may well be the duty of the Nature Conservancy to re-create certain habitats that man has destroyed in recent years. Fortunately, a glance at the list of seventy-three sites now being surveyed by the Nature Conservancy with a view to their adoption as Nature Reserves, reveals how

rich even now is our heritage of wild life. Skokholm, the Farne Isles, Wicken Fen, and Hickling Broad are already well known for their birds. Other sites deserving of fame are the yew wood at Kingsley Vale on the South Downs, Branton Burrows, Epping Forest, Alderley Edge, Hawes Water, and a vast host of other sites not less important.

Some of these may be made into Experimental Reserves on the lines recommended in the various reports on the conservation of wild life issued in recent years. Here, scientists could put to the test many theories now accepted—or rejected—on evidence that is not always convincing.

Other reserves may include Educational Plots where students from schools and universities may carry out the systematic study of ecology. One would like to see more Education Committees agreeing to the suggestion for special Childrens' Reserves on the lines of school gardens. Too much nature study in the classroom is still dull and unimaginative. In launching schemes of this kind, Local Authorities would be able to call upon expert advice from the Biological Service.

Developments along these lines may gradually produce a new general awareness of the importance and beauty of our wild life. The day is approaching when the nation may contain many 'sanctuaries in the inner meaning of the word,' where 'goodwill is radiated towards the living creatures' which trust themselves to the care of competent wardens.

Perhaps one may even look forward to the day when public opinion is so civilised in its attitude to nature that the whole country seems not unlike a vast nature reserve. If that happens, the true nature reserves will be 'special Holy Places' for the protection of rare species and unusual habitats.

Is this a mere dream? Perhaps it is. Yet would not our Victorian naturalists regard as fantastic a world where ruthless shooting and egg-collecting are generally frowned upon? Would they not have been astounded at a British Government spending 100,000*l.* in a single year on the preservation of wild life? In some spheres, at least, we have advanced far in the last fifty years. Who knows how far public opinion may move during the next half century?

GARTH CHRISTIAN.

Art. 10.—HEREDITY.

L'affaire Lyenko has brought into the limelight the whole issues of heredity. These are of the greatest importance: yet the layman is puzzled by the varying accounts given by scientists. Indeed the latter, perhaps as a result of being so extremely specialised, contradict themselves. This being the situation, is it too presumptuous if a layman tries to put pieces of the jig-saw puzzle together?

The ancient Greeks, having minds less full of the conventions of science than ours are, saw that there is a problem in connection with seed. If the acorn were a tiny oak, with trunk, roots, branches, leaves, etc., growth would be simply increase in size. But seed is not like that. It unfolds (indeed, the original meaning of 'evolution' referred to unfolding). It is fairly evident that Plato's doctrine of Ideas was largely based on the fact that there is a plan of an oak for an acorn and that Aristotle's doctrine of the entelechy was based on the fact that there is a plan of an oak *in* an acorn. In the fifth century B.C., growth was sought to be accounted for by the doctrine of *Phusis*, 'growth' or 'the process of growth.' Dr Gilbert Murray has translated it as 'evolution.' 'It is phusis,' he wrote, 'which gradually shapes or tries to shape every living thing into a more perfect form. It shapes the acorn, by infinite and exact gradations, into the oak, the blind puppy into the good hunting dog, the savage tribe into the civilised city. Phusis is shaping each thing towards the fulfilment of its function—that is, towards the good.'* It was the idea of phusis that passed into Stoicism and thence into Christianity as 'Providence' and then, at the Renaissance, into modern thought as 'Nature,' so that, for example, Charles Lamb wrote, 'Nature conducts every creature by instinct to its best end.'

But, perspicacious as the fifth century Greeks were, they failed to notice that they were confusing two different phenomena. Modern science recognises that, as seed unfolds, there is some sort of recapitulation of the development of, for example, the oak, but in the development of the puppy into the good hunting dog or the savage tribe into the civilised nation, there are other factors. So we

* 'The Stoic Philosophy,' p. 25.

must limit our attention to the reproduction of the adult in the offspring. To account for this, Empedocles put forward the theory of pangenesis—that every part of an organism produces tiny reproductions of itself and that a complete set of these comes together in each seed. (Curiously enough, this theory was also put forward by Charles Darwin.)

For some time there has been a convention among scientists of which the following is a recent and authoritative exposition :

‘Scientific history conclusively demonstrates that the progress of knowledge rigidly requires that no non-physical postulate ever be admitted in connection with the study of physical phenomena.’ *

So, until recently, geneticists have narrowed their attention to the chromosomes as the sole channel of heredity. The ovum is barely visible to the eye and the spermatozoon is visible only with high magnification. Within the germ cell is a nucleus. Within the nucleus of a germ-cell about to divide occur the chromosomes. They are of definite and constant number for each species, 16 in the guinea-pig, 24 in the mouse, 48 in the hedgehog and also the human being. There are 48 in the cell from the father and 48 in the cell from the mother. In the ovum, half of them are absorbed by the mother : half remain to be supplemented from the spermatozoon. In the spermatozoon, half of the chromosomes are absorbed by the father : half remain to be supplemented from the ovum. But, whilst in the ovum one pair of chromosomes carry the genes of sex and in the spermatozoon one pair of chromosomes carry the genes of sex, in the female they are both x-chromosomes, in the male x and y. When the x-chromosome of the male pairs with an x-chromosome of the female, the result is an individual with two x-chromosomes, a female. When the y-chromosome of the male pairs with an x-chromosome of the female, the result is a male.

Characters which appear in the ‘ontogeny’ (i.e. the development of a being from its beginning up to adult life) of the ancestry tend to reappear in the ontogeny of descendants at corresponding stages or earlier or later, and this is due to the transmission of internal factors from ancestry to

* G. C. Simpson, ‘Tempo and Mode in Evolution.’

descendants.* All living things commonly observable by us begin their individual lives as tiny protoplasmic cells. For example, a frog does. Why does the frog egg become a tadpole? Because once upon a time there were no frogs; all the ancestors of frogs at that time were tadpoles. *Every living thing recapitulates its ancestral history in its development* (although not necessarily, as we have just seen, in chronological order). The human embryo has gill-slits for a time. For a time it is covered with hair and has a tail. Even when the baby is born, it is recapitulating a simian stage. It has grasping power out of all proportion to its human development. The young child is still a quadruped like a monkey. It has feeble, short, crooked legs, and so it strongly resembles in its proportions one of the anthropoid apes which may be regarded as one of the immediate ancestors of the human race: it has to relearn the upright position. The simian resemblance persists in the toddler who has learnt to walk. With curved thighs, weak ankles, and soles that turn inward, the little one resembles in its gait the gibbon. It is the arboreal foot-poise that leads children to make holes in the outer sides of the soles of their shoes. It only later recapitulates the plantigrade foot; indeed, it is only in late childhood that the long leg characteristic of the human being is developed.

Heredity, according to the authorities, is partly 'dominant' and partly 'recessive,' i.e. certain aggregations of inherited characters come out and the rest are latent. Thus, every male, although dominantly male, is recessively female, and every female, although dominantly female, is recessively male. So, although the vast majority of both sexes conform to their respective norms, nevertheless at one end of the queue of men is the 'he-man' or 'cave-man,' and at the other the type that is derisively called the 'pansy'; at one end of the queue of women is the masculine type of woman and at the other the ultra-feminine woman. It may be that the son of a farmer cannot be happy unless he goes to sea: he is a throw-back to a seafaring ancestor. The son of a poet is not necessarily a poet: he may, dominantly, take after some other strain in the ancestry of either parent. Some inherited traits may be associated with one sex in one generation and with the other sex in the next.

* G. R. de Beer, 'Embryos and Ancestors,' pp. 90 and 97.

Weismann taught that 'acquired characters are not inherited.' But in his teaching he produced unclear ideas and flat contradiction. He sought to establish the dictum by cutting tails off mice and pointing to the fact that their offspring were born with tails. But here is a monstrous begging of the question. What is meant by 'acquired'? If we say that a person acquired a box on the ear, we are joking: but here is a famous scientist using the word 'acquired' and the phrase 'acquired character' *assuming* that characters are acquired without volition on the part of the being concerned and therefore that a character and a mutilation are the same thing. Moreover, does 'acquired' mean acquired in one generation? If so, it is not to be expected that a character acquired in one generation would be visible in the next. If, on the other hand, 'acquired' means acquired over a number of generations, then the dictum is manifestly untrue and contradicts evolution.* The truth is that a character acquired in one generation may not be visible or dominant in the next, but it can be recessive, and if subsequent generations build on this foundation, the character can in course of time become dominant.

Till recently, as we have said, most biologists have concentrated on the chromosomes as the vehicle of heredity. But the other day Dr Julian Huxley told us:

'Western genetics has just reached the exceedingly far-reaching conclusion that "heredity" is the property of particles involving certain combinations of protein and nucleic acid, whether lodged in the chromosomes or not. . . . In passing, it is because Mendelism (which deals with the distribution and behaviour of genes lodged in the chromosomes) turns out to be only one aspect, albeit the most important, of genetical science, that I have used the term "Western genetics" instead of "neo-Mendelian genetics." '†

Does this not savour of a retreating action? Where are we getting to? If now heredity is passed on by vague entities like 'particles involving certain combinations of protein and nucleic acid, whether lodged in the chromosomes or not,' are we not clinging blindly to the dogma that the means of heredity *must* be physical?

* We have never been told how the genes acquired the characters that are admittedly inherited.

† 'Spectator,' Nov. 11, 1949.

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May I respectfully submit that recent biologists have suffered from an exaggerated reaction? In the Deistic period the habit developed of discovering teleology everywhere. An all-wise Providence had contrived:

'Why has not man a microscopic eye?

For this plain reason, man is not a fly.'

Scientists developed a reaction against this sort of thing so strong that their eyes are now tightly shut against the teleology which, although not divine nor human, is indubitably there, as was seen by the ancient Greeks. It was also seen by the modern poet, D. H. Lawrence:

'Oh the great mystery and fascination of the unseen shaping,
The power of the melting, fusing Force—heat, light, all in one,
Everything great and mysterious in one, swelling and shaping
the dream in the flesh

As it swells and shapes a bud into blossom.'*

Professor A. C. Hardy, Linacre Professor of Zoology at Oxford, recently wrote:

'Whether there is any purpose in the lower organisms, biology cannot say—any more than it can say whether or not animals are conscious. About two at least of the attributes of life as we ourselves experience it—consciousness and sense of purpose—biology can say absolutely nothing.'

Yet Jennings wrote, 'If Amoeba were the size of a dog, no one would think of denying to its actions the name of intelligence.' Samuel Butler admitted that there is such a thing as jumping to conclusions but submitted that there is such a thing as jumping away from conclusions. We can see that Simpson, quoted above, is right—that modern biology deliberately excludes the non-physical from its work. But that does not prove that the non-physical does not exist. In fact, we know that it does, and it may be that biology will find it impossible to make sense of many physical phenomena without taking into consideration the cooperation of the non-physical.

Let us go back to the fact of physical recapitulation. Samuel Butler pointed out that memory works by recapitulation. If you learn a list of dates by heart, you begin at the beginning, run through an arbitrarily selected number,

* 'Amores.'

return to the beginning, run through approximately the same number again, and keep on repeating this lot until you can remember them. Then you return to the beginning, run through the memorised lot quickly, and add some more dates. Then you return to the beginning, and repeat. The process is cumulative, and as it goes on, *the early, most often repeated, part of the series contracts in memory, is only recapitulated, becomes automatic and less conscious in recall.* You become conscious as you approach the new items in the series.

Consider now a more complicated series of actions committed to memory. If one is learning to play the piano, one is at first conscious of how one sits, how one holds the arms and places the fingers and of the marks on the paper in front of one. If one 'practises,' i.e. repeats, as described above, in the course of time it is possible for a pianist to become so proficient that he can perform a most complicated piece of music and at the same time conduct a conversation over his shoulder. Vast numbers of actions that were originally conscious have become unconscious and subconscious and the mind is set free to use its conscious powers in what is called 'interpretation,' i.e. carefully selected timing and the like, to bring out the finer experiences embodied in the music.

Returning to the list of dates, we see that memory works by starting at the beginning of the series. The first stretch is recapitulated with the greatest rapidity and unconsciousness; the next stretch with less rapidity and unconsciousness; it slows down as it comes to the new; but there is established a norm of recapitulation.

In physical recapitulation, the first stretch of the ancestral history is recapitulated with the greatest rapidity; recapitulation slows down; the norm of recapitulation in the womb takes about nine months; and the child develops conscious memory only from about the age of two or later.

Butler pointed out that there is an analogy between physical recapitulation and memory which is absolutely exact. If we consider functionings acquired early in our ancestry, e.g. the circulation of the blood, we see that they are now unconscious and are not within conscious control. Functionings acquired later in our ancestry but not biologically recent, such as breathing, are now normally unconscious or subconscious but by attending to them we

can become conscious of them and can control them within limits. Functionings acquired in recent, human, history, e.g. speech, are always performed consciously and are (joking apart) within conscious control.

The fact is that there is a mental side to physical recapitulation, that mind is inherited as well as body. In 1870 Hering wrote :

'Theories concerning the development of individual consciousness which deny heredity or the power of transmission and insist upon an entirely fresh start for every human mind, as though the infinite number of generations that have gone before us might as well have never lived for all the effect they have had upon ourselves—such theories will contradict the facts of our daily experience at every touch and turn.'

Dr Julian Huxley wrote, only a few years ago, 'The generally accepted view is that all life has a mental as well as a material aspect'*. As the body develops physically, there is recapitulation of ancestral experience. From the time when offspring were retained by parents, offspring in each generation has depended on the mother. It is most important psychologically whether this condition is adequately fulfilled. The baby subconsciously expects to be supplied with what it needs, not only physically but also emotionally. The simian psychology lies at the base of post-natal life : when the mother says that her child is a little monkey, she is speaking more truly than she knows. The baby is highly sensitive, emotional, passionate : it tries to express itself with all its body at once : it is curious : it likes to experiment. The young child likes to imitate. Hering in 1870 pointed out that inherited memory makes possible the quickened learning of speech. Mr Guy Boas, writing from Sloane School, Chelsea, to 'The Times' of Jan. 5, 1950, said, 'English for English boys and girls is atavistic. The instinct to speak English is already there.' The recapitulation for the development of sex is also shown not only in the organs but psychologically. Thus, for the development of the psychological and affective qualities suitable for maternity, there are high sensibility, tenderness, spirit of self-sacrifice, subtle intuition in practical matters, conservative tendency—on the

* 'The Listener,' Dec. 10, 1942.

instinctive level. With the usual exceptions, the girl tends to be more timorous, the boy more venturesome. Children of six or seven like to play at hunting or fighting. The child recapitulates the life of adventure in the open air and loves stories of pirates, highwaymen, bushrangers, back-woodsmen, sailors, and so on. 'Penny dreadfuls' are attractive for similar reasons. Children of seven to nine are said to be fond of competing. Boys between 11 and 15 tend to form gangs, to be cruel, to take up an attitude or superiority to, to be exclusive of, girls. 'All those who deal with the young adolescent boy of 13-16 know that he does not want to spend his leisure in the company of girls: he is a boisterous young human at this age whose love of adventurous activity is at once a means for developing his physique and his means of self-expression.'* Girls too at this stage tend to segregate. This is a reproduction of the early segregation of the tribe into male and female groups. Both boys and girls at this stage tend to cooperative play. But there is a time-lag between the sexes. Girls are precocious compared with boys and those of the age of 13-16 seek companionship with the other sex.†

There is recapitulated the development of the use of the hands with all that that implies. There is recapitulated the differentiation of the woman looking after the home and children and men going out to outside work and more varied experience. Because men specialised the right hand in use of weapon and tool whilst women's right hands were often occupied and they had to use the left hand for a greater variety of functions than men did, left-handedness is more common among women than among men: women button their coats from the left, men from the right.

Mr Harold Nicolson has written:

'Scandinavians, Germans or Americans who at a distance seem indistinguishable from Englishmen, can be recognised as foreign owing to some almost indefinable difference in the modelling of muscles below the eyes, the nostrils and the mouth: these subtle differences are not wholly due to climate or diet, but must come from different habits of life or different processes of imitation: they must be due to altered states of

* Mr Basil Henriques, 'The Times,' March 31, 1947.

† 'It is extremely difficult to attract girls of this age to a single sex girls' club. The tendency to-day is to sap the virility of the nation by encouraging a boy of this age to join a mixed club.'—*loc. cit.*

mind and must, as such, be largely psychological. The actual cast of features does not change with the passage of centuries.*

That there is hereditary memory extending to most minute details is a fact of experience. Mr Harold Nicolson, again, has written :

'How comes it that the Hapsburg lip should assert itself through all manner of mixtures and permutations? Even in one's own family one can notice, in the most distant collaterals, in people even who have been born and brought up overseas, some formation of bone or eyelid which identifies them with the portraits of distant generations on the walls. Even the smallest personal gestures—the way a boy will hold a book, or adjust his muffler to his neck, or hand the pepper-pot—will suddenly recall to the older generation the movements of a grandfather who has been long dead. In the voices of children we often catch again *l'inflexion des voix chères qui se sont tues*. And in the habits of one's relations one can recognise age'n and again those quirks of impulse and diffidence, those odd divergencies of conduct, with which one is all too familiar in oneself and which one can recognise in the careers or writings of one's forebears.' †

In growing up, children repeat not only their ancestral adult history but also ancestry-long experience of growing up and subconsciously expect the kind of treatment received in the ancestral ontogeny. No more than the acorn is a miniature oak is the child an adult *in petto*. Therefore to treat it as such, to rely on 'reasoning,' 'moral suasion,' 'self-expression,' and the like is to throw on the recapitulating being a burden unsuited to its stage of development. Thus, corporal punishment can be more suited to it than the modern ones. That some adults find pleasure in inflicting it does not condemn it: the fact that people find pleasure in the act of procreation does not condemn procreation. Of the harder methods of earlier times Havelock Ellis wrote that they were 'a wise measure of training which the softness of civilisation has allowed to drop: for the ability to suffer hardness is an essential condition to all real manhood.' ‡ It has been established that, owing to recapitulation, large numbers of young

* 'Spectator,' March 3, 1950.

† *Ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1947.

‡ A swimming club in the town in which I live, run with recognition of this fact, is an exemplary success.

people have an instinctive need to be doing *real* work—which is being frustrated by our educational set-up.* Later in the recapitulation boys leave off their exclusiveness of girls, become interested in them, try to be attractive to them, paying attention to their own appearance. Recapitulation continues: there is historic connection between the 'romantic' Middle Ages and the 'romance' of love.

In recapitulation it is important that the phases should pass in due course. Fixations are highly dangerous.

We have recalled that Jennings said that if Amoeba were the size of a dog, no one would dream of denying intelligence to it. The experiment has been made of feeding to Amoeba grains of chalk. The Amoeba made repeated attempts to assimilate the chalk grains and then desisted permanently, obviously having *learnt*. Mr Aldous Huxley has drawn attention to what he has called 'physiological intelligence.' All cells have intelligence and memory and in organisms the intelligence and memory are organised and, although subconscious to the conscious mind, capable of cooperating with efforts of the conscious mind. 'The brain, the resultant centre of converging forces from each living body particle, is peculiarly responsive to those centres where is concentrated the physical will of the organism to exist eternally in its reproductions.' A woman has said of the coitus, 'Every cell in me was buzzing with life.'† There is thus available a modern version of the theory of pangenesis, only it is not necessary to assume the shedding of innumerable physical reproductions of the parts of an organism but only that memories of how the adult organism was formed are passed on.

As the mind develops in descent, the more-often-repeated recapitulations become unconscious and beyond conscious control, experiences pass into subconsciousness, leaving the conscious mind free to deal with contemporary life. Freud, Jung, and McDougall all subscribed to this. Yet the conscious mind is organically connected to the subconscious and the unconscious. We cannot live satisfactorily in the top storey entirely: we must from time to time descend to the lower levels we inherit: just as in a

* For evidence see my article, 'Real Education,' in 'The Quarterly Review,' October 1946.

† Quoted in Schwarz, 'The Psychology of Sex,' p. 144.

house with its various levels and offices the problem is to achieve as harmonious a use of the whole as possible in relation to the highest use.

Man has shame in incongruities between the retained and indispensable structures and functionings of primitive life and higher strata of his experience. Stevenson confessed, 'The prim, obliterated face of life and the broad, bawdy and orgiastic—or maenadic—foundations form a spectacle to which no habit reconciles me.' There are the primitive instincts of self-preservation at any cost, to power, selfishness and so on. Then there are defecation, urination, the juxtaposition of the sex organs to the organs of these functionings,* hair on the body, sweat, parts of the body that are unaesthetic.†

Incongruity between primitive urges and the higher developments of man is what is meant by 'sin,' which has occupied so much thought, and which has conjured up the figures of devils and the idea of temptation. It has of course been connected especially with sex. The progress of life involves ever-increasing inhibitions and separations. Butler pointed out the pleasure that comes from the relaxation of these. But it is not right to regard indulgence in sex experience as merely negative. Procreation goes back to the very cell, the finding of the kinship of life, of its unity. So there is intense pleasure in

'sinking back into the warm, lustful depth of life, of which we know nothing, disarming ourselves of will, disavowing morality, having faith in that vast, irrepressible unknown: we are a living part of it: it is our home. Humanity wanders in a wilderness, but there are moments of coming home, when the heart's defiance melts and is lost in a perfect satisfaction. Non-intellectual and unselfconscious being: it is into this that we merge ourselves: pure and utterly consummate being, unintellectual because it includes a vast ocean, complete and all-satisfying.'‡

It is not only in Russia that scientists have been deflected by social ideology. Before this happened in

* Augustine wrote, '*Intra faeces et urinam nascimur.*' This is part explanation of sex asceticism.

† Shaw has said that functions developed before speech was invented should be dealt with in silence.

‡ Margaret Kornitzer, '*The Modern Woman and Herself*,' pp. 194-95.

England, Doncaster, in his 'Heredity,' published by the Cambridge University Press, wrote :

'Not only bodily characters, but also those of the mind are essentially determined by the hereditary endowment received from the parents. . . . The inherent characteristics are all-important, and the effect of environment is not much more than to give them opportunity to develop. This is perhaps most impressively seen in the case of "identical twins." There is reason to believe that such twins are produced by the division of one ovum, and even if exposed to different conditions they remain throughout life much more like than ordinary brothers who may be brought up under precisely similar surroundings.' *

But in recent years scientists, like Dr Julian Huxley, have been discounting race, nationality (with its heredity in the making), family, and favouring legislation based on the importance of environment as against heredity.

The Christian doctrine of heredity, endorsed by Augustine, was that the soul passed on from father to son. Consequently, the soul acquired characters peculiar to the particular descent, in quality good, bad, and indifferent. Therefore people were not born equal but very different and inherited not only goodness but also sin. It was Locke's doctrine that there are no innate ideas that carried with it the implication that all are born equal, that heredity is of little importance and that environment is all-important, with consequences so very far-reaching. The time has come to see that Locke was wrong and the psychological basis of equality has gone. With it has gone the validation of a vast amount of social and educational change. There comes back the validation of the hereditary principle. Owing to the caste system in India, Brahmins are born with abnormal memories and children with abnormal endowment in mathematics, some peoples are born fighters and hereditary craftsmen have amazing skills. In government it becomes a question whether, as Mr Shaw has argued, we all do not exist on the hereditary principle and that therefore a hereditary Chamber is not more representative than a House of Commons elected on the party ticket.

R. F. RATTRAY.

* Pp. 49, 30-31.

Art. 11.—REFLECTIONS ON THE BUDGET.

ONE must admire the political skill of a Chancellor who can keep a whole nation arguing about 72l. millions on petrol, while he slips through 3,928l. millions, mostly Socialism, almost unnoticed. Sir Stafford Cripps himself should be more thoroughly discussed and the quality of his philosophical integrity examined more closely than has yet been done. In particular his habit of parading, what he calls, 'the Christian point of view' should not be allowed immunity from challenge. To claim divine authority for highly controversial views is hardly up to the proper level for a Bencher of the Middle Temple.

I do my best to visualise what is in Sir Stafford's mind, but I cannot see, in the nation of Christian paupers at which he seems to be aiming, the moral or physical stamina which will keep that nation alive. Sir Stafford would be in better taste if he were to respect the old tradition of Cabinet solidarity, and fall into line with many of his colleagues, who seem at times to ignore altogether the existence of Christianity or, for that matter, of any god at all.

Some of his recent actions have been definitely questionable. Having on several occasions sworn that he would never devalue, he went to Broadcasting House last September and said two dollars eighty would have to do for 4.03. He explained to the housewives that the only effect would be a penny on the loaf, and that he would not tolerate—tolerate—any increases in costs, or prices, by businessmen who might try to take advantage of the situation.

I felt it my duty to question the Chancellor's good faith on that occasion; and now note with interest how he went back to the microphone on Budget night and, without any attempt at apology or explanation, said that we had not yet experienced the full effect of the rise in prices which must follow the devaluation of the pound. He then proceeded to tell us he was taking 72,000,000l. out of petrol and commercial vehicles, and that he saw no reason why that should have any serious effect upon the cost of transport or fares. He omitted to mention the necessity for a desperate effort to save the nationalised railways from utter bankruptcy.

From there he went on to talk of 'ceilings' on subsidies which are not to be increased and of a limit to the cost of the health services. I suggest that he is wasting his breath, and insulting our intelligence, in talking that way. Those matters are outside his control; both will increase in cost, and in due course Sir Stafford will explain the reason for it. Edmund Burke said that Warren Hastings was 'resolved to die in the last dyke of prevarication,' and a study of the speeches, in series, of Sir Stafford Cripps might appear to justify a similar rebuke.

A Budget of 4,000*l.* million is the death sentence of this nation. It cannot go on, and it is very hard to see either the way out or what the ultimate result may be. One must take the long view, backwards and forwards, to get this question into right perspective. Start only with the arrival of Mr Lloyd George, not so very long ago, who produced a People's Budget by which he claimed to cure every ill to which flesh was heir, and to provide a paradise such as had never been possible before.

Lloyd George assumed the Chancellorship when the total cost of government of all kinds—national and local—of running the Empire and keeping this country on top of the world was 3*s.* 9*d.* per week per family. The Welsh Wizard then proceeded to break every known record in extravagance and push the cost up to 7*s.* 6*d.* The present figure is 8*l.* per week per family, and if it could be brought home to the labourer that when he gets his 4*l.* 5*s.* or 4*l.* 10*s.* in wages, he is also receiving 8*l.* worth of the blessings of Government, he might take a rather different view of the matter. But however that may be, we can recognise that we are in the midst of a rampant inflation which is reaching the galloping stage; and the imminent destruction of our currency should give us cause for alarm.

An item common to all our Budgets in the last fifty years, much discussed by its immediate victims but of small importance from the electoral point of view, Death Duties, has become far more serious than before by reason of its natural reactions.

The country is littered with costly capital assets, rotting for all to see. The most obvious example is—to use the words of the estate agent—'This desirable family residence, approached by a sweeping carriage drive,' and once the ambition of every family-man in the country.

Those places, by the tens of thousands, are now derelict, and we are too much inclined to think only of the personal hardship caused by the break-up of these larger or middle-sized establishments. It is not the personal hardship, for after all, those people were a mere minority, it is the national loss which is the appalling calamity. Property functions for the benefit of all, and will never be preserved except in personal ownership.

The latest accounts show that there are only fifty men in this country who can spend 6,000*l.* a year out of their income; one in 1,000,000 of us. But that again, in talking to a shallow-minded public, fails to arouse them to indignation, because they will think of the fifty persons, and fail to appreciate the weakening of the national structure and the loss of the strong position, in which a strong nation rested upon the solid strength of the individuals who composed it.

We have now reached the stage at which Death Duties are reducing the national capital by more than they bring into the Treasury. Those who are still possessed of their past savings and have arrived at my time of life, or anywhere near it, have to consider whether it is better to leave money for most of it to be taken by the State or to enjoy the benefit of spending for their own comfort or on some purpose which they think to be wise. Thus Death Duties are working from both ends, and we are engaged, as a nation and as individuals, in the crime of spending capital as income. Progress depends upon turning income into capital, a truth still remembered in the frantic appeals of the National Savings Movement; yet the very class whose existence is due to the faithfulness with which this principle has been applied is now obliged to forswear its own foundations.

There was an argument for Death Duties applied to the reduction of debt, a mere moving of capital from one pocket to another. Had that been the practice, the patriotism and common-sense of the responsible classes would have served to maintain our capital assets; but when those assets are earmarked for wild socialistic thriftlessness, no one can be blamed for thinking it useless to facilitate such madness. For my part, I see nothing left but the printing press, and that means a revolution of a more disastrous kind than we have yet experienced.

An expenditure of four thousand millions, some of which finds its way into every pocket, has developed a momentum too powerful to be arrested by any but the most drastic measures, and I cannot find a better illustration to support that suggestion than the attitude of the middle classes towards the medical services. A pauper is a person in receipt of assistance from the public funds, and we have for too long been playing with a scheme of things in which each of us is either a pauper or a taxdodger and most of us are both.

As a young man I lived in the East End of London, surrounded by the wonderful poor, the aged poor in particular, suffering every sort of inconvenience and sometimes misery rather than be degraded with the thought of applying to the parish or receiving any sort of official help. That was the spirit on which our position was built. We have now reversed that fine attitude as may be seen by the case of many a middle-class family of five to-day. A pound a week in cocktail bars between the five of them, a pound a week on cigarettes; and yet, by failing to see the folly of grasping at something for nothing, deliberately adding 50% a year to the cost of nationalised medicine and helping to destroy our splendid medical service. Such thoughtless people present a greater threat to the British way of life than was ever offered by any Communist. Yet they are capable of understanding the situation; they can see the quality of medicine going the road of the quality of coal.

It is as plain as a pikestaff. Every one knows some member of that wonderful class of general practitioners, the family doctors, worn to the bone with clerical work, filling up forms and writing out certificates; and we can see it coming, almost before our eyes, when the G.P. will be the clerk and we shall be handed over to specialists—so-called—selected and appointed in accordance with the principles that now apply to the selection of the Governors of the B.B.C., the directors of the Bank of England, or any of the fat jobs on the many coal, electricity, gas, and other boards, but not subject to the tests of competition which have hitherto ensured a competent service. The politician with the courage to proclaim that to do that for any man which he can and ought to do for himself is economic sin is one of a very small minority.

Passing from the middle classes, there is another responsible body of citizens failing sadly to appreciate the dangers of our situation. There are nearly 200,000 elected representatives of the people on district, borough, county, and parish councils. Such is the lethargy and lack of understanding of our foundations that these good people, for the most part, are positively toadying to totalitarianism. Think of the Corporation of the City of London, the City Fathers, who in their time have set up and deposed kings, of their own volition, and right and force and power, but to-day are content to send a humble petition to some Ministry asking whether they may spend a few thousand pounds on building on one of their own bombed sites, and knuckling under when told they must not do so. These people are responsible, from their own lack of interest in our traditions and their failure to appreciate the deeper and inner meaning of local self-government, for the continuation of a temporary war-time scheme which reduced them to the status of factory hands working an automatic machine.

Consider the legislation of the last five years, years spent in trying to justify four popular slogans: 'Full employment,' Security, Fair shares, and Equality of sacrifice. A forthright, frontal attack on these fallacious notions is overdue. 'Full employment,' in plain English 'unrequited wages,' means to a large proportion of the people double money for half work, except in such special cases as dockers, builders, and council workers, where it turns out to be treble money and no questions asked about the work at all. We do not hear so much about security to-day. Sir William Beveridge has sunk into the obscurity of the gilded chamber, and the mere mention of security brings a sickly smile to the countenance of a generation living in a state of all-pervading fear, which incidentally was finally abolished by the Atlantic Charter!

Freedom, democracy, and the right to choose are wholly incompatible with such nonsense as 'Fair shares.'

It is interesting to notice that the old Socialist slogan 'Each according to his needs' is not now used, and we have come down to 'shares' of anything that can be scrounged or scraped up from anywhere on any pretext except work and value.

Lastly, 'Equality of sacrifice.' That, it may be admitted, is the only Socialist promise with the merit of

practicability. Sacrifice starts at the top and works steadily downwards, and it is important that Sir Stafford Cripps and his fellow experts in demolition should be kept in office until the bottom learns that while poverty can be shared, wealth and well-being, prosperity and progress, must, from their nature, be matters of degree.

Such are the circumstances in which the average man is content that, at the skilful bidding of the Christian Chancellor, thought and speech and paper should be lavished on a new transport imposition, amounting to 1·8 per cent. of the bill he is called upon to pay.

ERNEST BENN.

SOME RECENT BOOKS.

- English Furniture Illustrated.** Oliver Brackett and H. Clifford Smith.
- Europe in Decay.** Prof. L. B. Namier.
- Woodwork in York.** J. B. Morrell.
- The Quarterly Review Under Gifford.** Hill and Helen Chadwick Shine.
- Letters of Gustave Flaubert.** Selected and Edited by Richard Rumbold.
- The European World 1870-1945.** T. K. Derry and T. L. Jarman.
- The Marines were There.** Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart.
- Sea Warfare 1939-45.** Capt. John Creswell.
- The Noble Duke of York.** Lieutenant-Colonel A. Burne, D.S.O.
- The Liberal Awakening 1815-1830.** Elie Halévy.
- The Great Philosophers: The Western World.** E. W. F. Tomlin.
- Psychology and Mental Health.** Dr J. A. Hadfield.
- The Vatican. The Story of the Holy City.** Ann Carnahan.
- King Charles the Martyr.** Dr Esmé Wingfield-Stratford.
- Wessex.** Ralph Dutton.
- Must Night Fall?** Major Tufton Beamish.
- String Lug, the Fox.** David Stephen.
- Quaker Social History.** Dr Arnold Lloyd.
- The World of Learning 1950.** European Publications.
- The Kon-Tiki Expedition.** Thor Heyerdahl.
- The Arab of the Desert.** Colonel H. R. P. Dickson.
- Thy People, My People.** Elizabeth Hoembey.
- The Spaniards in Their History.** Ramón Menéndez Pidal.
- Among the Doctors.** Alfred Cox.
- Watercolour Drawing of Thomas Rowlandson.**

FORTUNATE is the possessor of a book like 'English Furniture Illustrated,' by Oliver Brackett, revised and edited by H. Clifford Smith, F.S.A. (Ernest Benn); and indeed it might be added that fortunate is the country which can still show in its public and private collections such outstanding examples of furniture, extending over seven centuries. The first illustration is the Coronation Chair in Westminster Abbey made in 1300, the last shows a typical mid-Victorian drawing-room with its solid mahogany and over-elaborate decoration. Mr Brackett's introduction, annotated and brought up to date by Mr Clifford Smith, gives a short survey of the periods of English furniture, from the early oak cupboards, benches, trestle tables, and strong though markedly uncomfortable and hard chairs, evolving into the luxury of velvet and damask, carved walnut, marquetry, inlay and gesso of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and thence by baroque opulence, or severe classicism to Regency and the over-decoration in quality and jungle repletion in quantity of the typical Victorian rooms.

The volume is enriched by 240 fine plates, and the

proof of Mr Clifford Smith's great diligence, skill, and experience is that he has compiled a catalogue, with fully detailed descriptions of all the pieces of furniture illustrated and of all the paintings in which furniture is shown. This has enabled him to bring in an immense amount of helpful information, gleaned over many years of distinguished service in the Victoria and Albert Museum and elsewhere. He has been very successful in some cases in tracing the whole history of pieces illustrated, including the names of their makers, like William Vile who for many years was undeservedly overlooked, and of course there is further interesting information about the famous makers like Chippendale, Sheraton and Hepplewhite, Kent and Adam.

The book usefully fills an intermediate position between the great 'Dictionary of English Furniture,' by Percy Macquoid and Ralph Edwards, and the many small handbooks of varying value and comprehensiveness. The three magnificent folio volumes of the 'Dictionary' are beyond the reach of most students, while the small size of the handbooks limits their usefulness. 'English Furniture Illustrated,' while it cannot compete with the 'Dictionary' in comprehensiveness and range of detail, can with its quarto size show more detail in its plates than the smaller books, and the information supplied about each piece should satisfy any reasonable student or collector. The volume therefore deserves a warm welcome, but surely, considering the work which Mr Clifford Smith has put into it, it would have been fairer to add his name to Mr Brackett's on the binding.

'Europe in Decay,' by Professor L. B. Namier (Macmillan), includes critical essays on many books of reminiscence and historical retrospect published during the last few years in France, Germany, Italy, and, in the case of Winston Churchill, in this country. The French books by MM. Flandin, Reynaud, Bonnet, and Baudouin are striking examples of the ungentle art of putting the blame on somebody else and, in the proverbial verity, accusing oneself by making excuses! There are some interesting sidelights on Hitler and his character, behaviour, and enormities in the German memoirs, and Ciano's Diaries throw light on Italy. There are very strong criticisms of Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and enlighten-

ing accounts of the Anglo-French-Russian negotiations of 1939 and Nazi-Soviet relations, 1939-41.

Professor Namier is so widely read and exact a scholar and student of history that his analysis of, and judgment on, these various books must be of great value to the future historian of the period. Perhaps the prevailing feeling of the present reader of this book may be that if only the writers of these foreign memoirs and histories could be put into the witness box and examined by Professor Namier most would undergo a startling process of deflation, with their facts, or perhaps interpretation of facts, their evidence, and their conclusions exposed to the cold and piercing logic of percipient and unbiassed truth.

York is famous for its architectural splendours in stone and glass, but is less known as the home of very fine work of carpenters, joiners, and carvers. '**Woodwork in York,**' by J. B. Morrell, author of '**York Monuments**' (Batsford), is therefore welcome. The work of the craftsmen through the centuries includes doors, windows, brackets, barge-boards, panelling, stairs, banisters, chimney-pieces, tables, chests, and chairs, as well as the screens, stalls, pews, reredoses, pulpits, organs, lecterns, etc., in the churches. We are given information about the craftsmen themselves, beginning with Philip of Lincoln about 1350. The book is lavishly illustrated with over 200 plates excellently reproduced, and these with Mr Morrell's introduction and chapters on the various branches of craftsmanship make an attractive and comprehensive record of interest, of course, far beyond the borders of Yorkshire, as what craftsmen were doing there they were also doing elsewhere, though in few places in such outstanding style. The book is therefore a study of the best examples of contemporary woodwork through many generations.

The '**Quarterly**' must pay a warm tribute to '**The Quarterly Review Under Gifford,**' by Hill and Helen Chadwick Shine (North Carolina University Press and Geoffrey Cumberlege, London). This work (with an all-too-kind dedication to the present editor) is the result of long, thorough, and discerning scholarship and research into the records of the Review under its first editor, from 1809 to 1824. Unfortunately the desire for strict anonymity of contributors was so strong that even in John Murray's ledgers payments were always made by numbers

and not by name. Later generations tried to fill in the gaps, on the whole with success, and Dr and Mrs Shine have carried these revelations still further, but as will be seen in this book there are still many gaps, which are not likely ever to be filled now. The authors give fourteen pages to an exceedingly interesting historical survey of the early days of the 'Q.R.' Then there are eighty-eight pages of identification of contributors, followed by a bibliography with key abbreviations and an index of contributors. It would be presuming for the 'Q.R.' now to emphasise the flattering terms in which Dr and Mrs Shine write of its early years, but it is none the less grateful. The eminence and variety of ability and experience of most of those early reviewers means that research into their work often has appeal to many students who have never had direct interest in the 'Q.R.' Dr and Mrs Shine are to be congratulated on a notable achievement.

'I detest all despotism. I am a fervent liberal. That is why Socialism strikes me as a pedagogic horror, which will be the death of all art and all morality.' Thus, with extraordinary clarity and insight, Gustave Flaubert wrote over ninety years ago. The latest French edition of Flaubert's correspondence was published between 1926 and 1933. '**Letters of Gustave Flaubert**' (Weidenfeld and Nicolson) contains 120 representative examples, selected and edited by Richard Rumbold and beautifully translated by J. M. Cohen. As might not be expected from the author of 'Madame Bovary,' 'Salambô,' and 'Education Sentimentale,' Flaubert was a great and, apparently, spontaneous letter writer. Many of his *obiter dicta* are as perfect as they are apt to-day: 'Democracy is no more man's last word than was slavery or feudalism'; 'one has only to think about oneself to fall ill'; 'the more perfect the telescope the more distant the stars'; 'extend your horizon and you will find it easier to breathe'; 'Journalism . . . is an abyss which has swallowed the strongest constitutions'; 'that master of all masters, all-wise Shakespeare'; 'a man aiming at the Academy [Française] will stop at nothing'; 'I am pretty sore with the critics. What a miserable bunch!'; 'he is weak because he did not doubt enough'; 'high Art is scientific and impersonal.' Like all real artists, Flaubert was an aristocrat, feared the bourgeois from which he sprang,

and, foreseeing its domination, had an almost pathological hatred of democracy. Suffering terribly during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 he wrote: 'Perhaps there will be a return to racial wars, and within the next century we shall see millions of men killing one another in a single action. All the East against all Europe. Such great collective enterprises as the Suez Canal may well be a kind of experimental rehearsal for monstrous conflicts beyond our conception.' Flaubert was not only the greatest novelist France has produced; he was, in a real sense, the father of the modern novel; and he was a seer as well. He wrote that last sentence in 1870. His prophecy has only twenty years to run.

'The European World 1870-1945,' by T. K. Derry, D.Phil., and T. L. Jarman, B.Litt. (Oxon), A.M. (Harvard) (Bell), is a history of the recent past designed to give an understanding of the crowded and often puzzling present. The formation of the Second Reich is a suitable starting-point and the end of the Second World War an equally suitable finish, though actually a comprehensive epilogue carries the story on to 1949. We start with a survey of Europe in 1870 and its economic basis, and pass thence to the new Germany and Bismarck's policy, the Dual Alliance and the Entente Cordiale and to pre-war Europe and its developments and crises. Thence we go to the Balkan Wars, the First World War, the development of Russia, and of growing American influence on Europe. After that come chapters on the rise of nationalism and dictators and the Second World War, and finally an epilogue summary and a useful list of dates. The whole book is written in a severely practical and factual way, not stressing any special political dogma, but giving the reader clearly and usefully the bases on which to form his own opinions. It is thus a work which will be welcome to students of modern Europe.

Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart in his 'The Marines were There' (Putnam) rightly says: 'No Corps in this or any other war ever fought in so many parts of the world on land and sea and in the air. Indeed, to-day, the Royal Marines might well be permitted to add *Per Coelum* to their motto of *Per Mare Per Terram*. No Corps of comparable size was ever called upon to carry out such a variety of different tasks in conditions which called for speed and

skill of improvisation. Both the speed and the skill were taken for granted by the authorities at home, and rarely did the Royal Marines fall short of the high standard expected of them.' It might be added that in most of the tasks the Marines were the spearhead of the attack. Sir Robert starts with a brief summary of their past history, including the First World War. All the rest of the book deals with the recent war, and it resembles a well-painted picture of a subject, now well known, with magnifying glasses fixed in front of scenes scattered over the whole canvas—and those scenes certainly not the least exciting! So good a subject has been well placed in the skilled hands of Sir Robert, who makes the story both accurate and vivid. If the whole is rather full of names of individuals of whom the general public knows but little, what matters, the book is a tribute to a very fine Corps and leaders of exploits even though not in the public eye deserve commemoration.

'*Sea Warfare 1939-45*,' by Captain John Creswell, R.N. (Longmans), can be heartily recommended to all who want to know in clear, factual, and comparatively brief form what the British and American navies did in the recent war. Captain Creswell is an acknowledged authority on naval strategy and during the war he worked in the Plans Division of the Admiralty. He has had access to all the published material of our Admiralty and of the United States Navy Board. He begins with a brief survey of naval strategy before 1939 and then goes on to tell the fine story of the war in home waters, in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Mediterranean, the South Seas, and the Arctic. He tells of the difficulties and hardships of the time when we were alone and had to cope with the ever-increasing German submarine menace to our life-lines, of disasters like the loss of the 'Prince of Wales' and the 'Repulse' and of triumphs like the sinking of the 'Bismarck,' of our gradual overcoming of the enemy submarines and of the American naval campaigns in the Pacific winning back mastery, island by island, till the mainland of Japan was reached. Captain Creswell resists the temptation of diverging into byways, however daring, like St Nazaire. He keeps to the main stream of Allied strategy, detailing, explaining, and commenting, and he does this work with eminent success.

In '*The Noble Duke of York*' (Staples Press) Lieut.-

Colonel A. Burne presents that fine soldier in a new light. Many of us have underrated him. On reading this book one must revise one's opinion. He has been condemned on insufficient evidence; and the author's good fortune and diligence in being able to sift the Windsor Archives, and to quote from letters written by Frederick to his father King George and his brother the Prince of Wales, add vivid colour to the picture of the campaigns in which he was engaged. Sir John Fortescue in his 'History of the British Army' gives a rather caustic condemnation of the Duke's capabilities but he did not have access to these letters, which add considerably to our understanding.

The campaigns of Marlborough and those of the Duke of York in Flanders and Holland have much in common, and the author brings out the points of resemblance, and shows how in each case political interference from home only served to aggravate difficulties.

In this connection there was a critical moment in the campaign of 1794 when William Windham was sent out to report, and to test the possibilities of superseding the Duke in the command, in much the same way that Lord Milner was sent out to represent the Cabinet at the critical meeting at Doullens in March 1918.

Unfortunately, however, in the earlier campaign the delegate was a man with no military knowledge and without many settled convictions. Yet it would not be fair to place all the blame for two disastrous campaigns on such interference, or on the failure of our Dutch allies, and the Duke must bear his share of it. Where, then, did he fail? In Colonel Burne's opinion he was too kind. He placed, for instance, too much reliance on Sir Ralph Abercromby—outwardly a fine soldier, but always a pessimist, and in the end a defeatist. After his first serious mistake the Duke not only failed to take steps to replace him in his command, but actually shielded him, and Abercromby remained to act as his 'evil genius' in the Helder campaign. An illuminating remark by Windham in a letter to Pitt, explains much: 'He (Duke of York) yielded more to the opinion of others than followed his own.' For many years he was Commander-in-Chief at home.

How much he did for the army and the reforms he succeeded in carrying out in spite of the difficulties in his way are strikingly emphasised in this book. He might,

indeed, have gone down to history as a very great administrator had it not been for the unfortunate influence that Mrs Clarke was supposed to have over him, and to have exercised in matters both of patronage and of promotion. Though nothing substantial was proved, the unfortunate affair was instrumental in causing the resignation of the Duke and he retired into private life. The author presents the matter in its true perspective. It was right that, in the end, the Duke should be rehabilitated and he practically died in harness at the Horse Guards. This book takes its place as a serious contribution to history, and fills a gap that has long waited to be filled.

'He had the feelings of an English gentleman,' wrote Greville of the Duke, and that may well be his epitaph.

A new edition of Monsieur Elie Halévy's '**The Liberal Awakening 1815-1830**,' being volume II of his '**History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century**' (Ernest Benn), is welcome. Few foreigners have studied our political, constitutional, and economic history with more discernment, skill, and thoroughness, and that adds even greater value to this 'outside' view, so to speak, of our past problems and achievements. It is good for us to see ourselves through other eyes. The book is divided into two parts: the first, '**The Years of Lord Castlereagh**,' deals with the disillusionment of victory, crisis and agitation, economic questions, the Six Acts, the affair of Queen Caroline, the policy of reform and foreign and domestic politics. The second part, called '**The Decomposition of the Tory Party**,' deals with Canning's policy, especially with Spain and South America, the tendency to free trade and the economic crisis of 1825, Canning's final period and death, and the premiership of Wellington, with Catholic emancipation, retrenchment, and the growing pressure for reform. Canning may be taken as the hero of this portion, but not without appreciation of his faults as well as of his greatness. Peel also rightly gets prominence. M. Halévy's careful research and scholarship are proved by the striking completeness of references to authority and a consequent forest of footnotes, most useful for the student if somewhat overpowering for the general reader.

As sometimes happens, the publishers on the dust-cover of '**The Great Philosophers: The Western World**' (Skeffington) claim more for this book than does the author

himself. Mr E. W. F. Tomlin knows quite well that the great philosophers and philosophies of the Western World cannot adequately be summarised, much less analysed and expounded, in 282 pages, even if augmented by twenty portraits. Some of these are inevitably conjectural, and that of St Augustine by 'Bolicelli,' hitherto unknown. Mr Tomlin, for example, rightly emphasises in his excellent essay on Bergson the continuing importance of Heraclitus, but is unable to give him more than one paragraph of eighteen lines. He starts with a prelude and, alternating philosophers in groups by means of interludes, finishes with a postlude. These, by their clarity and simplicity, are designed to make easy reading easier. It is, however, doubtful wisdom that aims at giving the intellectual sluggard the idea that anything in the world of thought is easy, whereas the exact opposite is the truth. In every worthwhile philosophy and religion there is a hard core that can become known only to the seeker after truth by prolonged suffering, incessant and humble labour, bitter doubts; thus entailing stern self-discipline and pure disinterestedness. If, however, the opposite belief be held Mr Tomlin ranks high as an exponent of Philosophy without Tears.

It is nearly a hundred years since Sigmund Freud was born in Vienna and nearly sixty since he published his first book. Between 1900 and 1950 psychology has continued to survive in spite of some of its prophets and practitioners. It is now beginning to enjoy something of the status of a science. Amongst English students and writers on the subject Dr J. A. Hadfield enjoys a deservedly high place, and it will be enhanced by his '**Psychology and Mental Health**' (Allen and Unwin). The basic difficulty that prevents psychology from being acknowledged and accepted as a science will always remain, and this Dr Hadfield manfully acknowledges in his first sentence: 'It is generally agreed by psychopathologists that psychoneuroses such as Hysteria, Sex Perversions, Anxiety States, Obsessions, Depression, and many Behaviour disorders are traceable in their origin to abnormal conditions in the early years of life.' But by whom, and how, are these 'early years of life' to be accurately and truthfully explored and recorded? It is evidence of maturity in this emerging science that writers of authority, such as the

author of this book, emphasise prevention of mental and emotional disorders rather than their cure. Perhaps in his aim to be comprehensive Dr Hadfield has covered over-much ground in his fifteen chapters. But anyone who wants a succinct view of psychoneurotic disorders, and their prevention and possible cure, will find this a fascinating book.

For devout Roman Catholics the Vatican is the very centre of God's Kingdom on Earth. To bigoted Protestants it is a place of mystery and sometimes suspicious intrigue, a sort of giant and sinister religious spider's web! To constitutional historians it is interesting as being the smallest free, independent state in the world. To art lovers it is the home of magnificent architecture, pictures, books, and other treasures. It is a name known to millions in every continent, but apart from pictures of St Peter's comparatively few know what the Vatican looks like and what it includes. Therefore, **'The Vatican. The Story of the Holy City,'** by Ann Carnahan, with photographs by David Seymour (Odhams), will bring pleasant enlightenment. We are told about life within its boundaries, its architectural and other fixtures, its citizens, Church and lay officials, Swiss and other Guards. We are also told about the Pope, both as he appears in public and in the privacy of his residence, and about his work there. The text is clear and informative and the illustrations striking, comprehensive, and attractive.

'I come to bury Cæsar not to praise him,' cried Mark Anthony, according to Shakespeare, and then proceeded by skilled oratory and persuasive reasoning to convince his hearers of Cæsar's great virtues and his enemies' vices. The same might be said of **'King Charles the Martyr,'** by Dr Esmé Wingfield-Stratford (Hollis and Carter). The author disclaims desire to praise and merely wishes to deal with Charles in a fair and balanced way. The result is effective, as in the case of Julius Cæsar, and the reader ends with a feeling of warm sympathy with Charles and an intense dislike of his enemies. Incidentally Dr Wingfield-Stratford shows Charles as a skilled and resourceful strategist struggling, at times with some success, in really impossible conditions of lack of man-power and war material, of which his opponents had far greater resources. The author also disposes of many of the charges of intrigue

and ill faith usually brought against Charles in his dealings with Parliament, the army, and Cromwell, and maintains that all through, though Charles might have saved himself by compromise, he resolutely upheld his principles of Church, Crown, and loyalty to friends. This is the third volume of Dr Wingfield-Stratford's trilogy on Charles, and the whole is a notable and well-reasoned and well-written work which can hold its own against the eminent Dr Gardiner and other anti-Charles historians. Cromwell, indeed, beat Charles the King, but by cutting off his head and making him Charles the Martyr, Cromwell made sure of losing the final battle, as proved by the Restoration.

Messrs Batsford have added another volume to their attractive 'Face of Britain' series. It is 'Wessex,' by Ralph Dutton, and for the purpose of this book Wessex includes Hampshire, Dorset, Wiltshire, and parts of south Berkshire and east Devon. After a preliminary short survey of pre-history and the Roman occupation (and of these periods no part of the country shows fuller or more interesting remains) the author divides his territory into four regions, and taking each in turn conducts his reader most agreeably through a geological, architectural, ecclesiastical, and more mundane descriptive tour over hill and dale, field, woodland, cliff, moor, river, country town, and village, all in an apparently haphazard but entirely successful manner. Mr Dutton, himself a Wessex man and author of excellent books on English country houses, is really an ideal guide for such a tour. He has the skill to impart enough factual information to make his work of real value, but he never overloads it, and his personal touches and impressions make the whole exceedingly human. The volume is enriched with over 120 illustrations, some in colour, and suitable maps. From Winchester and Salisbury to Toller Porcorum, from crowded Portsmouth to the windswept Dorset downs, from Lyme Regis to Inkpen, from Longleat and Wilton to humble country cottages or mouldering ruins we ramble with great content with Mr Dutton to show the way.

Many grim books have been written of late about countries under Communist and Marxist domination, but none is grimmer than Major Tufton Beamish's '**Must Night Fall?**' (Hollis and Carter). The author's moderate and unemotional style and his factual evidence and documenta-

tion make the work all the more convincing. He says, 'This book is about four countries—Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary—where Communism has provided the first historical examples of the systematic elimination by a minority party, under direct orders of a foreign Power, of all national opposition. To describe this process is my main object.' And very successfully he does describe it. The theory of Marxism is of but academic interest to him, but he does know what it means in practice—class hatred, atheism, loss of freedom, torture, and blatant injustice. The process in all four countries described has, under direction of Moscow, been carried out with ruthless efficiency. 'What honest man can deny that the fruits of Marxism are misery and murder, hatred and hypocrisy, tyranny and torture—all these things were deliberately calculated as the means by which a minority could seize and keep power and privilege—the means, no matter how foul, always justified by the end.' That is the author's conclusion, and it is convincing. This book should be widely read.

Readers who favour popular but sound natural history will find pleasure in '**String Lug, the Fox,**' by David Stephen (Lutterworth Press). It is the life story of a Lanarkshire fox and, though it may be doubtful whether even a Scottish fox could be so canny in reasoning and behaviour, yet perhaps for the sake of a good story such licence in partly humanising an animal may be permitted. At any rate the true and less romantic habits of the fox are in no way concealed, and its life being of necessity much taken up with the hunting and killing, or fighting of other animals in the wild (and incidentally in the farmyard), we are told much about the habits of rabbits, grouse, pheasants, partridges, pigeons, mice, owls, otters, etc. The publishers says of the author that he is a brilliant young naturalist and has the authentic touch of the expert who knows and loves his subject. Undoubtedly he can write well in addition to observing well and he conveys his enthusiasm to his readers. A special feature of the book are the really first-class and accurate as well as artistic illustrations by Nina Scott Langley.

'**Quaker Social History,**' by Dr Arnold Lloyd (Longmans), is an important book, and an admirable illustration of the dignity, accuracy, and high sense of civic

responsibility with which members of the Society of Friends have always conducted all their business. Covering the years 1669 to 1738 it deals mainly with the great impact the ideals of the Quakers made on our national affairs. It is salutary, if humiliating, that our vaunted social services, which many think to be new, had their foundations firmly and wisely laid by this small but influential section of the community over two hundred years ago: moreover, in some respects their measures were more truly humane, more comprehensive, and paid better dividends in health, happiness, and well-being than they do now. Quaker philosophy and practice established Christian standards in home, business, social, national and international affairs which, because they are now ignored, mean failure. Always on the side of justice and equality leavened by mercy, the Quakers advocated and practised female equality long before a Suffragette was ever heard of. In peace and war their system of poor relief was copied over the civilised world and was, and is, so economical and efficient that it might profitably be studied by politicians who crassly believe and teach that they invented it all some twenty years ago! The titles of the chapters will serve to show the scope and purpose of the work: Church Government; Individual Freedom and Group Authority; Quaker Poor Relief; Quakers and the State; Quakers and the Church of England; Quakers and Youth. Every page of this book gives light and guidance on these problems; and every one of them is as pressing, contentious, and as far from a solution as ever it was. Why? Because, unlike the Quakers, we too often tend to ignore the basic human elements and exalt the omnipotence of our social machinery. Dr Lloyd has enriched his volume with bibliographies of manuscripts and of printed sources that will make it invaluable to students, while the charm of the writing will be welcomed by the ordinary reader.

'The World of Learning 1950' is a most valuable work of reference for anyone who wants to gain information about educational, scientific, and cultural institutions throughout the world. The compilation of such a book, running to 900 large pages and covering more than 70 countries, must entail an immense amount of hard work and patience, but such a book obviously has difficulties

for a reviewer, as it cannot be discussed as literature, history, biography, art, philosophy, or travel! Yet it deserves every commendation. Where else can one find, for instance, not only full details of the famous Sorbonne in Paris but also of universities in Ecuador or public libraries in Saudi Arabia, museums in Ottawa or schools of moral and political science in Bangkok; technical or medical schools in London or schools of art and drama in Hungary. There is a vast amount of information here for all who have to study such questions, and they should feel proportionate gratitude to European Publications to whose enterprise the book is due.

It would be a gayer, braver, and an even more dangerous world if all theories could be put to practical test. This would indeed mean the survival of the fittest—among theorists as well as theories. '**The Kon-Tiki Expedition**,' by Thor Heyerdahl, translated by F. H. Lyon (Allen and Unwin), is an impressive example both of bravery and survival. Mr Heyerdahl, a Norwegian, after considerable first-hand observation in the South Sea Islands and in South America arrived at the theory that the mysterious origins of the early inhabitants of Eastern Polynesia lay in Peru. Even those who knew of, and accepted, the similarities of characteristics, folklore, and art could not believe in the possibility of the pre-Inca bearded white men of Peru migrating across some four thousand miles of Pacific Ocean. It was to show that this was possible, with methods available to a stone-age people, that Mr Heyerdahl and his five companions committed themselves to a raft of balsa logs bound together with hemp, a square sail, and a steerage oar of fifteen feet leverage. Since the winds and currents swept them, as was anticipated, outside the regular shipping routes it appears that, in spite of their wireless (the only piece of modern equipment), their survival depended only upon the accuracy of Mr Heyerdahl's deductions. This modest, undating, record of perseverance, confidence, and courage takes the breath away, but it is wonderfully invigorating—and it holds a moral that even minor theorists can put into practice with less risk.

There is little basis of theory in Col. H. R. P. Dickson's book '**The Arab of the Desert**' (Allen and Unwin) for it is a strict record of facts acquired through many years spent

among the Arabs. In future years when Mr Heyerdahl's book will be re-read for its spirit of adventure, Col. Dickson's book will be kept for its valuable store of information ; and for a traveller to Arabia (if not restricted in his luggage by weight or bulk in aeroplane or on camel) it will become a treasured vade mecum. It will guide him at all the stages, from birth to death, from falconry to pitching tents, from camel dealing to love-making, from art to etiquette, from arrival to departure, and will provide him with fables and stories for the desert camp-fire. The collection of the material, arranged methodically under subjects, was started in 1929 when the author first went to Kuwait as Political Agent ; but it covers many years of experience among the Arabs of Northern Nejd, Syria, and Iraq. The few modest autobiographical threads are sufficient to reveal a pattern of affection and respect for, and a close association with, the desert Arabs and to confirm that this record of them is indeed a labour of love.

'Thy People, My People,' by Elizabeth Hoemberg (Dent), consists of extracts of letters and diaries between 1938 and 1946 of a learned German historian and his Canadian wife—both consistent and determined anti-Nazis. In 1940 Dr Hoemberg got called up for service in the office ground staff of the *Luftwaffe*, chiefly in Paris, till he was taken prisoner by the Americans in 1945. Frau Hoemberg remained at their home near Münster with her small children, and there she experienced the flow and later ebb of German power in Europe and the horrors of British and American bombing. The letters on both sides are astonishingly frank and outspoken, for apparently the Nazi authorities cared little about censorship : the diaries are still more outspoken. Thus we get an interesting insight into the German point of view of the war from two people, one an honest and able German and the other an equally honest wife, still proud of her Canadian-British background. The theme of both is that two blacks do not make a white and to fight admittedly loathsome Nazi crimes with similar methods leads to no good. The convincing accounts of Allied, especially American, behaviour, cruelty, looting, and debauchery, and the brutality of the French towards German prisoners are really disturbing. The provocation, after all the misery caused by the Germans, was great—often too great to be resisted. Both

Dr and Frau Hoernberg try to be fair minded and reasonable, but they will not be detached and they were both war-worn. This is a valuable and at times grim and thought-provoking book.

Contemporary politicians and their journalistic satellites in this country and the U.S.A., largely because of their ignorance of history and geography, suffer from the delusion that Spain can be ignored and a United Europe 'reconstructed' without her. They should read '**The Spaniards in Their History**' (Hollis and Carter), by Ramón Menéndez Pidal, Hon.Litt.D. of Oxford and Director of that august body the Royal Spanish Academy. Dr Walter Starkie, a Corresponding Member of the Academy, ably translates the text and contributes a brilliant prefatory essay on the man and his work. One of the greatest figures of European culture, Dr Pidal is scholar, humanist, medievalist, writer and, in the true sense, poet and seer, and is now the doyen of Hispanic culture: maintaining throughout a remarkable objectivity he gives us in four condensed, beautifully written chapters the unique essence of Spain. Her greatest tragedy was, and still is, that her soul is divided and evil men, within and without, have used this fact to drive her to self-destruction—and that would be the death-rattle of Europe. Dr Pidal, and all who love the true Spain, see clearly that Spain must somehow attain wholeness and unity and in this modest volume the devoted prophet indicates the true path.

Laymen may easily be confused about the spheres of activity of the Royal Colleges of Surgeons and Physicians, the General Medical Council, and the British Medical Association—and it seems that there is also a Medical Practitioners' Union. Readers of '**Among the Doctors**,' by Alfred Cox, formerly Secretary of the B.M.A. (Christopher Johnson), will have no excuse for not knowing what that excellent institution does, and how it does it. Dr Cox shows how much-needed organization came to the medical profession and how it has developed in the last two generations—a successful development largely due to Dr Cox's own keenness and ability. There is a double interest in the book: Dr Cox's own family background and upbringing and his experiences as a general practitioner in Gateshead and the wider interest of the work of the B.M.A.

He has some good stories and reminiscences of famous doctors. He can be acid in some of his references, as in the case of Mr Aneurin Bevan (but readers of the book are unlikely to complain of that), but he shows himself to be a kind-hearted, able, energetic, and companionable man whose heart was in his work. The book is rather scrappy in places but it is interesting and informative.

'Watercolour Drawings of Thomas Rowlandson' (Watson-Guptill Publications, U.S.A., distributed in this country by Messrs Batsford) is a welcome reminder that Rowlandson is one of the minor glories of our country—and as English as our climate. The twenty beautifully produced drawings in colour and the thirty in black and white in this volume are all taken from the well-known Albert H. Wiggin collection in the Boston Public Library. As a draughtsman, caricaturist, social observer, and satirist Rowlandson was inimitable. Son of a hairdresser, he studied art in Paris and became an R.A., but remained a cockney, a 'bit of a lad,' a gambler, and died in 1827 a disappointed man. Yet a vivid sense of beauty never left him and informed his fiercest caricatures (none of which appear here). A brief appreciation of Rowlandson by Mr A. W. Heintzelman, himself a notable etcher and dry-point engraver, and Keeper of Prints in the Boston Public library, completes a worthy tribute to one aspect of the work of a lovable man and great artist.

